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Agency theory predicts that the separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations leads managers to pursue their private benefits rather than those of the 
shareholders. In order to reduce managers’ opportunistic behaviour, shareholders appoint 
non-executive directors to monitor the managers. A number of tools are employed to 
improve the supervision efficiency, among which, compensation and dismissal are the 
two most effective instruments in the corporate governance system. Nevertheless, the 
performance of the corporate governance system depends on the independence of the 
non-executive directors. In particular, if the managers have a strong influence on the 
non-executive directors, the quality of corporate governance cannot be guaranteed. 
Managerial influence can be obtained in many ways. Director networks are one of them. 
Starting with Hallock (1997), researchers in the field of corporate governance have been 
investigating whether director networks have a detrimental impact on corporate 
governance. On the other hand, director networks transmit information, which can be 
valuable to the directors themselves as well as the company. The benefits of networks 
have been well recognized by scholars in sociology and management science. In 
particular, networks can improve job market performance and diffusion of information 
and innovation, which contribute to the value of the company (Granovetter, 1973 and 
Shropshire, 2010).   
 
To sum up, director networks may be beneficial to the company in terms of information 
collection, but may also harm corporate governance. In this thesis, I make use of a variety   2
of network centrality measures to assess the efficiency of the network’s two main 
functions, namely managerial influence accumulation and information collection. I show 
that both functions play an important role in CEO compensation and turnover. 
 
The thesis begins with a review on the history of social network studies and the literature 
on director networks in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I study the relation between director 
networks and CEO compensation for a recent UK sample. This study is based on a panel 
data for most listed companies from 1996 to 2007. Random effects models are applied to 
determine whether CEO compensation is related to various centrality measures and 
control variables. I find that, if the CEO’s network is strong in terms of managerial 
influence, his pay is higher and less related to the performance of the company. When the 
company has too many connections to adjacent companies, which may lead to a busy 
board, the CEO’s compensation is likely to become excessive too. However, when the 
company’s network grants it better access to information, the CEO’s pay in that company 
is lower. These results are robust across different sample and regression specifications. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on CEO turnover and succession. A random effects probit model is 
used to identify the factors affecting CEO turnover decision. The results suggest that 
director network centrality at the level of the individual director increases the probability 
of CEO turnover; i.e., better connected CEOs switch their positions more often. Turning 
onto the succession, candidates’ director networks characterised by better information 
collection ability contribute significantly to his chance of being appointed as an external 
successor. However, a managerial-influence oriented network does not have a similar 
effect. This result suggests the importance of distant networks in job information 
diffusion in the top managerial labour market. Additionally, compared to director 
networks at the company level, networks at the individual level seem to have more 
explanatory power on the issues of CEO turnover and succession. 
 
In the last Chapter, I extend the traditional scope of director networks from current 
professional networks to past professional networks as well as social networks. I propose 
two approaches for constructing the total network which is a hybrid of networks from   3
different origins. First, the enhancement approach considers past and social networks as 
enhancements of the current professional network within the company. This approach 
generates a measure for managerial influence. Second, the supplement approach treats all 
networks equally regarding information diffusion. It is used to assess the information 
value of the network. Both approaches suggest that past and social networks significantly 
improve the network efficiency in the managerial influence accumulation and 
information collection. More specifically, first when a large proportion of current 
CEO-director connections has been enhanced by connections of other origins, the CEO 
compensation increases. Second, the company performance increases with its access to 
information, which is evaluated by the average indirect centrality measure of the 
directors’ total networks. Hence, future research should include past and social networks 
to improve the accuracy of network measures. 






A Brief History of Social Networks 






Director networks, also known as director interlocks, are networks formed by executive 
and non-executive directors sitting on corporate boards. Links in director networks are 
established when two directors are sitting on the same board
1. Likewise, at the company 
level, networks can be mapped as well. When two companies share directors they are 
connected to each other. Research on director networks emerged at the beginning of the 
20
th century, when director networks were considered as a tool to foster corporate 
collusion. In recent years, director networks’ impact on other corporate governance issues 
including executive remuneration, manager turnover, and succession and firm strategy is 
the object of academic focus.   
 
It is important to realise that a director network is a type of social network with 
individuals or companies as vertices (or nodes) and connections between them as links 
(or edges, ties). The study on director networks hinges on social network studies in 
sociology. Therefore, before we review the director network studies, it is important and 
interesting to acquire some basic knowledge about social networks. The first part of this 
                                                 
 
1 Directors can be linked via social connections as well (e.g. alumni networks and (elite) club 
memberships). The social dimension of director networks has often been overlooked in the literature.   5
chapter will be devoted to summarising the concepts, methodology, and a brief history of 




2. History of Social Network Studies 
 
The history of social networks is a history of human beings. Back in the pre-historic era, 
humans cooperated to hunt, collect food and build shelters. Such work relationships and 
the relationships generated from the bloodline were the earliest social networks. As time 
passed, groups, tribes, kingdoms, nations and societies emerged. The social network grew 
in size and increased in complexity. Relationships between individuals are not merely 
generated through cooperation in work and family membership. Religion, politics, and 
other factors link people with certain similarities. Moreover, as the scale of trade 
transaction increased, networks of buyers and sellers came into being. Nowadays, there is 
no doubt that social networks have been influential in every part of our daily life. 
Although social networks have been well known and well implemented by people of 
different races and cultures for many centuries, the academic research on social networks 
only started at the end of the 19
th century. 
The earliest studies on social networks can be traced back to the 1890s, when scholars 
documented that shared values and beliefs (Gemeinschaft) and impersonal, formal, and 
instrumental social links (Gesellschaft) can connect individuals and form groups (Tönnies, 
1887). The term “social network” was first defined by Georg Simmel in the early 20
th 
century. Many of the concepts he invented or developed are still in use today, such as 
vertex (nodes), link (connection, tie), distance and dyadic relationship, which measures to 
what extent the target individual’s connections are controlled by another individual. In 
the 1900s, more scientific analysis based on data from surveys appeared. At that time, 
most researchers focused on the prevalent networks such as kinship, marriage, 
schoolmates, and workgroup (Bott, 1957). They found that network characteristics, 
including size and density could affect the individual interactions within the network.   6
One of the well-studied topics in social networks is the social network’s role in the labour 
market. Some of the earliest evidence is provided by Myers and Shultz (1951). In a 
sample of textile workers, they found that 62% of their employment was acquired 
through social contacts. Rees and Shultz (1970) continued with this line of research and 
found that this ratio is not unique to the textile industry. Across most professions, social 
contacts are extensively used to find employment. 
In the mid to late 1900s research on social networks was extended to more topics. The 
agents in networks included not only individuals, but also communities and groups. The 
methodology developed quickly during that period as well. Many new statistical variables 
to describe the network structure were proposed. Around the 1970s and 1980s, seminal 
concepts such as the strength of weak links (Granovetter, 1973) and the six degrees of 
separation as a part of the small world experiment (Milgram, 1967) were posed. The 
centrality and power of a vertex were developed (Freeman, 1977; Bonacich, 1987). In the 
late 1990s and the beginning of this century, social scientists advanced theoretical social 
networks analysis: theories of random networks and strategic network formation were 
combined with game theory. The quick development in social network theory demands 
more empirical support. Nowadays, the study on social networks attracts more attention 
from economics and finance. Network theory and methodologies are being introduced 
into research on network industries, game theory, marketing strategy, investment analysis, 
corporate finance, and corporate governance. These multi-disciplinary approaches embed 
research questions into a more realistic setting. 
 
3. Methodology in Social Network Study: Graph Theory 
 
Early social network studies concentrated on the individuals, their surrounding (ego) 
network, or networks in a small region around the individual. Research was largely done 
by conducting surveys. Since the middle of the 1900s, more graph theoretical and 
topology concepts and methods have been introduced; the research scope extended from 
local to global, from real networks to hypothetical networks. Thanks to the developments 
in graph theory, the current social network studies are quantitative. As a matter of fact,   7
graph theory has a much longer history than social network study. Back in 1736, 
Leonhard Euler published his seminal paper on the Seven Bridges of Königsberg, which 
posed the question about how to travel all seven bridges while passing each bridge only 
once. This puzzle is regarded as the first step towards graph theory. Since then, graph 
theory has interested researchers from various backgrounds such as mathematics, physics, 
computer science and sociology
2. The study on graph theory gradually developed into a 
number of sub-fields, such as graph colouring, graph paths and network flow. One of the 
most famous problems in graph colouring is the four-colour problem on the map. This 
problem was first asked by Francis Guthrie in 1852: “Is it true that any map drawn in the 
plane may have its regions colored with four colors, in such a way that any two regions 
having a common border have different colors?” This question remained a puzzle for 
more than a century until Heinrich Heesch conceived a computer-based solution in 1969. 
Graph path is about the connections between vertices in the graph, which has many 
implications in social network studies. For example, in graph path theory, the shortest or 
geodesic path is widely studied in the fields such as computer science and sociology. In 
fact, many network centrality measures (e.g. closeness and betweenness) are defined by 
means of geodesic paths. Lastly, network flow covers studies on the diffusion of 
information or disease in the networks. For instance, disease starts from a certain person 
in the network. It will infect adjacent people and gradually spread through connection 
among people. The speed and direction of the disease spreading are largely determined 
by the structure of the network. 
 
In recent decades, graph theory has been able to explore new areas with the help of 
high-speed computing. One of these areas, which is particularly important to social 
network studies, is random network modelling. By prescribing network properties, 
researchers are able to simulate networks formation and analyse the resulting connections. 
The importance of these techniques can hardly be over-stated because in the past 
researchers could only observe the outcomes of real social network formation, which is a 
chaotic process with unlimited number of interacting factors and a high degree of 
                                                 
 
2 Interestingly, the term “graph” only emerges in 1878, introduced by Sylvester in his paper “Chemistry 
and Algebra”.   8
randomness. In such a situation, it is difficult to identify the impact of a certain factor on 
network formation. With a random network as a benchmark, we are able to contrast the 
observed network with the random network. This benchmarking helps “identify which 
elements of social structure are not the result of mere randomness but must be traced to 
other factors” (Jackson, 2008, page 9). Hence, it is now possible to systematically search 
and study the factors that are responsible for real network formation. 
 
Lastly, another term frequently used in social network discussion is topology. Topology 
is the science of studying the quantitative properties of certain objects. If the object is in 
two dimensions it is on a flat plane, or a graph. Many graph theories are topology theories 
applied to a two dimensional world. Therefore, some people refer to graph theory as 
topology on lower dimensions.   
 
 
4. Topics in Social Network Study 
 
In the previous section, we have reviewed the development in graph theory. By means of 
graph theoretical tools, the study on social network structure has advanced rapidly in the 
past few decades, generating many interesting research topics. In this section, we focus 
on some of these research topics which are closely related to the networks between 
directors on the corporate boards. 
 
4.1 Small World 
In the previous section, we have mentioned the small world experiment carried out by 
Milgram (1967) who examined the network distance between two strangers in the real 
world. It starts with an experiment of asking a subject (living in Kansas, Nebraska, 
referred to as A) to send a letter to a complete stranger (living in Massachusetts, referred 
to as Z). Only the name, profession and an approximate address of Z are given to A. A is 
supposed to pass the letter to someone he knows and who is likely to know Z (referred to 
as B). If B receives the letter from A but does not know Z, he should pass it on to 
someone he knows (C). This goes on until the letter is delivered to Z. In the end, around a   9
quarter of letters were successfully delivered to Z. An unexpected finding was about the 
number of intermediaries needed for the letter to be delivered. The median number of 
hops was five with a maximum of twelve Considering the geographic distance between A 
and Z and the fact that the letter could hardly travel on the shortest path between them, 
the average network distance between two strangers is surprisingly short. This 
phenomenon has been referred to as the “Small World” phenomenon. Later, researchers 
have discovered small world features in many different social networks, including actor 
networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and corporate director networks (for the US, see 
Davis, Yoo and Baker, 2003; for the UK, Conyon and Muldoon, 2006). In these small 
world networks, every vertex is closer to other vertices (only five hops are needed from A 
to Z) than they are perceived given the long geographic distance (Kansas to 




Another fact which is worth noting is that the small world phenomenon is not created by 
chance. In the Davis, Yoo and Baker (2003) study on historical network structures of the 
corporate elites in America, they compare the director networks of US corporate elites in 
1982, 1990 and 1999. In their sample of the largest companies, significant changes have 
taken place over the years. Namely, less than one third of the companies in 1982 sample 
remained in the sample of 1999. 5% of the directors had stayed in their positions for this 
duration and less than 2% of the links in 1982 were still valid in 1999. Despite such 
dramatic changes, the network structures, measured by distance between vertices and 
level of clustering, were virtually unchanged from 1982 to 1999. This implies that the 
small world structure of the director networks is not maintained by particular directors or 
companies, but is of a very consistent nature. 
 
4.2 Strength of Weak Ties 
Many small world networks have a structure in which vertices turn out to be highly 
clustered. One disadvantage of being in a clustered group is that most of the links are 
                                                 
 
3  In research, the average shortest distance between any two vertices and clustering coefficient of the graph 
are used to quantitatively evaluate whether a network is a small world.   10
connected to nearby, similar vertices, which makes those links somewhat redundant. The 
survey conducted by Granovetter (1973) has demonstrated the usefulness of connections 
in job searching. During interviews with 54 subjects, Granovetter recorded the details of 
the subject’s relationship with the person who had helped him to find employment. He 
used the frequency of interaction between these two people in the past half year as a 
measure for the tie’s strength. 16.7% of the sample found their job through strong 
connections, 55.7% through ties of medium strength and 27.6% through weak ties. The 
relatively high job-search efficiency of the weak ties is referred to as “the strength of the 
weak ties”. 
 
Strong ties often exist between an individual and his family members and close friends, 
but these people are likely to have similar information sources as the individual. In 
contrast, weak ties are more likely to lead to individuals with access to different 
information, which is crucial in activities such as job-searching. The story of “The 
strength of weak ties” illustrates the heterogeneity of links in the network. In other words, 
links between vertices are not as simple as 0 - 1, they can have various functions. Take 
the director network as an example: one director is hired (connected) because he has 
valuable experience and information; another director joins the board because the director 
used to be a close friend of the CEO back at the university. These two links are 
considered to be equivalent in most of the existing literature. However, they are built and 
maintained for distinctive purposes. Therefore, they affect firm value and CEO power in 
different ways. 
 
4.3 Information Sharing 
Besides job-searching, information diffusion in networks has been studied in many other 
areas. One early example is on the diffusion of hybrid corn seeds among farmers (Ryan 
and Gross, 1943). The most recent study focuses on the spread of obesity among high 
school students (Christakis and Fowler, 2007). Researchers have frequently concluded 
that the likelihood of a subject exhibiting a specific behaviour increases if other 
connected subjects have exhibited this behaviour. In the context of company level 
networks, director interlocks diffuse practices between companies (Shropshire, 2010).   11
Not surprisingly, network structures play a critical role in this context. Assume 
information is randomly generated from one vertex in the graph; it should spread along 
the links of the network until it reaches all vertices
4. Apparently, the vertices that are on 
average closer to all other vertices are more likely to receive this information earlier. 
Depending on the actual structure of the network and the nature of information, if a 
vertex is standing on the connecting bridges between two groups of vertices, its access to 
information will be remarkably better than vertices on other locations. 
 
In empirical research, it is difficult to distinguish behaviour that is a response to new 
information or just to peer pressure. Another even greater challenge in this field of 
research is endogeneity. Again, let us use director networks as an example. Companies 
with strong positions in director networks are more likely to find and implement new 
technologies earlier due to an advantage in information collection. However, one has to 
be careful because the advantageous network position may not be exogenous. Usually 
they are located in the central position because they have been successful in the business, 
which allows them to be more capable of discovering and implementing new technology 
than their competitors. Hence, the positive effect of networks is mixed with other 




5. Facts about Director Networks 
 
Before we start with the literature review on director network studies, we consider some 
real life observations concerning director networks. Some legal restrictions and codes of 
corporate governance relevant to director networks are summarised first.   
 
5.1 Clayton Act Section 8 in the US 
                                                 
 
4 To simplify our discussion, we consider a link’s properties (strength, distance) as less relevant in the 
context of information transmission. This is a strong assumption. However, considering the development of 
communication technology today, it is a much less crude assumption than in the past.   12
In order to prohibit collusion between large companies, the US government enforced the 
Clayton Act in 1914. Section 8 of the Clayton Act is specifically designed to restrict 
director interlocks. At the beginning, director interlocks were defined as two competing 
corporations sharing one or more common directors. The act has been amended six times 
since its enactment. For instance, the act was amended in 1990 to also cover all corporate 
officers who are not directors on the board. A threshold for company size is also added to 
determine which companies are affected under this act. This threshold is set by the 
Federal Trade Commission, revised annually based on the change in gross national 
product. Today, Section 8 prohibits, with certain exceptions, any person from serving as a 
director or officer of two competing corporations conditional on specific thresholds. 
Competitor corporations are covered by Section 8 if each one has capital, surplus, and 
undivided profits aggregating to more than $10,000,000, with the exception that no 
corporation is covered if the competitive sales of either corporation are less than 
$1,000,000. Note that Section 8 does not affect companies in the banking sector. 
Interlocking in the banking sector is governed by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), under “Part 348, Management official interlocks”, which has even more stringent 
rules regarding director interlocks. 
 
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
is planning to enforce a new code on good corporate governance to further discourage 
multiple directorships because serving on too many boards will decrease the time and 
energy invested in any boards. Over-interlocking eventually interferes with a director’s 
ability to discharge his responsibilities.   
 
5.2 The Code on Corporate Governance in the UK 
In the UK most corporate governance standards are maintained by the code on corporate 
governance. The UK Corporate Governance Code (known as the Combined Code before 
2010) is a set of rules provided by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) as a guide to 
good board practice. This code is based on the "comply or explain" principle. This means 
if a company chooses not to comply with one or more provisions of the code, it must 
provide careful and clear explanations for this deviation and give evidence that the   13
corporate governance goals can be achieved through other mechanisms than the ones 
prescribed. Every two years, the code is subjected to review and adjustments. Two 
important articles of the Combined Code of 2008 are reviewed below. Section A 
proposes a guideline for the appointment of independent directors. In order to judge 
whether a non-executive director is independent, several criteria are provided. A director 
is not independent if he “holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other 
directors through involvement in other companies or bodies. (A.3.1)” As for the 
executive directors, A.4.5 states: “The board should not agree to a full time executive 
director taking on more than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor 
the chairmanship of such a company (Higgs Report, 2003).” A.3.1 and A.4.5 show strong 
discouragement towards multiple directorships. Should the company insist on allowing 
this, a clear explanation is to be given to the regulation authority as well as the investors.   
 
From these elements of the regulation and codes of best practices concerning multiple 
directorships or director networks in the US and the UK, it is clear that the regulatory 
authorities are considering the director networks potentially harmful to corporate 
competition, to the independence of non-executive directors, and the efficiency and 
responsibility of executive directors. In the future, we expect regulation to put more 
restrictions on the director networks.   
 
5.3 The Networks of the Ruling Corporate Elites 
The earliest director network documented is found in the incorporation documents of 
New England textile mills in the US in 1790. A small group of wealthy businessmen 
became owners of each other’s companies. Still, these director networks cannot be 
distinguished from ownership networks. In 1845 a larger group of 80 people, known as 
the “Boston Associates”, controlled 20% of the textile industry. Seventeen of these men 
served as directors in Boston banks, 20 were directors in six insurance companies and 
eleven were directors of five railroad companies (Dalzell, 1987). During the mid and late 
19
th century, director networks, usually led by families and large owners, became 
widespread in the major industries in the US. Banks and other financial institutes were at 
the centre of this powerful director network. This situation finally led to the adoption of   14
the Clayton Act (discussed above) in the early 1900s. With Section 8 of the Clayton Act 
outlawing a large part of director connections, director networks became much weaker in 
the competitive industries and the banking sector. Another change in the economy is that 
many owners started to depart from daily management and hire professional managers to 
operate the company. As a consequence of the separation of ownership and control, the 
networks between companies in the early 1900s had become less dominated by families 
and bankers, professional managers began to sit on each other’s boards. This trend 
continued until the late 1900s. Today, financial institutions are still the most connected 
companies, but much less than ever before. The majority players in the director networks 
are professional managers. Since the end of the 20
th century, when more women and 
coloured people joined the board, the diversification of director networks has increased. 
Although authorities put more restrictions on boards, there are still many firms with large 
networks. For instance, Citigroup had in 2005 25 links to other companies through shared 
directors. Most of these firms were the biggest in their sectors, including AT&T, Ford 
Motors, PepsiCo, Time Warner and Xerox (Domhoff, 2006). It is not surprising to hear 
the claim that the American economy is controlled by a small group of corporate elites 
from these large and connected companies. 
 
The situation in the UK bears many similarities as financial companies are also the most 
connected companies in the economy. But due to differences in regulation and culture, 
the development and structure of director networks differs from the American situation.   
 
The first research documenting the UK director networks is Beesley (1951). In his Ph.D. 
thesis, he traced down the director networks existing between all companies in British 
Midland metal and metal-using industries. He found that in 1948 there existed 
connections between the largest companies which employed one third of workers in the 
industry. Beesley considered this director network as a protective device to ensure that 
individual investment decisions would not be harmful to other group members. The 
coordination mechanism was, according to Beesley, harmful as it delayed investment in   15
research and development
5. In recent years, the director networks in the UK are more 
“concise” compared to the US case. Directors usually do not have more than two 
connections with other boards. The connections between companies are often maintained 
by one common director (Santella et al., 2008). Nevertheless, Renneboog and Zhao (2010) 
still find network superstars in their UK sample: Andy Hornby was sitting on four boards. 
He was even the CEO in one of the companies. Peter Cawdron was a non-executive 
director or chairman in nine companies. Both cases occurred in 2006. Another feature of 
the British director networks is that there are connections between financial institutions 
through common directors, as this is not prohibited by the UK law.   
 
Besides the US and the UK, director networks are found in other countries too. Santella et 
al. (2008) present descriptive statistics on director networks in Germany, France, Italy, 
the UK and the US. A sample of the 40-60 largest listed companies is gathered for each 
country. They show in the first three countries a small group of directors sitting on many 
boards and they are doing much more networking than the average directors.   
 
Since the 1970s director networks in Germany have come under pressure from the 
financial press. According to Prinz (2006), an overwhelming part of the listed companies 
are connected by directors and/or financial ties. He claims that influential director 
networks diminish the motivations to compete and restructure. Similar to the US and the 
UK, authority in Germany also imposes limitations on director networks. German 
business legislation (100, 105 AktG) requires that directors can hold a maximum of five 
positions in subsidiaries. Moreover, cross-directorships are forbidden. These rules 
effectively cut the growth of director networks in Germany. Nonetheless, Heinze (2002) 
shows that although over time there is a quantitative reduction in director networks, the 
qualitative strength and structure remained stable over the period of 1989 to 2001.   
                                                 
 
5 Another early study on British director networks was done by Stigler (1968). He examined the director 
networks in four British industries (aircraft, boots and shoes, tyres and cement) and concluded that the 
number of shared directors was extraordinarily small. However, one drawback in Stigler’s study is that he 
only considers connections between the directors and companies in his sample. For instance, the director 
interlock between a bank and an aircraft company is not counted. This may explain the unusually low level 
of connectedness.   16
 
Director networks in France are different from most other countries, featured by the 
education and political backgrounds of their directors. First, they are drawn from a 
limited set of Grandes Ecoles, which makes the alumni networks extremely powerful. 
Second, a large proportion of the business elites are former civil servants, which have 
built connections through political relations. Therefore, apart from the professional 
connections, one needs to consider a director’s educational and civil service background. 
These two networks are of overwhelming importance in the French business world. ENA 
(Ecole Nationale d’Administration) and Ecole Polytechnique graduates run 20% of the 
firms, which account for around 70% of all assets traded on the Paris Stock Exchange. 
20% of the firms are run by former high-ranking bureaucrats. These firms account for 
65% of the Paris Stock Exchange in terms of assets (Kramarz and Thesmar, 2006). To 
sum up, the director networks in France are based on education and past civil service, 
rather than just professional networks.   
 
Director networks in Italy and Spain are strong too. Compared to the US, the UK and 
Germany, director networks in the southern European countries show high network 
density. In an Italian sample of 40 blue-chips in S&P-MIB 40 index, 31 companies are 
connected to each other through shared directors. One out of ten directors is sitting on 
two or more boards (Santella et al., 2008). This ratio is similar for Spain (Crespi and 
Pascual-Fuster, 2008). On average, a Spanish director serves on 1.22 boards; but some of 
the directors even sit on five boards at the same time. 
 
To conclude, director networks have a long history and remain influential in most 
developed countries today. In the rest of this literature survey, we will leaf through the 
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6. What We Know about Director Networks 
 
Director networks are formed for different reasons. According to the origins of director 
connections, we can categorise connections into two groups: those motivated by 
individual reasons and those motivated by company reasons. Individual reasons include 
the common education background, past colleagueship and mutually beneficial 
relationships. Networks set up for corporate reasons are based on the need to create 
strategic alliances and access to network resources. Director network measures can be 
calculated at the individual or company level. The benefit of a strong network at the 
individual level is improved job opportunities. In the highly mobile top managerial labour 
market, better networks help directors to be invited to more prestigious positions, often 
associated with larger pay. As on the company level, director connections import 
managerial expertise, information from peer companies and the latest technology 
developments in the industry.   
 
6.1 Motivations behind Director Networks 
The concerns about director networks have drawn public and academic attention in 
Germany (Jeidels, 1905) and the US since the early 1900s. When some industries, for 
instance iron and railroads, became more concentrated towards the end of 19
th century, 
large corporation and financial institutions turned out to be connected by so-called 
interlocking directorates. In the US the debate even triggered a government investigation 
and led to the Clayton Act in 1914, which eventually prohibited interlocking directorates 
in the railroad industry, competing firms, and banks. Research on this period usually 
concentrates on the interlocks of a few largest companies in the economy, ignoring the 
networks between other companies. Most studies including Dooley (1969) document the 
details of the interlocks between the largest corporations, sometimes including business 
relationships and kinships. As it is often argued that interlocks are a product of the 
development of monopolistic structures, studies on interlocks are embedded in anti-trust 
research. In the mid-20
th century, anti-trust research also included investigations in types 
of interlocked directors, company types and whether interlocks are related to geography 
and industry factors (Mizruchi, 1982). The pioneering studies in Germany and the US   18
were soon mimicked for the UK (Aaronovitch, 1961) and the Netherlands (Baruch, 1962). 
Aaronovitch (1961) describes the networks among British companies as an instrument 
used by capitalists to control the industry. Baruch (1962) documents that director 
networks in the four large Dutch banks also played a crucial role in fortifying the control 
over a large range of related companies. Although the intensity of interlocking is lower in 
these countries in the early 20
th century, they share many features with the German and 
American markets, such as the high interlocking level in the finance industry. In a 
comparative study covering the first half of the 19
th century, Fennema and Schijf (1978) 
report that the number of interlocks declined in the US but increased in most other 
countries. The most plausible explanation is the introduction of legal restrictions in the 
US. 
 
Mizruchi (1996) presents a comprehensive review of the director network studies from 
the 1970s to the 1990s. In his paper, four motivations for network establishment are 
developed: (i) collusion, (ii) monitoring, (iii) legitimacy, and (iv) career advancement. 
The collusion argument has been discussed above. The monitoring argument is that 
interlocks are established for monitoring purposes which is expected to be translated into 
better performance. Burt (1983) confirms this positive association between profitability 
and interlocks, but Dooley (1969) and Lang and Lockhart (1990) find the opposite. In 
addition to the unclear results on the relation between interlocks and performance, 
another unsolved issue in these papers is the causality. In other words, is it profitability 
that triggers interlocks, or the other way around? Richardson’s (1987) research provides 
some answer to the causality question. His interviews with bankers confirm that bankers 
often join boards of companies in financial difficulty. The legitimacy argument suggests 
that recruiting reputable directors onto the board earns the trust from investors and 
financial institutions (Scott, 1992). Most studies prior to the late 1990s have overlooked 
directors’ individual incentives to initiate connections. Career advancement is one of the 
most prominent individual motivations to participate in director networks. On this topic, 
the pioneering studies by Stokman et al. (1988) and Zajac (1988) show that directors join 
other boards for reasons of prestige and extra compensation. A recent empirical test by   19
Kirchmaier and Kollo (2007) confirms the role of several individual factors such as 
prestige, title and education, which contribute to the expansion of director networks.   
 
Another motivation as well as benefit for having director networks not mentioned above 
is information value. More explicitly, director networks can transfer valuable information, 
knowledge, skill and experience between companies. Davis et al. (2003) study the 
composition of the small world of American corporate elite for the period 1982-2001 and 
find that board members who have been involved in crucial board decisions, e.g. M&As 
and business alliances, are more likely to be invited by other companies to serve as 
non-executive board members. This implies that director networks function as channels 
for gathering information for corporate decision-making. Myint and Vyakarnam (2004) 
present a case from the Cambridge Hi-tech cluster and show that valuable multiple 
directorships create new business opportunities and transfer management expertise. 
Another case study conducted by Shaw et al. (2006) documents the knowledge transfer of 
supermarket retail techniques from North America to Britain. During the 1950s British 
retailers faced difficulties in adopting the American methods of self-service selling in 
supermarkets. Some of the British retailers (e.g. Tesco and Sainsbury) solved this 
problem by direct observation of the US market. Others (Melias) transferred the 
knowledge via shared directors after having gained control over an American 
supermarket retailer. These cases provide textbook examples on how director networks 
can acquire knowledge and management experience to aid companies entering a new 
business (model). 
 
6.2 The Impact of Director Networks 
We can categorise the literature on this topic into four strands: (i) political coordination, 
(ii) strategy in M&A, (iii) financing opportunities, and (iv) managerial compensation.   
 
A pioneering study on director networks and firms’ political action is that by Koenig 
(1979) who found that connected companies contribute more to election campaigns. 
Studies by Mizruchi and Koenig (1986) confirm this finding but also report that 
interlocks via financial institutions can be used to predict the political positions of   20
companies. They argue that companies interlocked by indirect ties can better coordinate 
with each other and are hence more likely to express similar positions in congressional 
hearings. This is contradicted by Burris (1987). Clawson and Neustadtl (1989) point out 
that firms with more interlocks with the large firms are more likely to contribute to 
incumbents but decrease the likelihood of contributing to Conservatives in the 1980 US 
election. As it is likely that director networks involving politicians can benefit the 
company: Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) document that politically experienced directors 
are more prevalent in companies where costs of environmental regulation are higher, 
sales to government and exports are greater, and lobbying is more important. 
 
The second strand of the literature is on interlocks and M&A strategies. Interlocked firms 
are more likely to adopt similar strategies, such as takeover defences (Davis 1991) and 
friendly acquisitions (Palmer et al., 1995). D’Aveni and Kesner (1993) find that takeover 
resistance is more likely to be weaker if top managers from the bidder and target are 
connected. Haunschild (1993) studies 327 US firms in four industries and shows that 
firms are more likely to engage in acquisitions if they are connected with other firms that 
have recently made acquisitions. Lastly, on the issue of the probability of being the target 
in a takeover, Davis and Stout (1992) believe there is no association between the presence 
of a banker on the board and the likelihood of the firm being a target, whereas Fligstein 
and Markowitz (1993) find a positive correlation. This study also shows that bankers are 
often appointed to boards of firms experiencing financial difficulties, which may become 
takeover targets.   
 
The third strand of the literature comprises financing opportunities for which interlocks 
between firms and banks are of importance. Ratcliff (1980) finds that the interlocks of a 
bank are positively associated with corporate lending, but negatively with mortgage 
lending. Stearns and Mizruchi (1993a, 1993b) document a positive association between 
the presence of a banker on a firm’s board and the additional financing this firm attracts 
from that bank. Regarding this analysis, the question on causality arises. On one hand, a 
banker’s presence in a firm can facilitate borrowing. On the other hand, a firm with high 
leverage may desire a banker on the board as well.   21
 
Finally, the last strand is on managerial compensation. As we mentioned above, directors 
accept outsider directorships not just for the firm’s interest but also for private gains. 
Cochran et al. (1985) find that the proportion of outside directors is positively associated 
with the top manager’s chance of receiving excessive severance pay, which is confirmed 
by Singh and Harianto (1989), Wade et al. (1990) and Davis (1994). A likely explanation 
for this seemingly paradoxical finding is that the CEO appoints friends as outside 
directors in order to have little resistance to (controversial) corporate policies.     
 
6.3 Recent Director Network Studies in Finance 
Director networks have not received sufficient attention in corporate finance until the late 
1990s. Scholars with an economics or finance background seek to understand director 
network from a different perspective than sociologists. Guided by agency or tournament 
theory, director networks are regarded as a tool for the top manager to extend his power 
over the board in order to exploit personal benefit. Interlocks can be indicators of busy 
boards and hence ineffective corporate governance. In this section, we review the most 
recent director network studies on managerial compensation, managerial turnover, and 
firm performance. 
 
Pioneered by Hallock (1997), several papers demonstrate the positive correlation between 
board interlocks and CEO compensation. Later studies powered by better measurement of 
director networks also prove that a CEO’s compensation increases with his centrality 
level in his network (Barnea and Guedj, 2009). The explanation for this finding is that the 
CEO’s personal influence can be enhanced by his managerial power. Non-executive 
directors on a board with a powerful CEO may be more lenient in the CEO’s 
remuneration contract design. Moreover, if a company has too many non-executive 
directors with outsider directorships, this busy board may not be able to spend sufficient 
time on the remuneration policy of the firm. Both effects can result in a sub-optimal 
remuneration scheme that overpays the CEO. Such a relationship between directors’ level 
of connectedness and their payment is also found by Kuhnen (2006), and Devos, Prevost 
and Puthenpurackal (2006). An alternative explanation for the relation between CEO   22
connectedness and pay is offered by Engelberg et al. (2009). They argue that the 
companies pay their CEO for the connections. By counting the past, education and social 
connections of the CEO, Engelberg et al. (2009) find that one additional connection to 
the CEO increases his total pay by up to 10%.   
 
Concerning the issue of managerial turnover and succession, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
and Barnea and Guedj (2009) have analysed the turnover decision of the CEO: better 
connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed when performance of the company goes 
down. Not surprisingly, the turnover-performance sensitivity declines when the board is 
occupied by directors with many outside directorships. Moreover, evidence of the 
importance of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) is also found in the top managerial labour 
market. Liu (2008) demonstrates that better connected candidates are more likely to be 
chosen as the new CEO (especially when they are external candidates). 
 
How do director networks affect corporate performance? Early studies conducted by 
Carrington (1981), Meeusen and Cuyvers (1985) and Baysinger and Butler (1985) claim 
that there is either no correlation between interlocks and profitability or there is a 
negative correlation. In the recent literature, Ong, Wan and Ong (2003), Myint and 
Vyakanam (2004), Hochberg et al. (2007) and Gutierrez and Pombo (2010) show 
evidence that multiple directorships improve the performance of the company. In contrast, 
Kiel and Nicholson (2006) find no evidence of a relationship between financial 
performance and director connections. More studies show evidence of an adverse impact 
of director network on performance, e.g. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Fich and 
White (2003), Larcker et al. (2006), Kuhnen (2006), Santos, Da Silveira and Barros 
(2009), Kirchmaier and Stathopoulos (2008) and Subrahmanyam (2008). Some other 
researchers point out the relation between interlocks and poor corporate governance. For 
instance, Khanna and Thomas (2009) find the significantly positive relation between the 
degree of firm interlocks and stock price synchronicity, which is a sign of low 
governance transparency. In general, there is more evidence on the detrimental effects of 
director networks on performance than on the beneficial ones. 
   23
One needs to be aware of the common drawbacks in the existing literature. First, the 
causality and endogeneity issues mentioned above remain an issue even in many recent 
studies. For instance, in studies on the relation between performance and director 
networks, it is important to realise that the positive correlation between connections and 
performance may not result from interlocks improving performance but from connections 
being a proxy for past good performance. Second, selection biases are prominent in 
director network research. Some studies focus on the largest companies only or on an 
industry, which may reduce the integrity of the network. Third, many, especially early, 
studies do not appropriately control for the factors (such as CEO, board, firm and 
industry characteristics) that may influence the dependent variable, which hampers the 





In summary, a number of factors that contribute to the establishment and influence of 
director networks have been studied. The following figure summarises the motivations 
and impact of director networks. Some of them have been reviewed above, others remain 
































On the left hand side of the figure, we list the motivations for building and maintaining a 
link in the director networks. The ‘Company motivation’ box contains the main reasons 
why companies seek connections with other firms. The company can use directors as 
instruments to form alliances with competitors, coordinate political actions or acquire 
control over other companies. The second box contains the reasons for hiring a particular 
director, given the five desirable assets possessed by the director. Namely: 
 
Financing opportunities: a director from a financial institution may create more 
favourable lending-relationships.   
 
Field expertise: a director has unique knowledge and experience needed when a 
company intends to implement a new business model or has acquired a new business.   
 
Management skills: a director is hired to share his experience and management skills, 
which usually happens when small companies hire directors from large companies. 
   25
Information: a director is attracted to acquire the access to valuable information, which 
could be critical for companies expanding into a new market or industry. It usually 
involves senior directors from successful companies within the same industry.   
 
Reputation: a director is hired for his reputation in the industry or society at large. It is 
remarkable that many directors have nobility titles or an established career in 
management. 
 
Companies are not the only players that build links in the networks. Directors wish to be 
connected for individual considerations as well. The bottom left box lists four 
motivations: 
 
Career advancement: when a director joins another board to increase his chances of 
better future job opportunities. 
 
Past connection: when two directors had connections in the past, they are likely to keep 
in touch with each other after the termination of the previous connection, which 
contributes to director networks at present. 
 
Managerial (bargaining) power: when a director uses directorships to enhance his 
managerial power. His influence is strengthened when two CEOs are sitting on each 
other’s board as non-executive directors. 
 
Common background: directors having the same education (college, university), 
belonging to the same social (elite) clubs, or having the same nationality create ties that 
may strengthen the professional networks. 
 
The impacts on the company and directors are shown on the right-hand panel in the figure. 
They are divided into three categories, impact on corporate operations and strategies, on 
director’s opportunities, and on overall firm performance. The operations and strategies 
comprise financing, M&A transactions, research and development, competition on the   26
product and labour market, and political activism. The personal advantages of networks 
for directors include predominantly better job opportunities or increased compensation.   
 
From the literature survey above, we can conclude that director networks have various 
effects on corporate governance and firm performance, according to the different nature 
of the links and the level of connectedness. More specifically, a strong director network 
can benefit the company by bringing in more information. Director networks can also be 
abused by top managers to acquire individual benefits and erode corporate governance. It 
is not sufficient to judge the director network simply by the number of connections. In 
future research, first, one needs to study the origin of the links and the overall structure of 
the network in order to conclude whether the network is performance enhancing or 
managerial power oriented. Second, there are many corporate issues that may be related 
to director networks that remain undiscovered, such as the director network’s role in 
M&A waves and the relation between director networks and receiving financial rescue 
during crisis. Third, a few technical issues including endogeneity should be solved in 
future studies. Lastly, researchers in the fields of economics and finance could make 
future use of the network theories developed by sociologists while the network studies in 
economics and finance will provide empirical evidence for testing social network theory. 
 
References 
Agrawal, A. and C. Knoeber, 2001, Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?, 
Journal of Law and Economics, 44(1), 179-198. 
 
Aaronovitch, S., 1961, The Ruling Class: a Study of British Finance Capital, Lawrence 
and Wishart. 
 
Barnea., A. and I. Guedj, 2009, Director Networks, EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper, 
University of Texas at Austin. 
 
Baruch, F., 1962, Grote Macht in een Klein Land. Een Beeld van het Monopoliekapitaal 
en zijn Invloed in Nederland. Amsterdam: Pegasus. 
 
Baysinger, B. and H. Butler, 1985, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: 
Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, Journal of Law and Economics 
and Organization 1, 101-124. 
   27
Beesley, M., 1951, Concentration in Midland Metal Industries, Ph.D. thesis, Birm 
University. 
 
Bott, E., 1957, Family and Social Network Roles, Norms, and External Relationships in 
Ordinary Urban Families, Tavistock Publications. 
 
Bonacich, P., 1987, Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures, American Journal of 
Sociology 92, 1170-1182. 
 
Burris, V., 1987, The political Partisanship of American Business: a Study of Political 
Action Committees. American Sociology Review 52, 732-744. 
 
Burt, R., 1983, Corporate Profits and Cooptation: Networks of Market Constraints and 
Directorate Ties in the American Economy, New York: Academic Press. 
 
Carrington, P., 1981, Horizontal Co-optation through Corporate Interlocks, PhD Thesis, 
Dept. Sociology, University Toronto 
 
Christakis, N. and J. Fowler, 2007, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network 
over 32 Years, New England Journal of Medicine 357, 370-379. 
 
Clawson, D. and A. Neustadtl, 1989, Interlocks, PACs, and Corporate Conservatism, 
American Journal of Sociology 94, 749-773. 
 
Cochran, P., R. Wood and T. Jones, 1985, The Composition of Boards of Directors and 
Incidence of Golden Parachutes, Academy of Management Journal 28, 664-671. 
 
Conyon, M. and M. Muldoon, 2006, The Small World of Corporate Boards, Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 33(9) & (10), 1321–1343. 
 
Core, J., R. Holthausen, and D. Larcker, 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive 
Officer Compensation and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 
371-406. 
 
Crespi-Cladera, R. and B. Pascual-Fuster, 2008, Executive Directors Pay and Networks 
in Spanish Listed Companies, Working paper, Universitat Illes Balears. 
 
D’Aveni, R and I. Kesner, 1993, Top Managerial Prestige, Power, and Tender Offer 
Response: A Study of Elite Social Networks and Target Firm Cooperation During 
Takeovers, Organization Science, 4(2), 123-151. 
 
Dalzell, R., 1987, Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made, 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Davis, G., 1991, Agents without principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the 
Intercorporate Network, Administrative Science Quarterly 36, 583-613.   28
 
Davis, G., 1994, The Interlock Network as a Self-reproducing Social Structure, 
Unpublished manuscript, Kellogg Graduate School, Northwestern University. 
 
Davis, G. and S. Stout, 1992, Organization Theory and the Market for Corporate Control, 
1980-1990, Administrative Science Quarterly 37, 605-633. 
 
Davis, G., M. Yoo and W. Baker, 2003, The Small-world of the American Corporate 
Elite, 1982-2001, Strategic Organization 1, 301-326. 
 
Devos, E., A. Prevost and J. Puthenpurackal, 2006, Are Interlocked Directors Effective 
Monitors? Working paper, University of Texas at El Paso. 
 
Domhoff, G., 2006, Who Rules America? Power, Politics, and Social Change (Fifth ed.), 
McGraw-Hill. 
Dooley, P., 1969, The Interlocking Directorate, The American Economic Review 59, 
314-323 
Engelberg, J., P. Gao, and C. Parsons, 2009, The Value of a Rolodex: CEO Pay and 
Personal Networks, Working paper, University of North Carolina 
 
Fennema, M. and H. Schijf, 1978, Analyzing Interlocking Directorates: Theory and 
Methods, Social Networks l, 297-332. 
 
Fich, E., and A. Shivdasani, 2006, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? The Journal of 
Finance 61, 689-724. 
 
Fligstein, N. and L. Markowitz, 1993, Financial Reorganization of American 
Corporations in the 1980s, Sociology and the Public Agenda, 185-206, edited by 
William J. Wilson. Newbury Park: Sage. 
 
Freeman, L., 1977, A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness, Sociometry 
40, 35-41. 
 
Granovetter, M., 1973, The Strength of Weak Ties, American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 
1360-1380. 
 
Gutierrez, L. and C. Pombo, 2010, Outside Directors, Board Interlocks and Firm 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Colombian Business Groups, Working paper, 
Universidad del Rosario 
 
Hallock, K., 1997, Reciprocal Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive 
Compensation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 331-344. 
 
Haunschild, P., 1993, Interorganizational Imitation: the Impact of Interlocks on Corporate 
Acquisition Activity, Administrative Science Quarterly 38, 564-592.   29
 
Heinze, T., 2002, Die Struktur der Personalverflechtung Großer Deutscher 
Aktiengesellschaften Zwischen 1989 und 2001, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 31(5), 
391-410. 
 
Hochberg, Y., A. Ljungqvist and Y. Lu, 2007, Whom You Know Matters: Venture 
Capital Networks and Investment Performance, The Journal of Finance 62, 251-301. 
 
Jackson, M., 2008, Social and Economic Networks, Princeton University Press. 
 
Jeidels, O., 1905, Grossbanken zur Industrie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der. 
Eisenindustrie. Liepzig: Duncker & Humblot. 
 
Kirchmaier, T. and M. Kollo, 2007, The Role of Prestige and Networks in Outside 
Director Appointments, Working Paper, University of Manchester. 
 
Kirchmaier, T. and K. Stathopoulos, 2008, From Fiction to Fact: The Impact of CEO 
Social Networks, FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group. 
 
Khanna T. and C. Thomas, 2009, Synchronicity and Firm Interlocks in an Emerging 
Market, Journal of Financial Economics 92, 182-204. 
 
Koenig, T., 1979, Interlocking Directorates among the Largest American Corporations 
and Heir Significance for Corporate Political Activity. PhD thesis. Dept. Sociol., Univ. 
Calif., Sarita Barbara. 
 
Kramarz, F. and D. Thesmar, 2006, Social Networks in the Boardroom. IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 1940. 
 
Kuhnen, C., 2006, Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the 
Mutual Fund Industry, Journal of Finance 64(5), 2185-2220. 
 
Lang, J. and D. Lockhart, 1990, Increased Environmental Uncertainty and Changes in 
Board of Director Linkage Patterns: The U.S. Trunk Airlines during Deregulation. 
Academy of Management Journal 33, 106-128. 
 
Liu, Y., 2008, CEO Network and CEO turnover, working paper, University of Maryland. 
 
Meeusen, W. and L. Cuyvers, 1985, The Interaction between Interlocking Directorships 
and the Economic Behaviour of Companies, Networks of corporate power: a 
comparative analysis of ten countries, Oxford: Polity Press. 
 
Migram, S. 1967, The Small-World Problem, Psychology Today 2, 60-67. 
 
Mizruchi, M., 1982, The American Corporate Network 1904-1974, Sage Library of 
Social research 138.   30
 
Mizruchi, M. and T. Koenig, 1986, Economic Sources of Corporate Political Consensus: 
an Examination of Inter-industry Relations. American Sociology Review, 5, 482-491. 
 
Myers, C. and G, Shultz, 1951, The Dynamics of a Labor Market, Prentice-Hall. 
 
Myint, Y., S. Vyakarnam and M. New, 2005, The Effect of Social Capital in New 
Venture Creation: the Cambridge High-Technology Cluster, Strategic Change 
14, 165–177. 
 
Nicholson, G. and G. Kiel, 2004, A Framework for Diagnosing Board Effectiveness, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(4), 442-460. 
Ong, C., D. Wan
 and K. Ong, 2003, An Exploratory Study on Interlocking Directorates in 
Listed Firms in Singapore, Corporate Governance: An International Review 11(4), 
322–334. 
Palmer, D., B. Barber, X. Zhou, Y. Soyal, 1995, The Friendly and Predatory Acquisition 
of Large U.S. Corporations in the 1960s: the Other Contested Terrain, American 
Sociology Review 60, 469–499. 
 
Prinz, E. 2006. Corporate Governance and the Uncertain Role of Interlocking 
Directorates: Director Networks in Germany and their Impact on Financial Performance. 
Université de Bourgogne. 
 
Ratcliff, R., 1980, Banks and Corporate Lending: An Analysis of the Impact of the 
Internal Structure of the Capitalist Class on the Lending Behavior of Banks, American 
Sociological Review 45, 553-570. 
 
Rees, A. and G. Shultz, 1970, Workers in an Urban Labor Market, University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Renneboog, L. and Y. Zhao, 2010, Us Knows Us in the UK: on Director Networks, 
Managerial Power, and CEO Compensation, Working paper, Tilburg University. 
 
Richardson, R., 1987, Directorship Interlocks and Corporate Profitability, Administrative 
Science Quarterly 32, 367-386. 
 
Ryan, B. and N. Gross, 1943, The Diffusion of Hybrid Seed Corn in Two Iowa 
Communities, Rural Sociology 8, 15-24. 
 
Santella, P., C. Drago, A. Polo and E. Gagliardi, 2001, A Comparison of the Director 
Networks of the Main Listed Companies in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, Working paper, Bank of Italy. 
   31
Singh, H. and I. Harianto, 1989, Management-board Relationships, Takeover risk, and 
the Adoption of Golden Parachutes. Academy of Management Journal, 327-24. 
1  Shaw, G. and A. Alexander, 2006, Interlocking Directorates and the Knowledge 
Transfer of Supermarket Retail Techniques from North America to Britain, The 
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 16, 375-394.   
Subrahmanyam, A., 2008, Social Networks and Corporate Governance, European 
Financial Management 14(4), 633-662. 
 
Tönnies, F., 1887, Community and Civil Society, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Santos, R., A. Da Silveira and L. Barros, 2009, Board Interlocking in Brazil: Directors' 
Participation in Multiple Companies and its Effect on Firm Value, Working paper, 
University of São Paulo. 
 
Scott, W., 1992, Organziations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, Englewood Cliff, 
New York: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Shropshire, C., 2010, The Role of the Interlocking Director and Board Receptivity in the 
Diffusion of Practices, Academy of Management Review, 35, 246-264. 
 
Stearns, L. and M. Mizruchi, 1993a, Corporate Financing: Economic and Social Aspects, 
Explorations in Economic Sociology, 279-307. New York: Russell Sage. 
 
Stearns, L. and M. Mizruchi, 1993b, Board Composition & Corporate Financing: the 
Impact of Financial Institution Representation on Borrowing, Academy of Management 
Journal 36, 603-618. 
 
Stokman, F., J. Van der Knoop, F. Wasseur, 1988, Interlocks in the Netherlands: Stability 
and Careers in the Period 1960-1980. Social Networks 10, 183-208. 
 
Wade, J., CA III O'Reilly and I. Chandratat, 1990, Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the 
Exercise of Social Influence, Administrative Science Quarterly, 587-603 
 
Watts, D. and S. Strogatz, 1998, Collective Dynamics of “Small-World” Networks, 
Science 296, 440-442. 
 
Zajac, E., 1988, Interlocking Directorates as an Inter-organizational Strategy, Academy of 






Us Knows Us in the UK: 





1.  Introduction 
“The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends 
laws human and divine." ... "Applied to corporations which deal with each other 
it tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can 
serve two masters. In either event it tends to inefficiency; for it removes incentive 
and destroys soundness of judgment. It is undemocratic for it rejects the platform: 
'A fair field and no favors' " (Louis Dembitz Brandeis, 1914)
6   
Social and professional networks govern our lives; they are established through common 
education, sports interests, club memberships, as well as connections resulting from 
professional lives. The economics and finance literature has begun to give attention to the 
influence of managers’ and non-executive directors’ connections on corporate decision 
making and corporate monitoring. Indeed, it may be that informal aspects of corporate 
governance through professional networks have a bigger impact on corporate policy than 
                                                 
 
6  Brandeis was Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court and made this statement before the passing of 
the Clayton Act (1914) which prohibited extensive director networks that as these could lead to collusion in 
concentrated industries. The quote appeared in the US House of Representatives Staff Report to the 
Antitrust Committee (1965:3).   33
we anticipate and even influence the functioning of institutionalized governance 
structures (such as boards of the directors) or the role of governance regulation.   
Recent research shows that networks permeate economic decision making. For instance, 
Seidel, Polzer and Stewart (2000) document the strong impact of social ties on the wage 
negotiations of members of minorities. The discriminating effect against minority groups 
in the recruiting process of US high-tech companies is dramatically reduced when 
minority members are referred to the firm through a friend or relative working in that 
firm. Educational networks of mutual fund managers seem to influence their investment 
decisions (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2008a): they are more likely to invest in firms 
managed by people who have studied at the same university as them and the investments 
in connected firms perform better. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008b) document the 
impact of sell-side analysts’ social networks on their ability to collect superior 
information. They find that analysts perform better in terms of their stock 
recommendations if they have education connections with the companies’ directors. 
Hochberg  et al. (2007) conclude that venture capital (VC) funds' performance is 
positively affected by the influence of the network positions enjoyed by the VC’s parent 
firms. Whereas these papers are examples of the benefits of social networks, networks 
may also have a detrimental effect on corporate decision making. For instance, Kuhnen 
(2009) identifies the effect of the professional network of the fund’s director on the hiring 
and contracting decision of advisors to US mutual funds. If the candidate advisor was 
connected to the fund’s director through past business relationships, he/she was more 
likely to be appointed and paid a higher management fee. The fact that returns on funds 
with advisors connected to the board of directors are significantly lower than the returns 
on funds without connections suggests that connections raise agency costs. 
 
This paper examines the role of director networks on the top manager’s compensation 
and the pay-setting process in the UK. It is important to note that we will use the UK 
definition of a director who can be either an executive (manager, officer) or a   34
non-executive director.
7  In the UK, the notion “old boy network” is well understood and 
extends to a small group of corporate elites who sit on each others’ corporate boards. 
Many of them have been educated in famous colleges such as Eton, Cambridge and 
Oxford. Others got acquainted by memberships of exclusive clubs and organizations and 
form an influential network in the UK business world. Relative to other countries, such as 
the US, there is less regulation on director networks in the UK. In the US, Section 8 of 
the Clayton Act prohibits one person of serving as director of two or more corporations if 
the certain threshold values are met. In the UK, restriction on multiple directorships is 
only imposed on the directors working for the FTSE 100 companies. Moreover, the UK 
disclosure rules on executive compensation and governance (e.g. director and board 
characteristics) are stricter than those in most other western European countries including 
Germany and the Netherlands, which allows us to control for various factors that may 
affect CEO compensation. 
 
Over the past 15 years, executive compensation has increased substantially at a pace 
significantly above inflation and above the salary increases of employees. This 
phenomenon has continued even during the recent financial crisis. When the S&P’s 500 
stock index fell by 37.6% in 2008. 75% of the CEOs in the 2700 largest US companies 
received remuneration increases. Even in companies at the brink of bankruptcy, departing 
CEOs managed to enjoy huge severance packages. One example is Angelo Mozilo who 
was the CEO of Countrywide Financial that was saved by the Bank of America in June 
2008, and was given $188 million as a send-off package. And this event was not an 
exception
8. The situation in the UK is similar if not even worse. In 2009 when the 
economy had barely recovered from the crisis, large companies including Marks & 
Spencer and HSBC already started to increase the pay to their CEO generously. In spite 
                                                 
 
7  Executive directors are members of the board and exert a senior management position in the company (in 
the US, they would usually be called officers). The non-executive directors (in the US often called directors) 
are board members who are not involved in the daily management; they often are managers or bankers in 
other firms. 
8 Other examples include Kerry Killinger, the ex-CEO of Washington Mutual, who departed with $44 
million in September when his company failed; Mack Whittle, who successfully left South Financial group 
with an $18 million gold parachute several days before the company applied for federal loans, which would 
limit the executive pay.   35
of academic doubts over the last decade about the efficiency of the remuneration contract 
design (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003), the public debate on top management remuneration 
only flares up in times of crises such as the corporate governance/accounting disclosure 
crisis of 2000-2003 and the recent financial crisis that started in 2007. Each time, the top 
management remuneration practices were blamed to provide flawed incentives inducing 
short-sighted corporate strategies (Hill, 2006), but curbing these remuneration practices 
has proven difficult as soon as the outrage toned down.   
 
The arguments from industry against curtailing managerial pay are usually that attracting 
talent necessitates adequate compensation as firms would otherwise lose their 
competitive edge. “We’re a very big bank, we employ 200,000 people around the world 
[…]. We have obviously got to pay our people appropriately. I think our customers will 
appreciate that people deserve a fair wage’ (HSBC gives its fat cats ₤ 1.6 billion bonuses, 
2010 (Guardian)). This is indeed the key question: is it the competitive market for 
managerial talent that sets the compensation contract or is the contracting process 
hijacked by the executive directors? In order to provide a (partial) answer this question, 
we study the impact of the professional networks of executive and non-executive 
directors on managerial pay and the pay-for-performance sensitivity, while controlling for 
the traditional explanations such as shareholder control and board composition. Networks 
may be very valuable to the firm, which can be reflected in the directors’ compensation 
for the following reasons: first, connections with (peer) companies through directorships 
enable a firm to gain access to information prior to its public disclosure. Such information 
is especially valuable when a firm is planning strategic alliances, mergers or acquisitions, 
or is expanding into new markets. Early notice of critical business changes allows the 
company to reconsider and adjust their own strategy in time. Second, directors with 
strong networks are or develop into reputable figures in the society with access to 
politicians, employers’ organizations, regulators. Third, a network may also reflect 
managerial talent and a director’s past success in other firms. Thus, a large network 
reflects information, reputation and experience can be regarded as the guarantee for an 
executive director’s quality to the firms interested in hiring him. So, for all these reasons, 
directors’ connections may be valuable for a firm and translate into higher compensation   36
and/or different structures of compensation contracts. Key is that the value of a director to 
a company depends on the informational advantage generated by these connections, 
which allows a company to increase the pay to its better connected executive and 
non-executive directors. We therefore call the positive relation between remuneration and 
director networks at the individual level: the information-value hypothesis.  
 
The examples on pay excesses given above suggested that remuneration contracting may 
not necessarily be a mean to reduce agency problems but may be an agency problem 
itself, if the remuneration contracting is controlled by top management. Networked 
executive directors may accumulate more power and establish a stronger negotiation 
position vis-à-vis the board (and the remuneration committee) such that they are able to 
extract a more attractive compensation package. We label this relation the managerial 
influence hypothesis.  
 
While several recent papers, such as Barnea and Guedj (2009) and Horton et al. (2009), 
relate pay to networks, our paper contributes to the literature because of the following 
strengths. First, we are able to distinguish between the managerial influence hypothesis, 
which claims that CEOs set their own pay, and the information-value hypothesis, which 
states that connected CEOs deserve higher compensation because of the 
information-value of their professional networks. We distinguish between the two 
hypotheses by calculating measures of direct links (which proxy for managerial influence) 
and  indirect links (which mainly capture the potential for executives to collect 
information). Furthermore, we study the strength of networks at the individual director 
level and at the company level separately, which are often mixed in the existing literature. 
Second, in addition to the degree and (normalized) closeness measures frequently used in 
the literature, we also employ (normalized) eigenvector centrality and (normalized) 
betweenness to capture different aspects (such as the direct and indirect nature) of 
networks. Third, whereas most papers on networks employ cross-sectional data or data on 
a subset of companies (which hampers the network measurement), we have gathered a 
large data panel consisting of virtually all listed UK companies for a 12 year period 
(1996-2007), amounting to 13854 firm years. Fourth, we control for the role of networks   37
of remuneration consultants as well as internal and external corporate governance devices 
(shareholder voting concentration, board structure and composition, CEO characteristics 
and corporate performance). 
 
Our empirical analysis based on random effect models generates several insights. First, 
we use direct centrality measures to capture managerial influence resulting from director 
networks. We indeed find that higher direct centrality scores at the CEO level explain the 
CEO’s larger compensation package and lower pay-for-performance sensitivity, which 
supports our managerial influence hypothesis. We use indirect centrality measures to 
evaluate the CEO’s access to information and resources valuable to his company. The 
indirect networks are translated into larger remuneration for the CEO but do not have an 
impact on his pay-for-performance sensitivity. The economic effects of the direct 
connections (which proxy for power) are more than twice as high as those of the indirect 
connections.  
 
Second, at the company level, we use the direct centrality measures to test the busy board 
hypothesis. Our results are in line with the hypothesis that companies with a higher direct 
centrality score (which signifies that these directors are active in other firms and may 
hence be less effective monitors of the firm) over-pay their CEOs. Likewise, indirect 
centrality measures capture a company’s access to valuable information and resources. 
We find companies with better information access (and hence relying less on the CEOs’ 
networks) pay out a lower compensation to their CEOs.   
 
Third, we also investigate whether the relation between performance measures and 
changes in CEO compensation is influenced by the centrality measures of the CEO and 
the company. Our result shows the direct (managerial influence) centrality score lowers 
the pay-for-stock price performance sensitivity at both the CEO level as well the 
company level, which provides further support for the managerial influence hypothesis. 
The indirect measures (information collection) do not consistently influence the 
sensitivity.  
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We have studied the centrality-CEO compensation relation with many CEO, board and 
company characteristics controlled. For instance, we confirm that there are conflicts of 
interest when a CEO is a member of the committee on the board because his 
compensation is then significantly higher. The size of the client network of remuneration 
consultants increases CEO compensation, especially in large firms. The proportion of 
non-executive directors and female directors increases a CEO’s total compensation. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and formulates the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes how networks are captured and calculates the centrality 
measures. Section 4 shows the methodology and summarizes the descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 discusses the results, while section 6 expands on the robustness checks. Section 
7 concludes.   
 
 
2. The Literature and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Director Networks and CEO Compensation   
The optimal remuneration contracting view has been challenged by the rapid increase in 
managerial compensation and the lack of pay-for-performance sensitivity (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). A CEO can influence his remuneration contract when he can exert power 
on the board, when directors are on each others’ remuneration committees which could 
lead to collusion, when non-executive directors are nominated by a dominant CEO and 
when shareholder ownership concentration is weak. We study this managerial 
power/influence (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002) or skimming (Bertrand and 
Mulainathan, 2001) view on compensation contracting, and focus – while controlling for 
shareholder control (Mehran, 1995) and board effectiveness (Yermack, 1996) – on the 
influence of and interaction between executive and non-executive directors, in other 
words their professional networks. In their theoretical paper, Conyon and Read (2006) 
model the relation between multiple directorships and shareholder value. While the 
authors recognize that accepting outside directorships can be beneficial for the firm as 
outside directorships can bring in skills, knowledge and experience that may outweigh the   39
opportunity cost, executive directors will eventually opt for more outside directorships 
than what is optimal for their own company. 
A CEO’s network grows stronger when he accepts more external directorships. 
Reciprocal interlocks (a mutual exchange of directors) also occur more frequently. Such a 
network can be used to extend CEO power which could enable the CEO to influence 
board decisions-making to his own benefit. The connections built for the purpose of 
accumulating managerial influence are referred to as managerial influence oriented 
connections in this study. Networks do not only increase a director’s influence but they 
also bring additional skills, knowledge and information to the company, which may lead 
to corporate governance and performance improvements. Connections maintained for the 
sake information collection are referred to as the information value oriented connections. 
Although most studies do not distinguish between the two functions of director networks, 
we use different network centrality measures to describe different functions of a network. 
Centrality measures that capture the level of connectedness in the local region based on 
adjacent connections are called the direct centrality measures. They are used to measure 
the managerial influence oriented connections. Centrality measures that analyze the 
position of a director in the entire network based on distances between target director and 
other directors are called indirect centrality measures. They are used to evaluate the 
information value oriented networks. 
We therefore focus first on (normalized) direct centrality measures: the degree and 
eigenvector centrality which capture the power of the directors (details on the calculation 
are given in Section 3). We hypothesize that: 
H1  CEO whose network consists of many direct connections can exert managerial 
influence which is reflected in higher total compensation with low performance sensitivity 
(managerial influence hypothesis). The value of the ‘managerial influence’ networks 
declines in the presence of a board with more non-executive directors and of stronger 
shareholder  power.   
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Guedj and Barnea (2009) calculate centrality measures and show that CEO salary 
augments with the network size while controlling for corporate governance measures, 
CEO characteristics, and industry fixed-effects. This result supports their reputation 
hypothesis: when directors are connected, they relax their monitoring of the CEO, which 
leads to CEO compensation increases. This is also in line with the essence of the 
managerial influence argument. Brown et al. (2009) measure the networks of a large 
cross-section of UK companies and broaden the professional network by considering 
connections through education and social activities (golf club, charity organizations, etc). 
They find a positive relation between a CEO’s social network centrality and his total 
compensation and an inverse relation between centrality and pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. This also corroborates the managerial influence hypothesis. Larcker et al. 
(2006)  present an analysis with new director network measures which distinguish 
between friendly links and independent connections. They show that short friendly links 
are positively related to CEO compensation but negatively related to operating 
performance. This finding is also in line with the managerial influence hypothesis.   
Director networks can have many advantages at the level of information collection. Early 
access to information can give a company a competitive advantage. Such networks may 
enable firms to develop more effective corporate strategies. In the managerial labour 
market, companies would agree on a higher compensation for the CEOs with networks of 
higher information value. Therefore, we expect that the CEO’s information value 
networks are reflected in the size of the managerial compensation. The level of 
connectedness in terms of information transfers can be measured by indirect centrality 
measures: (normalized) closeness and betweenness. Once information emerges and 
spreads along the paths in the director networks, a director with a high normalized 
closeness and betweenness has high probability of receiving it (for details: see section on 
centrality measures). We therefore hypothesize:   
H2 CEO compensation increases with his access to information as approximated by his 
indirect network centrality determined by his distances to other directors and position in 
the entire network. The value of this information-network is reflected in higher 
compensation (information-value hypothesis).   41
Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster (2008) analyze the correlation between executive 
director’s pay and the network activity in Spanish companies in the electronics sector. 
Not only does closeness positively affect director compensation but so does betweenness. 
Hence, the authors provide some evidence that CEO compensation also reflects the 
information-collection value of networks. Likewise, Horton, Millo and Serafeim (2009) 
calculate closeness and the dyadic constraint. Higher dyadic constraint score implies 
higher proportion of local connections and therefore less likely to be an effective 
“broker” in the network. In other words, the directors with lower dyadic constraint scores 
turn to be more important or well-known in the network. The authors find that 
executives’ network centrality is positively associated with their compensation. 
Executives seem to be rewarded for the resources they bring to a firm through their 
networks, while non-executive directors whose connections are more locally constrained 
earn a higher fee since their isolation may be perceived as an indication of their 
independence and superior monitoring capabilities.   
 
Besides the individual level network used to test the above two hypothesis, we also build 
networks at the company level, where companies are vertices in the graph and shared 
directors become links between companies. The next two hypotheses about director 
networks at company level evaluate the effects of managerial influence and information 
value from the perspective of the company rather than the CEO, which allows us to see 
how networks affect the company’s decision makings by changing the governance 
structure and information access.   
 
Previously we have reviewed literature on individual level network. There are also many 
studies concentrating on the director networks at the company level. In this part of 
literature, it has been argued that if a company has a strong network, it may be less well 
run as non-executive directors may have less time to monitor their firm and the executive 
directors’ focus is dispersed (Fich, and Shivdasani, 2006; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). 
Consequently, the governance of companies with many direct links may be deficient 
which may lead to a non-optimal compensation contract. Hallock (1997) analyses mutual 
interlocks between firms through employee and CEO connections. He demonstrates that   42
CEOs of interlocked companies earn on average a significantly higher basic salary and 
bonus than the non-interlocked ones and concludes (as do Fich and White, 2002) that 
board interlocks harm corporate governance efficiency and result in higher CEO 
compensation. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H3 In companies with a strong network by means of direct links in the company level 
network, the CEOs’ total compensation is higher with a lower pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (busy board/managerial influence hypothesis). 
 
If the company as a whole has good access to information throughout its directors’ 
networks based on indirect links and hence does not depend on the CEO’s network alone, 
there is no need to remunerate the CEO for his network. Moreover, better information 
access at the company level is reflected in more information about CEO compensation is 
the peer companies and alternative choices for CEO, which grants the company better 
bargaining position in the CEO compensation negotiation. Therefore, we expect: 
 
H4 The company’s information collection efficiency assessed by the indirect centrality 
measure in the company level network negatively affects the size of CEO compensation 
package and improves the pay-for-performance sensitivity (Information value 
hypothesis).  
 
Although we have formulated hypotheses based on the network functions of managerial 
influence and information collection, it is important to understand that they are two 
aspects of the same network. These two functions are not exclusive; as the direct 
measures leading to managerial power or influence also capture information value that 
could benefit the company. Nonetheless, the correlation between the direct and indirect 
centrality measures are low (see Section 3), which suggests that for many director 
networks, direct and indirect measures do indeed capture different functions which 
necessitates a separate analysis of the two types of centrality measures. 
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2.2 Controlling for Other Determinants of CEO Compensation   
Besides the directors’ networks, CEO compensation may also be determined by corporate 
performance, the role of remuneration consultants, CEO characteristics such as tenure, 
board composition, ownership concentration by shareholder type, and some other 
characteristics such as firm size, risk, or industry.   
 
Remuneration consultants 
Remuneration consultants have the best access to information on current remuneration 
practices and may hence be influential in setting the remuneration policy of firms. 
Through its remuneration consultant, firm A may gain access to the remuneration practice 
in its peer companies. The impact of hiring a remuneration consultant on the 
remuneration policy of firm A can be twofold. A sudden increase in the remuneration in 
firm B belonging to a specific remuneration consultant’s network of clients may be 
quickly copied by the other clients (including A) of the consultant who hence spreads the 
information on the raising of the remuneration benchmark (as applied in B). In contrast, 
remuneration consultants may advise that remuneration packages be based on objective 
standards and benchmarks which attenuate the upward spiral in compensation. Recent 
analyses seem to support that remuneration consultants are driving compensation up: 
Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2009), who investigate the compensation consultants and 
executive pay in the US and the UK, conclude that CEO compensation is indeed larger 
and includes more equity-based compensation when a remuneration consultant is hired. 
Kabir and Minhat (2010) go one step further and report that CEOs’ equity-based 
compensation in the UK linearly increases with the number of remuneration consultants a 
firm hires. Moreover, the larger the consultant’s market share is, the higher the CEOs’ 
remuneration in the firms they advise. The authors conclude that competition between 
remuneration consultants leads to significantly higher executive compensation. 
 
CEO characteristics   
A CEO with longer tenure is likely to obtain higher remuneration package to compensate 
him for his company-specific human capital. Furthermore, his long experience may also 
make him more competitive on the managerial labour market (Murphy, 1986).   44
Furthermore, a CEO with long tenure may be more entrenched and thus have more 
influence on their remuneration. This will be especially the case if he has a longer tenure 
than most non-executive directors and if he has served on compensation and 
remuneration committees. We use the CEO’s age to proxy the CEO’s overall experience 
(possibly acquired in several companies). Thus, we expect that older CEOs and CEOs 
with longer tenure receive higher pay.   
 
Only rarely women are leading listed companies: female top managers occupy only 3-5% 
of the (executive) board seats in listed US and UK firms. Apart from evidence of a glass 
ceiling, women managers also seem to be discriminated against in terms of salary. For 
instance, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find that female top executives are earning 45% 
less than their male colleagues in large American companies. Kulich et al. (2010) confirm 
that only 3% of the executive board members are female in all listed UK firms and 
receive lower remuneration than their male counterparts. In addition, their compensation 
contracts also differ from male executive directors: female managers’ remuneration 
packages are less performance sensitive as their compensation has less upward potential 
in case of good corporate performance, but they lose less in case of poor performance.   
 
Although combining the functions of CEO and chairman of the board is discouraged in 
the UK Combined Code, we still find many such cases, though predominantly in small 
and medium-sized companies. We expect that the CEO who also assumes the tasks of 
chairman receive a higher remuneration to compensate him for the extra tasks but also 
because this CEO will be in a more powerful position vis-à-vis the other (non-executive) 
directors (Conyon and Peck, 1998). The conflicts of interest even augment when the CEO 
is also a member of the nomination committee which allows him to appoint friends as new 
board members or when he is a member of the remuneration committee. We also control 
for the notice period included in the CEO’s employment contract, which we expect to 
lower the level of total compensation needed to attract the CEO. 
 
Board characteristics   45
Board composition has often been considered as one of the critical measures of corporate 
governance effectiveness. A high proportion of non-executive directors, separation of the 
roles of CEO and chairman, the creation of committees are expected to be important to 
turn the board into an effective governance mechanism device (Mehran, 1995). Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) confirm the hypothesis on the negative relation between 
CEO pay and board independence. More recent research on the US by Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009) indicates that CEO compensation decreases in firms that comply with 
the new and stricter board structure regulations imposed on listed firms by the NYSE and 
NASDAQ in 2002-03. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the board has not always been 
satisfactory. For instance, Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) find that non-executives 
seem to support the executive directors in the UK even in the wake of poor performance. 
In our regression analysis, if a company has a larger percentage of non-executives on the 
board, we expect that excessive CEO compensation can be restrained. 
 
Share stake concentration 
A key aspect of corporate governance is the monitoring role exerted by major 
shareholders (Core et al., 1999). Executive directors owning shares in their firm will have 
better incentives that are more aligned with those of the other shareholders. Therefore, 
executive ownership may lead to more modest compensation packages. Less excessive 
compensation and a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity will arise in the presence of 
major share blocks held by non-executive directors (whose fiduciary obligations to 
monitor are now enhanced by stronger voting power) and by outside shareholders such as 
corporations, and individuals and families whose voting power incentivises them to be 
active monitors. Given that institutional investors are rather passive monitors, we expect 




                                                 
 
9  Conyon and Muldoon (2008) measure networks of shareholders and find that the ownership and control 
world is small in the sense that the geodesic path length is small compared to the number of vertices in the 
largest connected component.   46
Company size has been shown to explain most of the cross-sectional variation in total 
managerial compensation (Murphy, 2000; Core et al., 1999). Larger companies pay their 
CEOs substantially more than medium-sized and small companies as it takes specific 
(and rare) managerial talent to lead large corporations which also entails larger 
responsibilities. Therefore, we also expect that CEO compensation increases with firm 
size. 
 
Including corporate performance-related incentives in the remuneration contracts is key 
in the classic principal and agent framework (Grossman and Hart, 1983). However, 
neither accounting nor stock market performance measures are perfect benchmarks. The 
former are backward looking and are liable to manipulation by the management in order 
to augment their bonus compensation (Healy, 1985; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). 
Although employing stock prices as the yardstick has the advantage of a focus on (future) 
value creation, this may also induce a bias on the short term. Frequent overvaluation and 
undervaluation due to market sentiment may enable management to take decisions that 
cater to this sentiment while aiming at maximizing their variable pay. We will include 
both accounting and stock performance measures in our models. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) show that the benchmarks 
chosen in the remuneration contracts depend on the relative power of the management; 
they claim that management without principals prefers accounting benchmarks and is 
frequently not remunerated for the intrinsic quality but is paid for luck. In this study, we 
expect that the CEO total compensation, salary, bonus and equity-based compensation are 
sensitive to the company’s performance, measured by both accounting and stock market 
performance. 
 
It may take a CEO with specific human capital to manage a firm with a high level of 
riskiness. A risk-averse CEO may demand higher remuneration or a low 
pay-for-performance relation embedded in the contract to compensate him for managing 
a firm with more volatile cash flows or with a higher probability of entering into financial 
distress. 
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3. Capturing Networks 
 
3.1. The Network Definitions 
To quantify director networks, we resort to several graph-theoretical measures. Figure 
3.3.1 depicts the director network surrounding Andy Hornby, the CEO of HBOS plc, a 
banking and insurance company. Directors in HBOS plc are the dark grey circles at the 
right bottom corner. In 2006, Andy Hornby was also a non-executive director in the life 
assurance and unit trust company St. James's Place plc, and in the retail companies GUS 
plc and Home Retail Group plc. This example is a fragment of a complete director 
network whereby a director is denoted by a vertex (or node). A connection between two 
vertices is called link (or edge, tie). The system of these vertices and links is a graph (or 
map). As links between two vertices are established when two directors are sitting on the 
same board, Andy Hornby’s four directorships create connections with 38 directors. 
Besides Andy Hornby, HBOS and St. James's Place shared another two directors: Jo 
Dawson and James Crosby. Jo Dawson was an executive director in HBOS and a 
non-executive director in St. James's Place. James Crosby was the CEO in HBOS before 
Andy Hornby. Similarly, GUS and Home Retail Group shared three directors, Oliver 
Stocken, John Coombe and Terry Duddy. Oliver Stocken was a non-executive director in 
GUS and chairman of the board in Home Retail Group. John Coombe was a 
non-executive director in GUS and senior nonexecutive director in Home Retail Group. 
Terry was an executive director in GUS and the CEO in Home Retail Group.   
 
[Insert Figure 3.3.1 about here] 
 
A sequence between two vertices, visiting no vertices more than once, is called a path. In 
the above graph, there exist multiple paths between John Peace and Richard Ashton. For 
example: Peace – Duddy – Ashton, Peace – Stocken – Ashton, Peace - Coombe – Hughes 
– Ashton and etc. The length of a path is the number of links it comprises and a geodesic 
path is the shortest path between two vertices (which is not necessarily unique). In the   48
above example, both Peace – Duddy – Ashton and Peace – Stocken – Ashton are both 
geodesic paths between Peace and Ashton.     
 
3.2 Measures of Centrality 
In order to illustrate the calculation of various centrality measures, we construct a 
hypothetical network (Figure 3.3.2) with six companies and ten directors. In the table 
below, the numbers refer to firms and letters stand for directors (Table 3.3.1, Panel A). In 
order to compute the centrality measures, we record the network into a symmetric matrix, 
where 1 denotes a link between the two directors (Panel B). This matrix enables us to 
calculate the centrality measures (Panel D). 
 
[Insert Figure 3.3.2 and Table 3.3.1 about here] 
 
The degree centrality of a vertex is calculated as the number of links held by that vertex. 
In the above example, the number of links for director a is 6, so director a has degree 
centrality of 6. This can also be seen from Panel A of Table 3.3.1, director a is connected 
to 2 directors in company 3 and 4 directors in company 5. Note that since degree counts 
the connections between the CEO and other board members in the company, this measure 
could be affected by factors influencing board size. However, the board size in our 
sample study do not differ much for the vast majority of firms, most of the variation in 
the degree measure is caused by the connections gained from external directorships. 
 
The closeness of a vertex is defined as the sum of geodesic distances between this vertex 
and all other vertices that can be reached. We transform the link matrix of Panel B into 
the geodesic distance matrix by replacing all the zeros by the geodesic distance (Panel 
C)
10. Since higher closeness value in fact suggests the vertex is further from other vertices, 
this definition of closeness is also referred to as “farness” by some scholars. Another way 
                                                 
 
10  This is possible for all the nodes because we have a connected graph. In a non-connected graph, the 
closeness measure is sometimes normalized by dividing the sum of geodesic distances by the number of 
reachable vertices.   49
to define closeness (also used in closeness normalization) is to calculate the inverse of the 










In this formula, the closeness centrality of vertex v (Cc(v)) is equal to one divided by the 
sum of the lengths of geodesic paths (dG) from v to any other vertex t. Compared to the 
previous definition, the high closeness value here means shorter distance to all other 
vertices, which suggest the target vertex is more central in the network. The normalized 












n is the number of vertices in the graph. The normalized closeness is within a 1-100 scale, 
we can then compare it to the normalized closeness from other graphs. 
 
Eigenvector centrality of vertex v (CE(v)) equals the sum of all adjacent vertices’ 
eigenvector centrality scores:   
 
 
This calculation process begins with assigning score 1 to all the vertices. At each iteration, 
the score of vertex v is calculated as the sum of all adjacent vertices’ scores received in 
the previous iteration. In the above formula, matrix A is an n*n matrix with elements (v, j) 
and (j, v) equal to 1 if vertex j is adjacent to the target vertex v. Therefore, the centrality 
score for each vertex evolves after every iteration. The factor     is to make sure that the 
centrality scores converge rather than explode after many iterations. The advantage of 
eigenvector centrality over other centrality measures is that it not only captures how 
many vertices are linked to the target vertex (as degree centrality does), but also includes 
the centrality of those adjacent vertices (the degree of these linked vertices). Hence, a 
vertex will have a higher eigenvector centrality score if it is connected to more vertices 













The betweenness of vertex v is defined as the sum of its betweenness ratios. Betweenness 
ratio is the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t passing through vertex v, 
divided by the number of geodesic paths from s to t. In the above example, no geodesic 
path needs to pass director c, therefore his betweenness score is zero. Director b has a 
high betweenness score, because b is the only director connected to c. Thus, geodesic 
paths between director c and all the other directors need to pass director b, which leads to 














where the denominator is the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t, the 
numerator is the number of geodesic paths from s to t with target vertex v on the geodesic 
paths. Betweenness can be normalized in the same way as normalizing closeness.   
 
To calculate network centrality at the company level (H3 and H4), each company is 
considered as a vertex in the graph and two companies are linked if they share at least one 
common director. Once the graph for company level networks is drawn, the centrality 
calculation is identical as that at the director level. More specifically, the degree centrality 
of a company is the number of other companies it connects to through director interlocks. 
The closeness of a company measures how close it is to all the other reachable 
companies.  
 
Panel D in Table 3.3.1 presents the different centrality measures for the directors in the 
above example. As mentioned in Section 2.1, we categorize degree and eigenvector 
centrality measures and their normalized versions as the measures of direct links. 
Closeness and betweenness plus their normalizations are regarded as measures of indirect 
connections. Direct centrality measures focus on direct connections to adjacent vertices 
only; indirect centrality measures analyze the distance between the target vertex and all 
other vertices (closeness) or the position of the target vertex on other geodesic paths 
(betweenness). Therefore, they are called indirect connections. In H1 and H2, we state 
that networks designed to capture managerial influence and information collection ability 
can be measured by different types of centrality measures. CEOs with many external   51
directorships which contribute to his reputation and fame among the connected 
companies may be more influential. Such influence is captured by the direct measures in 
testing H1. Direct measures on the company level are used to test H3. Centrality 
measures capturing indirect links (closeness and betweenness) are used to measure the 
access to information through networks. Valuable information can spread through the 
connections in the network and reach directors depending on network structure. The 
higher closeness score implies shorter distance to other vertices, in which case the CEO is 
able to acquire the information earlier. A CEO’s high betweenness score implies that he 
may be standing on the ‘brokerage position’ between some otherwise separated groups. 
Such position also grants the CEO a larger chance of receiving information earlier. In the 
above example, director b would be the first person to know any information generated 
by director c. Such advantageous position is reflected in a high betweenness score. One 
may argue that direct connections bring in information as well. It is true but direct 
centrality measure is inferior to indirect ones in terms of quantifying information 
collection efficiency. For instance, directors with numerous direct connections in an 
isolated corner of the whole network can hardly receive information as quickly as 
directors in the centre of the network (even with fewer direct connections). Moreover, as 
suggested by Granovetter (1973), information from direct connections is likely to be of 
lower quality than that from distant connections, because directly connected individuals 
tend to have redundant (similar) information sources. Therefore, the indirect centrality 
measures are better proxies of the information collection efficiency of the CEO’s director 
network (H2). In H4, we use company level closeness and betweenness to proxy for the 
company’s information collection ability.   
 
In the context of this paper, it is also interesting to calculate networks for remuneration 
consultants. We identify all the clients advised by each consultant and then use the 
number of clients as a measure for the information access of that consultant.   
 
3.3 Sample Description: Director Networks 
On average, the degree of a listed British company is 4, which means that an average 
company have 4 interlocks with a median of 3 (Table 3.3.2). The closeness measure is   52
defined over all the connected vertices in the graph (which entails that all isolated 
vertices do not have a closeness measure). Whereas a higher degree signifies that a 
company is better connected, greater closeness implies that the company is further from 
the centre of the graph. However, due to the inverse transformation, normalized closeness 
has the opposite the interpretation: a higher normalized closeness indicates being closer 
to all vertices of the graph. The distribution of eigenvector and betweenness centrality 
measures are skewed, which means a small proportion of companies (mostly the largest 
ones) that are very well connected influence the mean statistics considerably.   
 
[Insert Table 3.3.2 about here] 
 
Table 3.3.3 exhibits the annual centrality measures over the sample period 1996 to 2007. 
All centrality measures indicate that the connectedness of British companies increased 
slightly at the beginning of our sample period (1996-1999), then remained stable until 
2004 when a minor decline in the degree of connectedness commences. When we 
partition the sample companies according to size as reflected by index membership 
(FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small Cap, and FTSE Fledging), we observe that larger 
firms have remarkably more direct links (degree) than other companies (Table 3.3.4). The 
closeness measure confirms that larger firms are also more closely related to all the 
companies in our sample than the constituents of the other indices. The eigenvector 
centrality measure shows that FTSE 100 companies are at more important positions in the 
network than FTSE 250 firms, Small Cap and Fledglings. Lastly, the betweenness 
measures indicate that larger firms are more likely to be on any geodesic path in the 
graph. This implies that they are usually occupying the important junctions of the 
networks.  
 
[Insert Table 3.3.3, 3.3.4 about here] 
 
In Table 3.3.5 we present the covariance matrix between all the centrality measures used. 
The first four rows contain centrality measures at the director (D) or the individual level. 
The bottom four rows are at the company (C) level. The columns have the same order.   53
The two main measures for direct and indirect links, namely degree and closeness, are not 
much related to each other at director level or company level. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3.5 about here] 
 
In order to understand more about the evolution of director networks in the UK, we 
employ additional network statistics to describe the yearly network graphs (Table 3.3.6). 
As the number of companies increases over time in our sample, the total number of links 
between companies increases as well. The network density is calculated as the number of 
links that actually exist divided by the maximum number of links that could exist given 





, where n is the number of vertices in the graph, 
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is the maximum 
number of links possible, l is the number of existing links. As Table 3.3.6 shows the 
density of the graph has decreased over time. This implies that companies in more recent 
years are less connected. The whole network graph becomes sparser but counts more 
vertices. Let us now focus on the graphs’ components, which are the groups of vertices 
that are directly or indirectly connected with each other. The size of a component is the 
number of vertices in that component. Table 3.3.6 shows that the number of components 
with size greater than three (NC>3) increases steadily overtime. The size of the largest 
component (Max C) in every year increases for some of the years in the sample. We can 
therefore conclude that, as time passes, a growing proportion of companies opts not to be 
linked into the largest component, but to establish their own components.   
 
[Insert Table 3.3.6 about here] 
 
Table 3.3.7 considers the network structures by sector for the year 2007. The director 
network differences between sectors are remarkable. On average, companies from the 
financial, IT and medical sector are more connected than other sectors. However, the 
networks of these three sectors have different structural features. In the financial sector, 
most companies are connected with each other within a gigantic component (including 75   54
companies), and only a few smaller coalitions exist (See Figure 3.3.3a). In the IT industry 
(Figure 3.3.3b), companies are likely to be linked to other companies in their sector, but 
the networks are smaller and a dominating component is absent. Although the size of the 
subsample of IT firms is similar to that of the financial sector, the size of largest 
component in IT sector is only one third of that in financial sector. The IT sector has 
many more median-sized components than the financial sector (13 versus 5).   
 
[Insert Table 3.3.7, Figure 3.3.3a and 3.3.3b about here] 
 
In the above discussion, we have focused on corporate networks on the basis of 
directorships. In the context of managerial compensation policies it is also important to 
study whether firms are connected by employing the same remuneration consultant. 
Those connections may imply that information and insights on remuneration policies in 
other firms are more easily dissipated through their clients’ networks. Many companies, 
mainly small firms and midcaps, do not hire external remuneration advisors (Table 3.3.8). 
Over the period 1996-2007, 145-198 remuneration consultants were active. We observe 
an increasing trend in the hiring of remuneration consultants. In the midst of our sample 
period (2002), a company is on average connected with more than 40 other companies 
through remuneration advisors. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3.8 about here] 
 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
 
4.1 Estimation Methods 
As our main estimation method, we employ a random effects GLS regression. Regarding 
the choice between fixed effects versus random effects models, we opt for the latter for 
the following reasons. Whereas a fixed effects model assumes that each individual 
company/director has an unobservable individual effect, a random effects model 
considers these individual effects as random deviations from a mean individual effect.   55
Therefore, a random effects model requires a large enough cross-section of a data panel 
relative to the sample period’s length, which is satisfied in our sample of 12 years and at 
least one thousand companies in each year. In a fixed effect model, every subject’s 
individual effect enters as a parameter in the regression model, which is avoided in the 
random effect model as the individual effects result from a draw from a random 
distribution. Random effects models have hence a higher number of degrees of freedom 
which gives the random effects model higher estimation efficiency. Another advantage of 
the random effects model is that it is a weighted average of between and within 
estimators. Compared to the fixed effect model which is based on within group estimator, 
the random effects model thus also considers the differences between individual averages. 
Lastly, the fixed effects model cannot estimate time-invariant variables, such as gender 
and position, which are important in our analysis. We find that the explanatory variables 
in virtually all model specifications are not correlated with the individual effects, as 
shown by the Hausman test. As this condition holds, random effects models are 
econometrically more efficient methods in panel data estimation.   
 
We run the following two sets of regressions on:     
a. the level of the CEO’s total compensation: 
CEO total compensation it = α + β1 × Performance measures it  
+ β2 × Network measures it  
+ β3 × CEO characteristics it 
+ β4 × Corporate governance measures it 
+ β5 × Ownership concentrationit 







γj, t × Industry j × Time t 
The network measure included is based on the director network function we intend to test 
(managerial influence or information collection). We extend the analysis by replacing the 
above dependent variable by the compensation sub-categories such as salary, fees, bonus 
and equity-based compensation. The performance measures consist of accounting 
performance (return on assets) and a stock performance measure (market-adjusted return).   56
CEO characteristics include the CEO’s gender, tenure, age, membership in committees 
(audit, nomination and remuneration), and the combination of the positions of CEO and 
chairman of the board. Board structure variables are important internal corporate 
governance controls. Ownership concentration consists of the percentage of block 
holdings by category of shareholder. We categorize all the share stakes held by directors 
and all the blocks of 3% or more into the various shareholder categories as discussed later 
in Section 4.4.4. Lastly, we include some firm characteristics such as size, capital 
structure, and stock price volatility. All regressions include industry and time dummy 
variables. 
 
b. The pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation 
Change in CEO compensation it = α + β1 × Performance measure it  
+ β2 × Network measure it  
+ β3 × Network measure it × Performance measure it 
+ β4 × CEO characteristics it 
+ β5 × Corporate governance variables it 
+ β6 × Ownership concentration it 







γj, t × Industry j × Time t 
In the above pay-for-performance sensitivity regression, the change in the total 
compensation or a subcategory of compensation is the dependent variables, which may be 
partially explained by the interactions of performance and network centrality measures.   
 
An analysis of remuneration contracting should also be related to the examination of 
CEO departure and dismissal because disregarding the CEO turnover decision may cause 
sample selection problems in the remuneration analysis (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 
2005). When the analysis of changes in compensation only includes ‘surviving’ CEOs, 
the sample distribution is restricted which may lead to estimation biases. In order to study 
the compensation and turnover decision simultaneously, we also use the following 
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where   it it 2 1   ,   are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0, variances 
2
1   and 
2
2  , and covariance  12   (Amemiya, 1984).  1   and  2   are vectors of the 
model coefficients. In our models, i corresponds to a firm and t to a year. 
*
it Turnover  and 
*
it on Compensati  are underlying latent variables that are not observable. However, the 
sign of the 
*
it Turnover  variable can be observed and coded as a binary variable 
CEO_stayedit: if a CEO loses his or her job (i.e.,  0
*  it Survival ) it is coded as 0, 
otherwise it is coded as 1. Obviously, compensation is only observed for CEOs who are 
not dismissed.  it 1   and  it 2    are the sets of explanatory variables explaining CEO 
turnover and compensation, respectively. They include the measures enumerated above. 
The two sets of explanatory variables, i.e.,  it X1  and  it X 2 , are not disjoint (they can 
differ, however).   
 
Throughout the paper we call Equation 1 the selection equation, while Equation 2 is the 
regression equation. The selection equation explains CEO turnover, i.e., 
1 _  it stayed CEO  corresponds to those firm-years when the CEO keeps his or her 
position. The regression equation explains the compensation of these CEOs in the 
subsequent year. As the notion of compensation sensitivity to performance is not 
meaningful for new CEOs, we restrict the remuneration analysis to CEOs with tenure of   58
more than one year. Estimating the parameters of regression Equation 1b on the basis of 
the non-turnover sample only, would not be a valid alternative to the proposed method, 
because the OLS estimator of  2   is biased when the selection of the regression sample 
is endogenous (i.e.,  0 12   ). 
 
4.2 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
We have collected the data on the remuneration of executive and non-executive directors 
as well as detailed board information from Manifest.info. There is information for 1154 
companies on average in each year. Other company-specific data including sector 
categorization, accounting information (including profit measures, capital structure and 
firm size),  stock performance and volatility, are gathered from Datastream Advance. 
Ownership data is provided by Manifest.info, Thomson Financial, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Our dataset starts in 1996 (after the release of the Greenbury 
Report on Managerial Compensation in 1995) and ends in 2007. It comprises most of the 
listed UK companies whose combined market value amounts to more than 99% of total 
market capitalization of the London Stock Exchange. The dataset comprises information 
on 1758 companies
11 for which we have 9789 firm-years with CEOs, 13854 firm-years 
with CEOs and CEO-equivalents
12 and 121825 firm-years with all directors. All sample 
companies are listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and comprise large, 
medium-sized, small caps, as well as tiny firms. Virtually all companies belong to one of 
these indices: FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small Cap, FTSE Fledgling, and FTSE AIM. 
The FTSE 350 comprises both the FTSE 100 (which consists of the 100 biggest 
companies that represent about 81% of the market capitalization of the whole LSE) and 
the FTSE 250 (which comprises the next 250 largest companies and represents about 
15% of the UK market). FTSE Small Cap includes companies that are relatively small, 
and cover about 2% of the total LSE market value. We have also gathered data on firms 
included in the FTSE Fledgling index and FTSE AIM index, which are usually firms too 
                                                 
 
11  In our regression analysis, we will include 1216 firms as for firms without interlocked directors. The 
centrality measures are not defined.     
12  Appendix B provides the reason and a detailed procedure of identifying CEO equivalents.   59
small to be included in the FTSE All-Share index
13. In sum, we have info on virtually the 
complete UK market. This fact is important in the context of network research as limiting 
the sample size to e.g. FTSE 350 only would give a distorted picture of the networks 
existing in UK listed firms.     
 
In case the length of the financial year deviates from 365/366 days (it is then more than 
30 days longer or shorter than 365), the remuneration and accounting information are 
adjusted accordingly to make sure they are comparable to other annual values. When a 
financial year is not coinciding with the calendar year, we apply this rule: e.g. we regard a 
financial year ending between January and June 31
st 2005 as the year 2004 whereas we 
consider a financial year ending between 1st July and 31
st of December 2005 as the year 
2005. In this approach the CEO’s compensation and performance of the relevant are 
matched. 
 
In this study, CEOs are the main subjects. The number of firm-years for which we have 
data on the CEO remuneration amounts to 9789 and even to 13854 when we use a 
broader definition of the CEO (Details about identifying CEO equivalents can be found in 
Appendix B). The remuneration packages designed for the top managers are more 
complex than for other executives, these packages are more valuable and (ought to be) 
more strongly related to firm performance. Hence, the CEO’s remuneration is considered 
as the best epitome of remuneration practices.   
 
4.3 Remuneration Data 
The total remuneration package of a director can be dissected into these sub-categories: (i) 
salary, (ii) fee, (iii) bonus, (iii) equity-based compensation (stock options and long term 
incentive plans), (v) miscellaneous remuneration, and (vi) other. The salary includes a 
fixed payment and is usually paid out in cash (and exceptionally in shares). Fees are 
usually paid for consulting and supervisory services rather than for operational work and 
                                                 
 
13  FTSE All-Share can be seen as the aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap 
Indices. It represents 98-99% of the UK market capitalization. FTSE AIM overlaps to some extent with 
FTSE Fledgling.   60
are hence more often compensation for non-executive directors or former executive 
directors. The bonus can consist of cash or shares and is usually paid when specific 
benchmarks or targets were reached over the past year (or past few years). Bonuses can 
also be voluntarily deferred or are compulsorily deferred for a vesting period of usually 
three years. In practice, the initial cash deferral bonus is often converted into stocks at 
favourable terms if the CEO commits to remain in his company or achieves some 
performance criteria over the vesting period. A deferred bonus realized in stock is 
recorded as restricted stocks and categorized as equity-based compensation.
14  
 
Equity-based compensation includes restricted shares and stock options. Restricted 
shares are granted to the management under different schemes such as shares 
appreciation rights and deferred bonus schemes. In most circumstances, the restricted 
shares cannot be sold until certain goals are reached or subsequent to a vesting period. 
Restricted shares are valued at the market price at the grant date. The market price at 
grant date was collected from Datastream Advance. Stock options give the CEOs the 
right to acquire company stocks at a predetermined price (exercise price). Stock options 
in the executive remuneration package in the UK have often vesting conditions 
(performance benchmarks) and always vesting periods, typically three to five years. We 
approximate the value of the stock options by means of the Black-Scholes option pricing 
formula. Most options are granted at the money; the market price and stock price 
volatility at the grant date are collected from Datastream Advance. As we lack 
information about the time to maturity of stock options, we use ten years (the usual time 
to expiration at the grant date) as the default maturity for all stock option value 
calculations. The interest rate of 10-year UK government bonds (Gilts) is used as the 
risk-free rate.   
 
Miscellaneous compensation includes compensation that is not paid out on a regular basis, 
and includes transaction bonuses, recruitment incentives, relocation expenses, and loss of 
                                                 
 
14 In our dataset, we include the deferred bonus plans in cash terms at the grant date. All performance 
related sub-categories are recorded and valued at the grant date. 
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office compensation. A transaction bonus is granted when the CEO has administrated 
major corporate transactions, such as mergers, acquisition and other types of asset 
restructuring. A deferred cash bonus (different from the deferred bonus defined above) is 
granted mainly with the aim of retaining the CEO. For instance, the CEO needs to remain 
employed for the vesting period (typically 3-5 years) in order to claim this cash award 
(which is not performance-related). The recruitment incentive is paid when a position is 
difficult to fill without such an additional allurement and is associated only with new 
appointments. Relocation expenses are awarded in case the newly-appointed CEO needs 
to move nearer to his new firm. The loss of office compensation is also known as 
severance pay (or a golden parachute). When the contract is terminated before it expires, 
the CEO is compensated for this early departure. The payment of the severance pay is 
often not contractually specified and is often granted even when the CEO is fired 
following poor performance. Our dataset also contains a remuneration category labelled 
‘Other’, which is rare and includes all forms of compensation and benefits that are not 
included in any of the above categories and comprises the CEO’s (medical) insurance 
paid for by the firm, some ‘ad hoc benefits’ and ‘unusual compensation’ about which the 
firms do not give detailed information. 
 
We also have over information about pension contributions done by the company for the 
benefit of executive directors. Given that this information does not seem complete, we 
exclude it from the calculation of the value of the total yearly compensation. 
 
Table 3.4.1 and Figure 3.4.1 report descriptive statistics on remuneration for the whole 
sample period 1996 to 2007.
15   The most important components of a CEO’s 
compensation package in the UK are equity-based compensation (restricted shares and 
stock options), fixed salary, and bonus. On average, ₤ 296,215 is paid to a CEO each year 
                                                 
 
15  The tables R1-R5 and the tables in appendix D describe the remuneration variables. The numbers in bold 
are unconditional figures (i.e. these statistics are based on the whole sample independent on whether or not 
a specific type of compensation has been granted) and the numbers in normal face are conditional figures 
(these statistics are calculated based on the occurrence of a specific type of compensation). Unconditional 
remuneration statistics provide a good overview of the population but provide little insight when there are 
only few observations for a specific type of compensation.   
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as equity-based compensation, which accounts for 44.8% of his total remuneration. The 
salary on average amounts to ₤ 202,931 or 30.70% of the total remuneration. The bonus 
is also a significant source for a CEO’s wealth accumulation with an average of ₤ 
126,290 or 19.11% of the total compensation. The remaining compensation components 
such as fees, miscellaneous compensation and other are only marginal and add up to a 
mere 5% of CEO compensation.   
 
[Insert Table 3.4.1, Figure 3.4.1 about here] 
 
How did the value of compensation packages evolve? Figure 3.4.2 and the Panel A of 
Table 3.4.2 show a strong increase in the total remuneration which peaked in the year 
2000 (following the strong stock market boom that continued during the 1990s), was 
followed by a short-lived decrease in 2001-2002 (coinciding with the equity market 
decline and the collapse of the M&A market) and then kept rising till 2007. By 2007, the 
total remuneration for the CEO had almost doubled relative to 1996. Over the entire 
sample period, the total remuneration increased at an average rate of 9.43% per annum. 
There are only modest increases in the fixed salary over time, but the augmentation of the 
bonus and equity-based compensation are striking. Particularly in 2000, when the stock 
market peaked before the bursting of the IT bubble, the equity-based compensation also 
became the most valuable aspect of a compensation package (amounting to 53.04% of the 
total remuneration). Moreover, if we look across the industries, the distribution of CEO 
compensation is highly skewed: a small number of well paid CEOs (mostly from FTSE 
350) have driven up the average CEO compensation in the UK market. Lastly, 
equity-based compensation is still a smaller part of total remuneration of UK CEOs than 
that of US CEOs (where the proportion of equity-based pay exceeds 50%). In 2007, 
CEOs of S&P 500 companies were paid USD 13.4 million on average whereas UK CEOs 
of FTSE 100 companies on average received ₤ 4.3 million (USD 8.6 million).   
 
[Insert Figure 3.4.2, Table 3.4.2 about here] 
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Figure 3.4.3 visualizes the inflation-adjusted remuneration trends over the sample period. 
The figures confirm the strong increase in remuneration in 1999-2000, which is followed 
by a small and short-lived decline as from 2003 onwards. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.4.3 about here] 
 
In order to understand better the differences in CEO compensation across sectors, we 
compare the remuneration of the five most paid CEOs (and their averages) for each sector 
in 2007 (Table 3.4.3). We learn that the companies in the industries of Financial Services, 
Food Producing, Media, and Utilities reward their CEOs the most. The highest paid CEO 
in 2007 was Bart Becht from the Reckitt Benckiser Group with a compensation of ₤ 31 
million, followed by Terence Leahy from Tesco’s earning ₤ 21 million. For each of these 
CEOs (and most other top earners), more than 80% of their remuneration package 
consists of equity-based compensation. 
 
[Insert Table 3.4.3 about here] 
 
The positive relation between CEO remuneration and corporate size (here captured by 
stock exchange index membership) has been documented in many remuneration studies 
before. Partitioning the sample firms based on membership of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, 
FTSE Small Cap and FTSE Fledgling (Table 3.4.4 and Figure 3.4.4), we find that the 
CEO remuneration of the largest firms (FTSE 100) is about 10, 5 and 2.5 times larger 
than that of the Fledglings, Small caps and FTSE 250 firms. The growth in nominal 
salaries for the CEOs leading Fledglings is 9.84% per annum. The growth is stronger at 
about 19.5% annually for small caps and FTSE 250 firms, and 15.3% for the largest firms. 
In sum, we observe that first directors, and particularly CEOs, are better compensated in 
larger companies. The CEOs in the FTSE100 companies are paid nearly ten times more 
than the CEOs in the FTSE Fledgling companies. Second, the structure of the 
compensation packages in large companies is markedly different from that of smaller 
companies. The bonus, restricted shares, and stock options make up a larger proportion 
(up to 70%) of the total executive directors’ compensation of larger companies. In the   64
FTSE Small Cap and FTSE Fledgling companies, the proportion of the performance 
related compensation is down to less than 60% and 40%, respectively. The difference in 
remuneration between companies from different indices is also reflected in the pay of the 
executive directors (excluding the CEO) and the non-executives. The executives in the 
FTSE 100 companies earn three times more than those in the FTSE Small Cap and five 
times more than the FTSE Fledglings. The differences in remuneration structure are also 
pronounced when comparing CEO income by index. For non-executive directors, the 
difference in fees also exists across firms belonging to different indices but is much less 
significant. Non-executive directors employed by a FTSE 100 firm earn on average 
₤73,483 annually, which is about three times the pay received by the average 
non-executive director working for FTSE Fledgling companies (₤27,581). Regardless of 
the size of the company, the compensation of the non-executive director is always 
dominated by his fee which is usually stable during the non-executive’s stay in office. 
Third, executive compensation increases significantly above inflation (with annual 
growth rates of more than 15%) and the proportion of performance-based compensation, 
i.e., bonus and equity-based compensation, rises even faster. 
 
[Insert Table 3.4.4, Figure 3.4.4 about here] 
 
4.4 CEO, Board and Firm Characteristics  
The CEO’s average age is about 53 years. While this average age remains relatively 
stable over time, the average tenure declines from 8.7 years in 1996 to 4.9 years in 2007 
(Table 3.4.5 and Figure 3.4.5). Executive directors are somewhat younger than the 
nonexecutive directors, 50 and 58 years, respectively. This age and trend in tenure also 
persist in firms of different sizes and sectors - only the CEOs in the largest companies 
have a shorter than average tenure. Age and tenure data will enable us to test whether 
remuneration depends on experience. In line with the findings on the gender of top 
management in other countries, we find that the top managerial market in the UK is 
dominated by male managers. Although the proportion of female CEOs has slightly 
increased over time (from 0.8% in 1996 to 2.6% in 2007), the vast majority of the CEOs 
is still male.     65
 
[Insert Table 3.4.5, Figure 3.4.5 about here] 
 
Across our sample period, CEO turnover amounts to 23.75% which includes 1.1% 
turnover resulting from the decease of the CEO and 10.4% being non-retirement (Panel A 
of Table 3.4.6). The retirement turnover comprises the departure of CEOs who are 63 
years old or above (and hence near the retirement age) whereas the non-retirement 
category includes turnovers with CEOs younger than 63. Given that the true reason 
behind the turnover is not available – most firms seem to use euphemistic terms to 
describe the CEO’s departure - we do not distinguish between voluntary turnover and 
disciplinary turnover for the non-retirement turnover cases. We also collect information 
on the CEOs’ contract such as the notice period. More than three quarters of the 
companies (77%) are required to inform the CEO twelve months prior to the dismissal. 
For about 12%, the notice period is longer than 20 months.   
 
[Insert Table 3.4.6 about here] 
 
On average, the board comprises 8 directors of which 5 are non-executives (Table 3.4.7, 
Panel A). Merely 4% of the board members are female. In 13.1% of the firm-years, the 
CEO also chairs the board of directors. Given that such board duality may harm the 
independence of the board’s supervision, the UK Corporate Governance Code 
discourages the combination of the tasks of CEO and chairman. In this context, it is rather 
surprising to find that in 13.1% for all firm-years CEO and chairman is the same person. 
While board duality is rare in the FTSE 100 firms (3 out of 105 in 2007), it is more 
frequent in smaller firms (6 out of 86 for FTSE Fledgling companies in 2007). There is 
however a significant decline in board duality over time: in 1996, 21.0% of the CEOs had 
also assumed the tasks of chairman while this number dropped to 7.0% by 2007.   
 
[Insert Table 3.4.7 about here] 
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The UK Corporate Governance Code also requires that a firm has audit, nomination, and 
remuneration committees. In the context of the functioning and independence of these 
committees, it is important to note that these committees should be staffed mainly by 
non-executive directors. We investigate to which extent the CEO and other executive 
directors are present on these committees. Most companies, with the exception of a 
fraction of the very small firms, comply with the UK corporate governance code and have 
audit (98%) and remuneration committees (88%). In more than 80% of all firm-years, 
there is a nomination committee (Table 3.4.7, Panel B). Panel C shows the composition 
of the three major committees. Considering all firm-years with a nomination committee, 
the presence of executive directors is quite common. In more than half (53.5%) of these 
firm-years, we observe that at least one executive director participates in the decision 
making of the nomination committee. The presence of executive directors on the 
remuneration committee is also remarkable. Conditional on the presence of a 
remuneration committee, at least one executive director is a member of the committee in 
one out of five firm-years. In Panel D, we examine the extent to which CEOs are present 
in the committees. Nomination committees have often been criticized for not being 
sufficiently independent from the CEO who could influence the appointments in order to 
hire non-executive directors who are unlikely to oppose his views and not actively 
monitor the executive directors. In about 44% of the firm-years, the CEO is a member of 
the nomination committee which he chairs in 11.5% of the cases. CEO membership of 
the remuneration committee creates obvious conflicts of interest, and Panel D presents 
that the CEO is a member of the remuneration committee in 10% of the firm-years and 
even chairs this committee in 2% of the cases. One would expect that these conflicts of 
interests are much larger in smaller firms which have smaller boards. The statistics from 
subsamples according to index indeed confirm that a CEO’s committee membership 
linearly decreases with company size although the CEO is still a member of the 
remuneration committee in about 2.5% of the firm-years in FTSE 100 and in 7% for 
FTSE 250. 
 
[Insert Table 3.4.8 about here] 
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Remuneration committees frequently hire remuneration consultants (42% of all 
companies in 2007) and report their main consultant (Table 3.4.9). The most frequently 
hired remuneration consultant as reported by the firm in its annual report is New Bridge 
Street Consultants (on average hired by 15.3% of the firms), followed by Towers Perrin 
(5.8%), and Deloitte and Touche (4.9%). Of the listed companies, 22.8% report that they 
only use internal advice to set managerial pay.     
 
[Insert Table 3.4.9 about here] 
 
CEO compensation may also be determined by company specific factors. In our empirical 
analysis, we include corporate performance, firm size, capital structure, and stock price 
volatility as control variables. Accounting and stock performance are measured by the 
return on asset (ROA) and the market-adjusted return respectively. The book value of 
total assets captures company size. The capital structure is measured by the long-term 
debt over total assets ratio. Stock volatility is the stock's average annual price movement 
to a high and low from a mean price over the past 52 weeks
16.  
 
4.5 Insider and Outsider Ownership Concentration 
We categorize all the share stakes held by directors and all the blocks of 3% more into the 
following shareholder categories: (i) investment and mutual funds, (ii) insurance 
companies, (iii) pension funds, (iv) banks, (v) nominees accounts, (vi) individuals and 
families not related to a director, (vii) industrial and commercial companies, (viii) CEO, 
(ix) executive directors (excluding the CEO) and (x) non-executive directors. Categories 
(i) to (iv) constitute the institutional investors
17 and classes (viii) to (x) make up the 
insider ownership. Table 3.4.10 exhibits that the ownership concentration is rather stable 
over time and fluctuates around 35%; it is 34.0% in 1998 and 35.1% in 2007. Insider 
ownership concentration, which combines the share stakes owned by the CEO, the other 
executive directors, as well as the non-executive ones amounts to about 7% over the 
                                                 
 
16  We also tried annual stock return variance which generates same conclusion. 
17  The owners behind the nominee accounts are often also institutional investors (Franks, Mayer and 
Renneboog, 2001).     68
whole sample period. Relative to other countries (the US and Continental Europe) where 
executive directors rarely hold share stakes of more than 0.5% of the total shares 
outstanding of listed companies, executive ownership concentration in the UK is high. 
The CEO and the other executive directors own on average almost 4.7% of the equity, 
which gives them significant voting power. The average CEO holds 2.5% of the market 
capitalization. From 1998 to 2001, an upward trend in insider ownership concentration is 
visible, possibly caused by an increase in the use of equity-based compensation for the 
top management. Subsequently, the combined insider stakes stabilize around 6.8%. The 
shareholder category with the highest ownership concentration is the investment funds 
that on average hold almost 14.7% of the equity. The investment fund share holdings 
percentage has increased gradually over the sample period from 8.5% in 1999 to 17.5% 
in 2007. The ownership concentration held by banks and pension funds remains relatively 
stable over time. All the institutional shareholder classes combined control around 20.7% 
of the voting rights. The combined equity stakes of industrial and commercial 
corporations is almost 8% over our sample period.   
 
[Insert Table 3.4.10 about here] 
 
Table 3.4.11 investigates the relation between ownership concentration and firm size. 
Ownership concentration is smallest in the FT100 firms for which the aggregated share 
blocks account for 19.7% of the market capitalization. The corresponding percentage for 
the FT250, SmallCap and Fledglings are larger at 29.8%, 35.9% and 39.2%, respectively. 
The share stakes that individual ownership and directors are able to acquire in the largest 
firms are as expected small: insider ownership in FTSE100 averages to 1.3%, and 
individuals and families not related to a director are only relatively rarely able to 
accumulate share blocks of 3% or more (the reporting threshold) such that their average 
ownership is only 0.8%. Table 3.4.11 also shows that insider ownership is already 
significantly higher (at 4.6% in FTSE 250 firms) and augments with size to 8.7% in the 
Fledglings. Investment funds’ average stake ranges from 8% in FTSE100 to 19.1% in the 
Fledglings. Table 3.4.12 documents differences in ownership concentration and structure 
across sectors. The most concentrated industries are the financial, manufacturing, logistic,   69
and utility industries. Least ownership concentration can found in retailing, 
communications, and leisure industries.   
 




5. Interpretation of the Result   
 
5.1 Compensation and Director Network Centrality 
In table 3.5.1, we estimate the impact of director networks on the CEOs’ total annual 
compensation, which includes salary, fees, bonus, equity-based compensation and 
miscellaneous income. In the first column, the degree centrality, which is measured at the 
individual director (CEO) level (Degree (D)), significantly increases in the CEO’s total 
compensation. CEOs with a strong network based on direct connections have higher 
compensation. When we replace degree by the eigenvector centrality of the network, we 
reach similar results. We also investigate the relation between networks based on indirect 
connections (the closeness level) which proxies for the information-value of the network, 
and remuneration. As shown in the third column, normalized closeness (nCloseness (D)) 
indeed significantly boosts CEO compensation. This implies that a CEO’s network 
resources are valuable to and valued by the company. We only employ one type of 
centrality measure because some centrality measures proxy for similar functions of 
connections (degree or eigenvector for direct links and closeness or betweenness for 
indirect links). Still, the correlations between centrality measures of different functions 
such as degree and normalized closeness are very small (0.18). When we include both in 
a model, we observe that both remain strongly statistically significant. So, this suggests 
that both our managerial influence hypothesis (powerful CEOs extract higher 
compensation) and the information-value hypothesis (CEOs with networks enabling them 
to collect valuable information or resources) are upheld. The degree coefficient’s 
economic significance is stronger than that of the closeness coefficient. When each 
measure increases by one standard deviation, the impact on total compensation is 9.2%   70
for the former and 4.2% for the latter. This suggests that direct links are more important 
and that there is more support for the managerial influence hypothesis (H1). 
 
[Insert Table 3.5.1 about here] 
 
Now we turn to the centrality measures at the company level: a firm’s degree shows how 
many boards are interlocked with this firm. The second column shows that company 
degree (Degree (C) has a significantly positive impact on the CEO’s total compensation. 
The fact that degree is high signifies that these board members are active in many other 
companies as executive or non-executive directors, which implies that these directors 
divert some of their time and energy. The probability of collusion may also increase with 
the number of board interlocks. When a board is more interlocked, corporate governance 
may become less effective, and as a possible consequence, the CEO is able to extract 
higher compensation. In the last column of Table 3.5.1, we evaluate the impact of 
closeness (nCloseness (C)) at the company level, namely the collection of indirect links 
of the company through its directors. We find a negative correlation which signifies that 
when a firm has many indirect links, it depends less on the network to attract valuable 
information and resources such that the firm can afford to pay out a lower total 
compensation. This supports hypothesis H3 which states that better access to information 
improves the efficiency of remuneration design. (Below, we show more evidence on the 
pay-for-performance regressions).   
 
While the centrality measures are related to total compensation, we also investigate 
whether they have a different impact on the various components of pay (Tables 3.5.2 to 
5.5). We first turn to the fixed salary models (Table 3.5.2). We find that our earlier results 
are upheld: the CEO’s direct network (degree (D)) yields a higher fixed salary and so 
does the company’s direct network (Degree (C)). We also find that indirect networks are 
valued in monetary terms given the positive correlation with fixed salary. In contrast, the 
CEO’s fixed salary does not decrease when the company’s information collection ability 
through the combined director network is high.   
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[Insert Table 3.5.2 –3.5.5 about here] 
 
We reach similar conclusions when analyzing the relation between direct networks and 
the bonus (Table 3.5.4) and equity-based compensation (Table 3.5.5). The degree at both 
the individual and the company level increase these two sub-categories of compensation. 
Also, the closeness measure for individual CEO networks increases the CEO’s bonus and 
equity-based pay. Yet, the closeness on the company level limits these aspects of pay. So, 
it seems that a well-connected company that relies less on the CEO’s network, pays lower 
bonuses and equity-based compensation. We do not find any impact of networks on fees 
(Table 3.5.3) and other types of compensation not included in the above categories. It 
seems that managerial influence generated by direct networks increases all the main 
components of CEO compensation. The information-collection ability at the firm level 
reduces the performance-based compensation, bonus, and equity-based pay.   
 
To sum up, a CEO’s network increases his compensation through two channels. In line 
with the managerial influence hypothesis, the CEO’s direct links grant him more 
influence over the board. Potential collusion between network members may contribute 
to a larger remuneration package. We also find evidence that if the CEO has a network 
valuable for information collection, his pay increases accordingly. This is in line with the 
information collection hypothesis: a company rewards the CEO for the resources he 
contributes to the firm through his network. When we study the director networks at the 
company level, the managerial influence hypothesis and information collection 
hypothesis make different predictions. More specifically, we measure the direct links 
from the company to all ‘adjacent’ companies and the indirect links from the company to 
all companies in the population. The former, direct centrality (degree) has a positive 
correlation with CEO total compensation and its components. This result suggests that the 
direct interlocks of board members may weaken corporate governance efficiency and 
result in higher CEO compensation. The latter measure, closeness at the firm level, 
lowers CEO compensation because the board is better informed and needs to rely less on 
the CEO’s network. These two results demonstrate that it is important to have the ‘right’ 
type of networks, which provide valuable information rather than managerial influence.   72
 
Our results are not only significant statistically, but also economically. Considering the 
economic significance of a one standard deviation change in the centrality measures 
(Table 3.5.6), we find the degree measures at the individual level and company level have 
a relatively large influence (9% and 15%, respectively) on the CEO’s total compensation. 
The information value related measures have a smaller impact. A one standard deviation 
increase of closeness (which stands for better individual information access) raises the 
total compensation by 4%. When such information advantage is realized on the company 
level, total compensation is lowered by about 4%. In short, networks that enhance 
managerial influence seem more influential than information-collection networks. 
 
[Insert Table 3.5.6 about here] 
 
We move on to analyzing the pay-for-performance sensitivity, which is captured by 
performance and the interaction term between network and performance. Table 3.5.7 
shows that when the number of direct connections (column 1 (Degree D)) increases, the 
change in total compensation becomes less sensitive to stock performance. This is in line 
with the managerial influence hypothesis as we had already found higher compensation 
for CEOs with stronger direct connections and now show that the stock performance 
sensitivity declines for this type of CEOs. We do not find any evidence for accounting 
performance sensitivity. When the degree at the company level is high (column 2 of 
Table 3.5.7), we also find a lower sensitivity. A higher degree at the company level 
signifies that all the directors combined have many direct links with other companies. 
This implies that the executive directors may be more powerful but also that the 
non-executive directors exert duties in other firms which may erode their corporate 
governance effectiveness (busy board hypothesis). When we turn to the information 
collection aspect of the director networks, we note that the closeness measure for the 
CEO (nCloseness (D)) has no significant impact on the pay-for-performance sensitivity 
of his remuneration. This implies that a stronger director network position for the purpose 
of information collection is not translated into a stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity.   73
When we consider closeness on the company level, we observe less accounting 
performance-sensitivity, which does not support hypothesis 4
18. 
 
[Insert Table 3.5.7 about here] 
 
We have also included in each model a firm’s network resulting from the connections of 
its remuneration consultant through the client firms. This measure also captures a firm’s 
information gathering ability, similar to the closeness centrality discussed above. The 
firm benefits then from information on the remuneration practices of the remuneration 
consultant’s clients. The estimated network coefficient of the remuneration consultant is 
positive and significant, implying that companies associated with a remuneration 
consultant with a large client network pay their CEOs more. The interaction term of firm 
size with consultant network size is also significantly positive which signifies that larger 
firms employing larger remuneration consultants grant their CEOs a larger total 
compensation.  
 
5.2 Other Determinants of CEO Compensation 
In the regressions, we have also controlled for corporate performance, company size, 
CEO characteristics, and corporate governance variables such as ownership concentration 
and board composition.     
 
In most models, both accounting  and stock price performance have a significantly 
positive impact on total compensation. In the pay-for-performance analysis, the change in 
total compensation is more sensitive to stock performance than accounting performance. 
When the changes in the components of compensation are examined (not shown), we find 
that salary is more sensitive to accounting performance measure than to stock 
performance. Performance-related compensation including bonus and equity-based 
compensation are significantly positively influenced by both accounting and stock 
performance. Lastly, management fees are not related to performance. 
                                                 
 
18  Due to data limitation, in the current pay-for-performance study we do not include CEO’s wealth change 
in their stock and option holdings.   74
 
In line with the existing compensation literature, company size drives up CEO 
compensation as larger companies pay more to attract and retain top managers. The debt 
to assets ratio is also positively related to CEO compensation, which suggests that 
companies with high gearing (some of which may be financially distressed) need to 
attract or maintain CEOs with higher cost. CEO remuneration decreases with stock price 
volatility, which is somewhat counterintuitive as we would expect the CEO to be better 
compensated in risky firms which may be more difficult to manage or demand a larger 
equity-based compensation package (which is not the case). An alternative explanation 
for this result is that the company shift to fixed compensation as the performance signal 
for determining variable compensation contains too much noise.   
 
We also investigate the impact of CEO characteristics on CEO remuneration. Contrary to 
some of the literature on gender, we do not find any difference between the compensation 
of male and female CEOs, which may be the result of including other control variables 
such as tenure, age, industry, corporate size. Not surprisingly, a CEO’s compensation 
increases with tenure. Combining the function of CEO with the tasks of the chairman 
does increase his salary at a first glance. However, further investigation reveals that the 
combination of both functions is almost exclusive to small companies where the CEO 
compensation is lower. When we add the interaction term between the combination of 
CEO-chairman duality and total assets, the result indicates that a CEO earns more if he is 
also the chairman, considering firm size. We also include a dummy variable that equals 
one if the CEO is a member of one of the committees (audit, nomination and 
remuneration), as such memberships augment his influence. The results confirm that 
committee membership yield the CEO a larger compensation. When we include 
membership of the remuneration committee alone, we find that conflicts of interests 
prevail because the CEO’s total compensation is now higher. Lastly, the notice period of 
the CEO is not related to his pay. 
 
Board characteristics include the proportion of nonexecutive directors and of female 
directors on the board. In most model specifications, both proportions are positively   75
correlated with CEO total compensation. Contrary to the US results of Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009), our finding suggests that non-executive directors in the UK are lenient 
in granting the CEO high compensation. This may result from the fact that non-executive 
directors are executives in other firms and raising the pay in one firm, may increase the 
compensation in their own firm.   
 
The last set of control variables consist of the ownership variables. Among the three 
insider ownership categories, the CEO stock holdings are the only factor that significantly 
influences total compensation. Intuitively, as the CEO acquires a larger share stake in his 
company, a larger fraction of his wealth is tied to the corporate performance. Hence, he 
may need to be less incentivized through remuneration. We also find that non-executives 
shareholders are not more effective supervisors. As for the outsider ownership, in the 
categories of outsider block holders, only individual block holdings held by individuals or 
families not related to a director and the share stakes held through nominee accounts 
reduce the CEO’s compensation. Industrial block holdings are not related to the level of 
compensation. These findings provide some evidence that outsider blockholders may 
curb excessive compensation. However, if large share stakes are owned by institutions 
(bank, investment fund, pension and insurance company), the total compensation of the 
CEO is high. This is congruent with the fact that most institutional shareholders in the 
UK are passive monitors. A more detailed analysis by type of institutional owner is 
performed below in the section on the robustness checks. 
 
 
6. Further Analysis and Robustness Checks 
 
6.1 Endogeneity 
One criticism is that there may be one common factor which contributes to both high 
compensation and strong network connections. For example, a successful CEO who is 
well compensated attracts non-executive directorships because he has a good track record 
(good past performance). Therefore, we apply an instrumental variable approach with   76
board size and the CEO’s honorary title
19 as the instrumental variables for the centrality 
measures at the individual director (CEO) level (Table 3.6.1). The outcome confirms our 
earlier results that corroborate the managerial influence hypotheses as high CEO degree 
measures boost total compensation. Similarly, at the company level, the model with 
instrumental variables generates a similar conclusion as the one implied by the random 
effects models: high degree measures on the company levels (proxying both for executive 
power and busy boards) lead to higher CEO compensation. We do not find a significant 
impact of the closeness measures which captures the information collection value of a 
network. We also run a regression with individual CEO fixed effects (Table 3.6.2), but 
we reach the same conclusion: the relations between network centrality and compensation 
persist.  
 
[Insert Table 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 about here] 
 
6.2 Heckman Sample Selection Equations 
In most of the existing academic literature, the two main monitoring devices related to 
top management, namely the compensation (the carrot) and dismissal (the stick), are 
examined separately. However, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) point out that 
disregarding CEO turnover may cause sample selection problems. When the departing 
CEOs disappear in the sample in the year of departure (when a new CEO is hired), the 
sample distribution is biased. In order to take into account the information of CEO 
turnover, we employ the Heckman sample selection equations to simultaneously study 
turnover (the selection equation) and compensation (the regression equation). Table 3.6.3 
shows that the type-2 Tobit model yields virtually the same results as those resulting from 
the random effects models.   
 
[Insert Table 3.6.3 about here] 
 
 
                                                 
 
19  Variable equals one if the CEO has a honorary title such as Lord, Sir and/or Baron.   77
6.3 Other Centrality Measures 
Besides the degree and closeness measures, we use additional network statistics to 
estimate the strength of networks based on direct and indirect links. We run the 
regression models with eigenvector centrality and the betweenness measure as substitutes 
for degree and closeness, respectively. Details on the measurement can be found in the 
network methodology section. Both normalized eigenvector centrality and normalized 
betweenness at the director level are significantly positively correlated to total 
compensation, which is in line with our findings for degree and closeness. At the 
company level, whereas the eigenvector centrality estimates are congruent with those for 
degree, the betweenness measure yields different results than closeness. Although the 
betweenness measure is defined very differently from degree, the correlation in this 
sample between betweenness and degree is high. This explains the similar results from 
betweenness and degree. 
 
We also have run regressions with the following extensions.   
 
Including both degree and closeness 
Since degree and closeness have a low correlation, we can include both variables in the 
regression. The result shows that they give same implication as in the separated 
regressions, at individual level as well company level (Column 1 and 2 in Table 3.6.4 
respectively).  
 
[Insert Table 3.6.4 about here] 
 
Outward degree 
We mentioned in the previous section that the degree measure on the individual level 
could be affected by the board size. In order to resolve this problem, we create a degree 
variable that is only based on the ‘outward’ connections to other firms (and thus excludes 
the connections to the directors of the own company). By including the outward degree 
measure in our models, we draw the same conclusion as before for the analysis of total 
compensation: the CEO’s outwards degree measure increases the total compensation   78
significantly (Column 3 in Table 3.6.4). In the pay-for-performance sensitivity analysis, 
we also find evidence for the negative impact of outwards degree on the sensitivity in 
terms of stock performance. This suggests that it is the outwards direct connections that 
play an important role in the pay-setting process. 
 
Zero closeness for isolated companies 
In the company level networks, the closeness centrality for isolated companies cannot be 
defined and we therefore did not include isolated companies in our closeness analysis. An 
alterative method is to put these missing closeness scores to zero. Intuitively, the 
distances from these companies to others are considered as infinity. With this new 
definition of closeness, we obtain the opposite result (Column 4 Table 3.6.4): namely the 
closeness measure at company level increases the CEO total compensation. A possible 
reason is that isolated companies are usually small with low CEO compensation.   
 
Error terms as indirect centrality measures 
We have discussed in Section 2 that direct and indirect connections are not exclusive and 
in some cases they can be complementary. In order to disentangle the effect of direct and 
indirect connections, we employ different centrality measures. In this robustness check, 
we first run regressions with the closeness centrality measure as the dependent variable 
on degree centrality measure. The error term of this regression is the part of indirect 
centrality cannot be explained by the direct centrality. When we include this orthogonal 
indirect measure into the total remuneration regression, we find that this indirect measure 
(at the individual level) increases the CEO’s total compensation, which is in line with our 
earlier finding whereby we used closeness as the indirect centrality measure. Thus H2 is 
supported. In contrast, the orthogonal measure of indirect closeness at the company level 
does not lower CEO compensation, which is different than the prediction of H4. In the 
pay-for-performance study, we expect that better information access at the company level 
can improve the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation (H4). 
However, we have not found evidence for this prediction either for closeness or for the 
orthogonal indirect centrality measure. 
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Change in centrality measures 
We investigate whether the change in the centrality measures affects the total 
compensation or pay-for-performance sensitivity. We use individual’s and company’s 
percentage change in degree and closeness from previous year as independent variable. 
However, we do not find statistical evidence for the relation between change in centrality 
and total compensation or pay-for-performance sensitivity.   
 
6.4 Fees, Restricted Shares and Stock Options 
The separation of CEO and chairman does not seem to affect salary, bonus, or 
equity-based compensation. When we run a regression with total fees as the dependent 
variable, we observe that the combination of both positions is largely compensated by 
means of fees.   
 
In the regressions, we have combined restricted stock (LTIPs) and stock options into the 
category of equity-based compensation. However, these two types of compensation do 
have different characteristics in terms of risk and incentives. As stock options reward the 
owner in case of stock price appreciation but have a lower bound at zero in case the stock 
price drops, managers are incentivised to undertake riskier operations. Typically, stock 
options induce more risk-taking behaviour relative to restricted shares (Murphy, 1999). 
We now use each of these types of equity-based compensation as the dependent variable 
in our models. The level of stock options granted to the CEO increases with the degree 
measure both at the individual and company level. This result is in line with our earlier 
results on total compensation regression and our expectations as formulated by H1 and 
H3. The fact that closeness is not related to option compensation at both the individual 
and company level contradicts H2 and H4. Fewer restricted shares are granted to the CEO 
when closeness at the company is higher, which is in line with the result from the 
baseline model and H4. Other centrality measures (e.g., degree at individual and 
company level and closeness at individual level) are not related to restricted shares. In the 
pay-for-performance analysis, we find that compensation via stock option is less sensitive   80
to performance changes if the CEO has a higher degree centrality score. This supports the 
managerial influence hypothesis (H1). 
 
6.5 Extended Pay-for-performance Sensitivity   
While in the previous section, we have analyzed the total pay-for-performance sensitivity, 
we also examine the change in performance-related compensation (the sum of bonus and 
equity-based pay) to estimate the sensitivity. Our results are similar to those shown 
above.  
[Insert Table 3.6.5 about here] 
 
As a robustness check, we replace the level of performance in the sensitivity regression 
by the change in performance. This model yields results which are largely similar to the 
ones reported in Section 5.1.   
 
When we estimate models with the percentage changes in total compensation and 
performance, we obtain similar conclusions although with lower significance. Whether 
the CEO’s pay is sensitive to performance has been a long debate. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) find the low sensitivity for the US CEOs’ compensation package. Hall and 
Liebman (1998) offers counter evidence. Nonetheless, the relation between pay and 
performance is likely to be non-linear. Powerful CEOs would prefer their pay to be 
performance-sensitive when performance increases, but not be sensitive in case of 
declining performance. We therefore run our regressions on the sub-samples of positive 
and negative performance changes, but we find no significant difference between 
networks’ impact on pay-for-performance sensitivity he two sub-samples. 
 
6.6 Institutional Ownership Classification 
Our models include the main categories of shareholder. We partition the category of 
institutional investors into more detailed shareholder classes in order to investigate 
further which types among the institutions are more effective in influencing CEO pay 
(Table 3.6.6). The results from these regressions exhibit that pension funds are able to   81
restrain CEO compensation whereas the presence of blocks held by other classes of 
financial institutions does either have no effect or a positive one on CEO pay. 
 
[Insert Table 3.6.6 about here] 
 
6.7 Other Sample Specifications 
New and old contracts 
Our random effects models were based on firm-years. With the Heckman sample 
selection models, we focused on on-going CEO contracts. The compensation-centrality 
relation of a new CEO may be different from that for ongoing contracts. Compensation 
for the new CEO does not hinge on the past performance of his new firm (but possibly on 
the performance of his old firm). Therefore, the first year contract typically includes more 
extraordinary compensation components such as a sign-on bonus or relocation fee. These 
elements may be less relevant to the network-compensation relation. We still find similar 
results when we run our models on two separate samples, the new contracts and the old 
(on-going) contracts. For both the models applied to the new and the on-going contracts, 
we find very similar results as the ones shown in Section 5 (except that the company level 
closeness measure loses its significance for new contracts). 
 
[Insert Table 3.6.7 and 3.6.8 about here] 
 
Excluding financial companies 
The current sample includes all UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(including the ones listed on the Alternative Investment Market). We have also included 
financial companies in the network calculations as some bankers also belong to the 
director networks of industrial and commercial companies. Given that financial 
companies have a different asset structure and comply with different regulatory 
requirements than firms from other sectors, we re-estimate our results excluding financial 
firms, although that the director network measures are still calculated based on the graph 
including all companies. The result presented in Table 3.6.9 show that the non-financial 
sample yields the same results as shown above.     82
   
[Insert Table 3.6.9 about here] 
 
CEO and CEO equivalents 
Some companies do not have an executive director with the title of CEO. These 
companies are usually small and led by managing directors or other senior executives. 
We did not include these ‘CEO equivalent’ managers in our main regression. As a 
robustness check, we present regression result on the sample including both the CEOs 
and the CEO equivalents. The method to selection the CEO equivalent is explained in 
appendix B. As Table 3.6.1 shows, the results from this larger sample are quite similar to 
the CEO sample. 
 





In this paper, we have examined the relation between directors’ networks, and CEO 
compensation and pay-for-performance. Specifically, we distinguish between two 
functions of networks: the accumulation of managerial influence and the collection of 
valuable information and resources. The former implies that powerful CEOs may take 
advantage of their position to extract high benefits such as compensation at a cost to the 
shareholders. The latter function is beneficial to the company (and the director). The 
existing literature does not allow for this difference but we make this distinction by 
employing network centrality measures at the direct and indirect level. Strong direct 
networks (measured by degree and eigenvector centrality) proxy for managerial influence, 
whereas strong indirect networks (measured by closeness and betweenness) proxy for the 
information-collection value. We find that both strong direct and indirect networks are 
rewarded by higher compensation (fixed salary, bonus, and equity-based compensation). 
When we look further into pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, we 
find that high direct centrality measure decreases the pay-for-performance sensitivity.   83
The combination of high CEO compensation and low pay-for-performance corroborates 
the managerial influence hypothesis. While the information value of indirect networks is 
reflected in higher CEO compensation, this function of networks does not influence the 
pay-for-performance relation.   
 
When we study the director networks at the company level, the managerial influence 
hypothesis and information collection hypothesis have different predictions. More 
specifically, we measure the direct links of the target company and the indirect links from 
the company to all other reachable companies in the market. We find that strong direct 
company network leads to higher compensation (applies to all of its components) and 
lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. This finding is in line with the managerial 
influence hypothesis and the busy board hypothesis as directors who exert duties as 
executive or non-executive director may be less effective monitors as reflected in high 
CEO compensation with low pay-for-performance sensitivity. Closeness at the firm level 
lowers CEO compensation because the board is better informed and needs to rely less on 
the CEO’s network. Taken together, these two results suggest that it is important to have 
the ‘right’ type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information 
whereas others can lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of 
the firm and its shareholders. 
 
In this study on centrality-CEO compensation relation, we have controlled for many CEO, 
board, and company characteristics. For instance, our empirical findings confirm indeed 
that conflicts of interest emerge when a CEO is a member of the remuneration committee. 
In this case his compensation is significantly higher. We also document that remuneration 
consultants influence CEO compensation. When a firm hires a remuneration consultant 
with a large client network, CEO compensation is significantly higher. We also find that 
a high proportion of non-executive directors or female directors on the board also 
increases CEO total compensation.   84
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Figure 3.3.1. Example of a CEO’s professional network   
 
This Figure depicts the director networks surrounding Andy Hornby (white circle in the middle of the 
graph). Directors in the four companies served by Andy Hornby are represented as circles in different 
colors. In this figure, each circle stands for a vertex (director) in the network. Directors sitting on the same 
board established links between them. The lines between circles are the links between vertices (directors). 
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Figure 3.3.2. A Director Network Graph 
 





Table 3.3.1. An example of director network   
These tables explain how director networks are mathematically recorded and calculated. Panel A is an 
overview on the example network. Panel B is the matrix used to record the network. Panel C calculated the 
geodesic distance between each pair of directors. Panel D shows the basic centrality measures calculated 
for this example network. 
 
Panel A : Example of a network 
 
Company Director   Company Director 
1 a  5 a 
   5 b 
2 b  5 j 
2 c  5 f 
   5 d 
3 a    
3 e  6 b 
3 f  6 g 
   6 d 
4 h  6 e 
4 d  6 h 
4 i  6 i 
4 j      91
Panel B : Matrix representation of above table.   
 
   a  b c d e f  g h i  j 
a  0  101110011
b  1  011111111
c  0  100000000
d  1  100111111
e  1  101011110
f  1  101101011
g  0  101110110
h  0  101101011
i  1  101111101
j  1  101010110
 
Panel C : Geodesic distances 
 
  a  b  c  d  e  f  g  h  i  j 
a  0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
b  1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
c  2 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
d  1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
e  1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 
f  1 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 
g  2 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 
h  2 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 
i  1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
j  1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 
 
Panel D : Centrality measures 
 
 Degree  Closeness  Eigenvector  Betweenness 
a        6     12.000      0.299      0.167 
b        9      9.000      0.379      8.933 
c        1     17.000      0.054      0.000 
d        8     10.000      0.372      0.933 
e        7     11.000      0.336      0.567 
f        7     11.000      0.336      0.567 
g        6     12.000      0.299      0.167 
h        6     12.000      0.293      0.367 
i        8    10.000      0.372      0.933 
j        6    12.000      0.293      0.367 
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Table 3.3.2. Summary statistics of centrality measures (company level) 
 
This table summarizes the key centrality statistics (degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality) of the companies in 
the sample. N stands for is the number of observations (firm-years). Note that the number of observations is smaller for the 
closeness measure as closeness measure cannot be calculated for isolated (non-networked) companies. SD stands for standard 
deviation. P25, P50 and P75 are the values at the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentile. The summary statistics are calculated over all 
firm-years. Below each centrality measure is the normalized version denoted by “n”. The centrality measures are calculated using 
Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  Min  P25  P50  P75  Max 
degree  13854 4.02    3.88 0.00 1.00 3.00    6.00    29.00 
(n)  degree  13854  0.35   0.36  0.00  0.09  0.26   0.52   3.49 
closeness  11319 448,512    381,822 133,702 247,103 290,541    617,579    2,340,900 
(n)  closeness 11319  0.36   0.14  0.07  0.25  0.40   0.43   0.59 
Eigenvector  13854  0.01   0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00   0.02   0.36 
(n)  eigen  13854 1.94    3.68 0.00 0.00 0.48    2.25    50.23 
betweenness  13854  1,402.96    2,359.46 0.00 0.00  349.90    1,838.89    28,711.68 
(n)  between  13854  0.20   0.34  0.00  0.00  0.05   0.27   5.52 
 
Table 3.3.3. Summary statistics of centrality measures (company level) by year 
 
This table presents the annual average centrality measures on the company level over the sample period. In the first column are 
the names of different centrality measures, namely, degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. Below each 
centrality measure is the normalized version, denoted by “n”. The centrality measures are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. 
Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
degree  3.99   4.11   4.25   4.11   4.16  4.40  4.28  4.20  4.01   3.77   3.71  3.63 
(n)  degree  0.53   0.49   0.46   0.42   0.39  0.39  0.38  0.37  0.29   0.26   0.24  0.24 
closeness  156,205   166,495   202,946   233,054  306,080  321,953  324,680  351,209  566,905   709,816   728,352  802,400 
(n)  closeness  0.53   0.56   0.53   0.48   0.41  0.40  0.39  0.38  0.28   0.23   0.24  0.22 
eigenvector  0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02   0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01   0.01   0.01  0.01 
(n)  eigen  2.48   2.61   2.37   2.32   2.04  2.10  2.35  1.79  1.83   1.74   1.52  1.13 
betweenness  773.68   952.25   1,095.47   1,177.41   1,222.66  1,302.45  1,287.51  1,347.33  1,679.10   1,611.80   1,845.24  1,718.78 
(n)  between  0.28   0.28   0.26   0.24   0.22  0.20  0.21  0.20  0.17   0.15   0.16  0.15 
 
Table 3.3.4. Summary statistics of centrality measures (company level) by company size 
 
The table below shows the centrality difference by firm size as proxied by index membership. In the first row are the names of 
different centrality measures, namely, degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. Below each centrality measure 
is the normalized version denoted by “n”. The centrality measures are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own 
calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  degree  (n) degree  closeness  (n) closeness eigen  (n) eigen  between  (n) between 
FTSE  100  9.29   0.85   346,261  0.40  0.05  6.69   3,918.76  0.62 
FTSE  250  5.63   0.50   364,221  0.39  0.02  2.75   2,158.92  0.31 
FTSE  SmallCap  3.64   0.32   403,238  0.38  0.01  1.45   1,136.87  0.16 
FTSE  Fledgling  2.62   0.22   432,451  0.36  0.01  1.08   696.77  0.10 
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Table 3.3.5. Covariance matrix of the centrality measures 
The table presents the covariance matrix of the centrality measures. 
 
  d degree  dn close  dn between dn eigen  degree  n close  n between  n eigen 
Degree (D)  1         
(n) closeness (D)  0.186  1        
(n) betweenness (D)  0.762  0.124  1      
(n) eigenvector (D)  0.427  0.120  0.264 1     
Degree (C)  0.538  0.201  0.330 0.272 1    
(n) closeness (C)  0.180  0.97  0.122 0.136 0.172 1    
(n) betweenness (C)  0.467  0.228  0.340 0.261 0.846 0.223  1   
(n) eigenvector (C)  0.455  0.235  0.274 0.364 0.777 0.238  0.652  1
 
Table 3.3.6. Network component structure (company level) by year   
This table lists the average network component statistics over the sample period. Nr of obs. is the number of 
observations in each year. Density evaluates how many links actually exist in relation to the theoretical 
maximum number of links in the graph. N link is the number of links present in that year. NC>3 gives the 
number of components with size above three in that year. Max C is the size of the biggest component in that 
year. These statistics are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Nr of obs.  749  832  915  984 1,065 1,133 1,117 1,151 1,400 1,449  1,528  1531
Density  0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002  0.002
N  link  2990 3418 3888 4046 4434 4980 4780 4834 5610 5466 5676  5562
N  C>3  6 3 8 4 7 5 7 5 9 11 9  11
Max  C  573 664 739 786 836 896 877 902 1066 1052  1127  1101
 
Table 3.3.7. Network component structure (company level) by sector 
This table shows the component structure information by sector in 2007. In the first row, N link is the number 
of links present in that year. Degree (avg.) is the average degree of all companies. N C>3 gives the number of 
components with a size above three. Max C is the size of the biggest component. The centrality measures and 
structure statistics are calculated using Matlab and Ucinet. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  N link  Density  Degree (avg.)  Degree (sum)  N C> 3  max C 
Financial 202  0.0057  1.15  232 5  75
IT 197  0.0043  0.84  166  13  25
Logistics 148  0.0041  0.61  90 7  17
Energy 111  0.0051  0.56  62  7  6
Industry 105  0.0029  0.31  32  3  6
Medical 87  0.0094  0.81  70  4  13
Leisure 78  0.0060  0.46  36  3  5
Media 75  0.0054  0.40  30  4  3
Mining 73  0.0095  0.69  50  3  12
Retail 66  0.0061  0.39  26  4  4
Food 45  0.0121  0.53  24  2  4  94
Table 3.3.8. Networks of remuneration consultants 
 
This table shows the number of remuneration consultant links by company and by year. If a company does 
not hire a remuneration consultant, the value equals zero. If a company has more than one remuneration 
consultants, the sum of the links from the consultants is taken. Data source: Own calculations based on 
Manifest. 
 
 Mean  SD  Min  P25  P50  P75  Max 
1996 19    37  0 0 0 24 218 
1997 19    37  0 0 0 22.5 218 
1998 18    35  0 0 0 18.5 218 
1999 19    35  0 0 0 20 220 
2000 19    36  0 0 0 24 222 
2001 23    40  0 0 0 31 242 
2002 55    76  0 0 11 94 434 
2003 79    94  0 0 36 152 554 
2004 59    81  0 0 2 123 382 
2005 53    74  0 0 0 136 324 
2006 46    66  0 0 0 96 291 
2007 39    60  0 0 0 60 276 
Total  40    65  0 0 0 63 554   95
Figure 3.3.3a. The network of the financial sector 
This is the company networks in the finance industry in the UK market, 2007. Each box stands for a 




Figure 3.3.3b. The network of the IT sector 
This is the company networks in the IT industry in the UK market, 2007. Each box stands for a company. 




   96
Table 3.4.1. CEO remuneration 
 
This table shows CEO total remuneration and its components for the whole sample and over the period 1996 to 2007. N is the 
number of observations (firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value 
at the first and third quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type 
of remuneration. The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The 
other values are conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum 
number of observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years 
when a certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable  N Mean  SD  Min  P25 Median P75  Max Percent 
Total salary  13,854  202,931    203,891  0  0  166,000  296,600    2,400,000  30.70%
Salary in cash  3,392  302,738    220,312  1,846  151,086  249,500  395,000    2,248,685 
Salary in shares  8  21,412    27,830  2,993  2,999  5,000  41,374    69,554 
Total fees  13,854  4,032    45,895  0  0  0  0    4,939,000  0.61%
Fees in cash  685  32,777    50,598  448  19,000  23,000  29,412    1,000,000 
Fees in shares  1  755,555    .  755,555  755,555  755,555  755,555    755,555 
Total bonus  13,854  126,290    357,054  0  0  9,000  120,764    10,000,000  19.11%
Bonus in cash  7,006  221,039    401,899  130  50,000  112,500  241,000    10,000,000 
Bonus in shares  71  259,067    475,088  2,658  60,000  121,874  254,363    3,116,035 
Bonus vol deferred  74  284,467    299,701  6,445  81,975  166,500  420,000    1,312,500 
Bonus mand deferred  383  351,810    471,916  2,296  90,000  185,853  426,770    3,837,500 
Total  equity  13,854  296,215   2,507,032  0  0  0  112,998   186,841,117  44.81%
Restricted  shares  2,724  873,798    3,311,575  2 144,230 335,248 735,428    134,000,000 
Stock  options  2,504  724,886   6,170,366  0  85,577  202,765  424,812   186,841,117
Total miscellaneous  13,854  6,678    100,691  0  0  0  0    6,333,880  1.01%
Transaction Bonus  24  730,499    1,090,632  25,014  88,604  158,125  1,067,548    4,686,697 
Deferred Cash Bonus  74  315,155    763,065  573  66,973  138,000  299,623    6,333,880 
Loss of Office    88  372,080    327,852  20,775  156,500  267,550  442,500    1,544,745 
Recruitment incentive  29  535,351    800,968  4,556  87,500  221,799  539,000    3,225,044 
Reallocation expenses  28  121,207    134,532  5,000  38,146  72,000  130,055    500,000 
Other 13,854  24,867    102,144  0  0  10,000  20,000    6,624,000  3.76%
Overall  Total  13,854  661,012   2,652,929  0  39,375  253,684  622,868   186,879,117  100% 
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Figure 3.4.1. CEO remuneration structure over the whole sample from 
1996-2007 
 





Figure 3.4.2. CEO Remuneration over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
 
This figure shows the change in the value and structure of CEO compensation over the whole sample period. 
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Table 3.4.2. CEO remuneration structure over time 
 
This table shows the CEO remuneration structure over time. Panel A shows the average CEO compensation over time. The percentages are the proportion of this 
compensation component as part of total compensation. Panel B contains inflation-adjusted remuneration values, with 2007 as the base year. Panel C shows the 
CEO median compensation over time. N is the number of observations in each year. Equity-based compensation includes restricted shares and stock options. 
Miscellaneous covers transaction bonus, deferred bonus, loss of office, recruitment incentive and reallocation expenses. Except for Panel C, all the values are 
unconditional on whether that type of remuneration is granted. If a type of compensation is not granted to the CEO in a firm-year, a zero will be recorded as its 




  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007    Total
N  749    832    915  984 1,065 1,133 1,117 1,151 1,400 1,449 1,528 1,531    13,854   
Salary  181,009    190,203    192,741 194,401 204,652 209,295 210,977 217,923 203,087 205,214 200,275 209,441    202,931   
  44.59%  49.54%  48.80%  48.42%  28.18%  33.44%  32.78%  28.72%  26.62%  27.63%  25.55%  23.56%   34.82%
Fee  2,343    2,357    2,243 7,670 3,114 2,885 3,428 3,862 3,891 3,741 4,404 6,584    4,032   
  0.58%  0.61%  0.57%  1.91%  0.43%  0.46%  0.53%  0.51%  0.51%  0.50%  0.56%  0.74%   0.66%
Bonus  68,493   72,037   71,636  86,503 104,508  81,872 101,129 124,207 131,794 163,452 194,364 202,084    126,290   
  16.87%  18.76%  18.14%  21.54%  14.39%  13.08%  15.71%  16.37%  17.28%  22.01%  24.79%  22.74%   18.47%
Equity-based  131,144   96,742   96,935  83,871 385,216 302,648 286,757 380,858 388,319 338,883 352,450 436,809    296,215   
  32.30%  25.20%  24.54%  20.89%  53.04%  48.36%  44.55%  50.19%  50.91%  45.63%  44.96%  49.15%   40.81%
Miscellaneous 521    292    245 1,833 1,764  823  14,659 5,012  11,010 9,493 9,772  13,586    6,678   
  0.13%  0.08%  0.06%  0.46%  0.24%  0.13%  2.28%  0.66%  1.44%  1.28%  1.25%  1.53%   0.79%
Other  22,454    22,316    31,146 27,231 27,027 28,311 26,761 27,030 24,679 21,906 22,662 20,282    24,867   
  5.53%  5.81%  7.89%  6.78%  3.72%  4.52%  4.16%  3.56%  3.24%  2.95%  2.89%  2.28%   4.44%
Overall  Total  405,962    383,947    394,946 401,510 726,281 625,833 643,711 758,891 762,779 742,689 783,927 888,786    661,012   
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Panel B. Inflation adjusted 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007    All 
N  749 832 915 984 1,065 1,133 1,117 1,151  1,400 1,449 1,528 1,531    13,854
CPI Index  84.1    85.7    87.0 88.2 88.9 90.0 91.1 92.4 93.6 95.5 97.7  100.0     
Salary  215,115 222,010 221,515 220,518 230,151 232,624 231,544 235,952 216,972 214,859 204,974 209,441    221,306
Fees  2,784 2,751 2,578 8,700 3,502 3,207 3,762 4,182 4,157 3,917 4,507 6,584    4,219
Bonus  81,399 84,083 82,330 98,124 117,529 90,998 110,987 134,483  140,804 171,134 198,924 202,084    126,073
Equity-based  155,854 112,920 111,406 95,139 433,213 336,383 314,711 412,366 414,867 354,811 360,719 436,809    294,933
Miscellaneous  619 341 282 2,079 1,984 915 16,088 5,427  11,763 9,939 10,001 13,586    6,085
Other  26,685 26,048 35,796 30,889 30,394 31,467 29,370 29,266 26,366 22,936 23,194 20,282    27,724
Overall Total  482,454 448,152 453,906 455,451 816,774 695,591 706,463 821,674 814,928 777,595 802,318 888,786    680,341
 
Panel C 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007    Total 
N  749   832   915  984  1,065  1,133  1,117  1,151  1,400  1,449  1,528  1,531    13,854  
Salary  154,000   159,000   168,000  168,937  175,000  176,000  180,000  186,000  163,000  156,905  151,625  151,086    166,000  
Fees  0   0   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0    0  
Bonus  21,926   25,000   22,361  25,000  13,000  0  0  20,000  4,500  0  0  0    9,000  
Equity-based  0   0   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0    0  
Miscellaneous 0   0   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0    0  
Other  10,000   11,000   11,000  12,000  12,038  12,000  12,000  12,000  8,000  3,664  2,020  1,000    10,000  
Overall Total  214,100   226,382   237,720  236,000  263,000  267,418  273,000  309,540  270,915  259,170  241,288  228,727    251,303  
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Figure 3.4.3. Real (Inflation adjusted) and Nominal CEO remuneration over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
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Table 3.4.3. The best paid CEOs by industry in 2007 
 
This table shows the five highest paid CEOs by sector in 2007. Tenure is the number of years he/she has served as CEO. When turnover equals 1, the CEO will not leave his position in the 
subsequent year. When CEO=chair equals 1, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest and Datastream. 
 
CHEMICAL                       
Company First_name  Surname  Gender Age  Tenure  Turn over  Chairman Salary total  Fees total  Bonus  Equity-based  Misc. Others Total 
GlaxoSmithKline plc  Jean-Pierre  Garnier  Male  60  8 1 0 911,554   0  1,364,309  13,700,000  0  763,490  16,700,000  
Shire plc (OLD)  Matthew  Emmens  Male  56  5 0 0 582,186    0 1,049,546 5,357,139  0  212,025 7,200,896   
AstraZeneca plc  David R  Brennan  Male  54  2 1 0 999,184    0 1,015,300 4,943,462  0  151,086 7,109,033   
Phytopharm plc  Daryl  Rees  Male  47  1 1 0 181,401   0  77,000  2,014,572  0  16,778  2,289,751   
Johnson  Matthey  plc  Neil  Carson   Male  51  4 1 0 630,000   0  573,000  959,999  0  29,000  2,191,999  
Average         660,865   0  815,831  5,395,034  0  234,476  7,098,336  
COMMUNICATIONS           
Vodafone Group plc  Arun  Sarin  Male  53  5 1 0 1,310,000    0 2,130,000 6,108,709  0  155,000 9,703,709   
BT Group plc  Ben  Verwaayen  Male  56  6 0 0 792,000    0 2,301,000 2,966,123  0  53,000 6,112,123   
Freedom4 Communications plc  Micheal  Read  Male  60  4 1 0 384,000    0 1,800,000  563,775  0  0 2,747,775   
Inmarsat plc  Andrew  Sukawaty  Male  52  4 1 1 376,709   0  400,882  496,539  0  18,130  1,292,261  
Thus Group plc  William  Allan  Male  54  9 1 0 435,120    0  209,075  602,140  0  21,147  1,267,482   
Average         659,566    0 1,368,191 2,147,457  0  49,455 4,224,670   
FINANCIAL           
Man Group plc  Peter  Clarke  Male  48  0 1 0 462,000   0  6,724,000  5,675,855  0 11,000  12,900,000   
ICAP plc  Michael  Spencer  Male  53  9 1 0 360,000   0  7,675,000  2,838,647  0  5,817  10,900,000   
F&C Asset Management plc  Alain  Grisay  Male  54  2 1 0 325,000    0 1,794,333 7,334,000  0  11,000 9,464,333   
HSBC Holdings plc  Michael  Geoghegan  Male  54  2 1 0 1,040,000   0  1,915,000  5,013,237 0  61,000  8,029,237   
Royal Bank of Scotland  Frederick    Goodwin  Male  49  8 1 0 1,290,000   0  2,860,000  3,717,474 0  40,000  7,907,474   
Average         695,400    0 4,193,667 4,915,843  0  25,763 9,840,209     102
 
FOOD                            
Company First_name  Surname  Gender Age Tenure Turn  over Chairman  Salary total Fees total Bonus  Equity-based Misc.  Others  Total 
Tesco plc  Terence  Leahy  Male  52 11 1 0 1,293,000  0 2,879,000  16,400,000  0  95,000  20,600,000   
Diageo plc  Paul  Walsh  Male  53 8 1 0 1,087,000  0 1,188,000  6,166,799  0  39,000 8,480,799   
J Sainsbury plc  Justin  King  Male  47 4 1 0 850,000  0  1,563,000 4,552,890  0  29,000  6,994,890   
SABMiller plc  Ernest  Mackay  Male  59 9 1 0 1,020,000  0 1,606,000  3,943,875  0  310,055 6,879,930   
British American Tobacco plc  Paul  Adams    Male  55 4 1 0 1,076,641  0 1,015,616  3,245,902  0  137,016 5,475,175   
Average           1,065,328 0  1,650,323  6,861,893  0  122,014  9,686,159   
IT            
Invensys plc  Ulf  Henriksson  Male  45 3 1 0 750,000  0  1,024,500 7,497,647  0  15,857  9,288,004   
Misys plc  John  Lawrie  Male  55 2 1 0 570,000  0  1,026,000 2,097,433  0  31,681  3,725,114   
Sage Group plc; The  Paul  Walker    Male  50 21 1 0 699,000  0 793,000 1,075,362  0  21,000  2,588,362   
Logica plc  Martin Peter  Read  Male  58 14 0 0 503,000  0  0 1,505,673  0  29,000  2,037,673   
Innovation Group plc; The  Hassan  Sadiq  Male  40 5 1 0 285,000  0 200,000 1,485,000  0  48,000  2,018,000   
Average           561,400 0  608,700  2,732,223  0  29,108  3,931,431   
LEISURE            
Sportech plc  Ian  Penrose  Male  42 2 1 0 281,000  0 420,000 4,350,000  0  16,000  5,067,000   
Partygaming plc  Mitchell  Garber  Male  43 2 1 0 528,802  0 396,832  530,700  3,225,044  90,480  4,771,858   
InterContinental Hotels Group plc  Andrew  Cosslett  Male  53 3 1 0 732,000  0  1,114,560 2,776,197  0  25,000  4,647,757   
Domino's Pizza UK & Ireland plc  Stephen  Hemsley  Male  50 7 0 0 240,000  0 240,000 3,360,000  0  35,000  3,875,000   
Thomas Cook Group plc  Manny  Fontenla-Novoa  Male  54 1 1 0 231,000  0  2,652,000  842,839  0  5,000  3,730,839   
Average           402,560 0  964,678  2,371,947  645,009  34,296  4,418,491   
LOGISTICS            
Galiform plc  Matthew  Ingle  Male  53 2 1 0 525,000  0 525,000 5,656,541  0  18,000  6,724,541   
Clarkson plc  Richard  Fulford-Smith  Male  53 4 1 0 550,000  0  2,500,000  808,220  0  90,000  3,948,220   
Bunzl plc  Michael  Roney  Male  54 2 1 0 725,000  0 556,000 2,076,675  0  28,900  3,386,575   
Michael Page International plc  Stephen  Ingham  Male  45 2 1 0 360,000  0  1,533,000 1,277,626  0  22,000  3,192,626   
Experian plc  Don  Robert  Male  49 2 1 0 704,977  0 704,977 1,138,076  0  473,845  3,021,876   
Average           572,995 0  1,163,795  2,191,428  0  126,549  4,054,768     103
 
MEDIA                            
Company First_name  Surname  Gender Age Tenure Turn  over Chairman  Salary total Fees total Bonus  Equity-based Misc.  Others  Total 
WPP Group plc  Martin  Sorrell  Male  63 22 0 0 1,003,000  0 1,650,000  5,448,569  0  35,000  8,136,569   
Pearson plc  Marjorie  Scardino  Female  61 11 1 0 900,000  0  1,341,000 3,810,123  0  91,000  6,142,123   
British Sky Broadcasting Group plc  Jeremy  Darroch  Male  47 1 1 0 675,029  0  1,216,250 3,629,200  0  17,132  5,537,611   
Yell Group plc  John  Condron  Male  58 7 1 0 850,000  0  1,206,150 2,356,120  0  311,000  4,723,270   
Reed Elsevier plc  Crispin  Davis    Male  59 8 1 0 1,135,680  0 1,267,419  2,076,728  0  28,137  4,507,964   
Average           912,742 0  1,336,164  3,464,148  0  96,454  5,809,507   
MINING & MANUFACTURING            
BHP Billiton plc  Marius  Kloppers  Male  47 1 1 0 842,571  0 907,285  15,200,000  0  37,323  17,000,000   
Ferrexpo plc  Michael  Oppenheimer  Male  54 2 1 0 286,057  0  0 2,280,342  4,686,698  0  7,253,096   
Rexam plc  Leslie  Van De Walle  Male  52 1 1 0 750,000  0 360,000 4,217,837  1,469,482  81,000  6,878,319   
Tomkins plc  James  Nicol  Male  54 6 1 0 879,000  0  1,142,000 3,614,166  0  45,000  5,680,166   
Gem Diamonds Ltd  Clifford  Elphick  Male  47 0 1 0 356,383  0 231,649 5,052,310  0  24,060  5,664,402   
Average           622,802 0  528,187  6,072,931  1,231,236  37,477  8,495,197   
OTHER (E.g., Health care equipment )            
Reckitt Benckiser Group plc  Bart  Becht  Male  51 8 1 0 912,000  0  3,257,000  26,700,000  0  112,000  31,000,000   
Burberry Group plc  Angela  Ahrendts  Female  48 2 1 0 850,000  0  1,147,500 8,863,719  1,760,934  420,000  13,000,000   
Eurasian Natural Resources Corp plc  Johannes  Sittard  Male  65 1 1 0 1,623,000  0 1,000,000  9,990,000  0  53,000  12,700,000   
Shire plc  Matthew  Emmens  Male  56 5 0 0 582,186  0  1,049,546 5,354,655  0  212,025  7,198,412   
Cadbury Schweppes plc  H  Stitzer  Male  56 5 1 0 862,000  0  1,715,000 2,060,791  0  666,000  5,303,791   
Average           965,837 0  1,633,809  10,593,833  352,187  292,605  13,840,441   
RETAILING            
Marks & Spencer Group plc  Stuart  Rose  Male  59 4 1 0 1,070,000  0  0  5,774,992  0  305,000  7,149,992   
DSG International plc  John  Browett  Male  44 0 1 0 275,000  0  0 2,834,111  600,000  7,000  3,716,111   
HMV Group plc  Simon  Fox  Male  47 2 1 0 493,000  0 498,000 2,376,596  0  1,000  3,368,596   
Signet Group plc  Terry Lee  Burman  Male  62 8 1 0 792,014  0  0 2,048,197  0  55,375  2,895,586   
Kingfisher plc  Gerard  Murphy  Male  52 5 0 0 925,700  0 326,000 1,380,138  0  57,468  2,689,306   
Average           711,143 0  164,800  2,882,807  120,000  85,169  3,963,918     104
UTILITIES                            
Company First_name  Surname  Gender Age Tenure Turn  over Chairman  Salary total Fees total Bonus  Equity-based Misc.  Others  Total 
Royal Dutch Shell plc  Jeroen  van der Veer  Male  60 10 0 0 1,305,176  0 2,122,106 14,300,000  0  23,463  17,700,000   
BG Group plc  Frank  Chapman  Male  55 7 1 0 996,593  0  1,400,000 6,266,753  0  4,161  8,667,507   
Dana Petroleum plc  Thomas  Cross  Male  47 13 1 0 588,000  0  1,764,000 4,527,650  0  65,000  6,944,650   
BP plc  Anthony  Hayward    Male  51 1 1 0 877,000  0  1,262,000 3,616,312  0  14,000  5,769,312   
Centrica plc  William  Laidlaw  Male  52 2 1 0 873,000  0 753,000 2,865,444  0  64,000  4,555,444   
Average           927,954 0  1,460,221  6,315,232  0  34,125  8,727,383   
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Table 3.4.4. CEO total remuneration by size (index) 
This table shows the CEOs’ total remuneration by index membership over time. The data is nominal. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Average  Annual Increase 
FTSE 100  955,869 1,038,242    1,120,791 1,299,045 1,514,746 2,028,255 2,311,766 2,679,007    3,286,194 3,242,778 3,670,274 4,437,831  2,334,128 15.30% 
FTSE 250  415,895  504,910    496,427  482,648 1,191,443  750,820 1,009,197 1,115,332    1,560,428 1,295,518 1,412,776 1,551,190  998,383  19.41% 
FTSE SmallCap  369,810 228,203    246,511 246,755 781,335 476,123 421,753 641,486    404,161 505,388 612,414 708,272  483,963  19.36% 
FTSE Fledgling  125,901 133,963    137,530 165,358 241,735 318,374 210,233 208,834    231,710 332,479 295,162 273,020  234,954  9.84% 
 
Figure 3.4.4. CEO remuneration across indices over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
This figure compares the average total CEO compensation of firms listed in different indices. 
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Table 3.4.5. CEO characteristics: tenure, age, gender, and board duality 
 
These panels summarize the individual characteristics of the CEOs. Panels A-D present the data on gender, 
age, tenure (in years), and board duality (are the functions of CEO and chairman of the board exerted by 
two different persons or by the CEO alone). N stands for the number of firm-years. The mean is the average 
value of the variable; SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at the 25% and 75% 
quartiles, respectively. The exceptionally old CEO of 97 years is Gerald Ashfield who joined London and 
St Lawrence Investment Company plc in 1952. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Panel  A.  Male    N Mean  SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
CEO 13,289    0.981  0.137  0 1 1  1  1
Executive dirs. (excl CEO)  35,463   0.961  0.194  0 1 1  1  1
Non-executive dirs.  62,622   0.946  0.226  0 1 1  1  1
Panel B. Age          
CEO  13,289    53  8 26 47 53    58    97 
Executive dirs. (excl CEO)  35,463   50  8  25  44  50   55   86 
Non-executive  dirs.  62,622    58  8 23 54 59    64    91 
Panel C. Tenure          
CEO  13,289    6 7 0 1 4    8    51 
Executive dirs. (excl CEO)  35,463   7  6  0  3  5   9   90 
Non-executive  dirs.  62,622    7 6 0 3 6    9    95 
 
Figure 3.4.5. CEO turnover and tenure over the whole sample from 1996-2007 
 
This figure depicts the trends in turnover, non-retirement turnover and tenure for CEOs over the whole 
sample period. The diamond curve and square curve stands for the turnover and disciplinary turnover 
trends, using vertical axis on the left. The circle curve shows the average CEO tenure over sample period, 
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Table 3.4.6. CEO turnover and contract notice period 
 
Panel A presents basic statistics concerning CEO turnover. Panel B also shows the notice period of CEO 
contracts. The frequency/percentage columns give how often a specific notification period is included in a 
CEO employment contract. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 












Panel B. Notice period 














Total  13854 100%
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Table 3.4.7. Board structure and board committees 
 
This table gives an overview of the board composition and structure and of the board’s committees. In Panel A, N is the 
number of observations. The mean is the average value of the variable; SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 
are the values at the 25% and 75% quartiles, respectively. Board size refers to the number of directors on the board. 
Percentage of executives is calculated as number of executives divided by board size. The number of males is the 
number of male directors on the board. Similarly, the Percentage of males is the number of males divided by the board 
size. The bottom row of Panel A shows the probability of having the CEO as chairman of the board. Panel B shows the 
frequency of occurrence of the three main board committees in UK listed firms. The denominator is the number of firm 
years: 13845). Panel C gives details on the staffing of the committees. The first row reports the size of the committee. The 
second row shows the proportion of committees with at least one executive presence in all firm years. The last row 
shows the average proportion of executives in the committee. Panel D shows the CEO’s presence in the committees. Data 
source: Own calculations based on Manifest 
 
Panel A 
 Mean  SD  Min  P25  P50  P75  Max 
B o a r d  s i z e   7 . 8 9     3 . 4 1167   1 0   2 6
Number of executive dirs.  3.35    2.26  0 2 3  5  18
Percentage of executive dirs  41%    15.0%  0% 25.0%  35.3%    45.5%    100%
Percentage of male dirs.  96%    8% 0% 92.0%  100%  100%  100%




Presence of Committee in listed firms  
(13854 firm-years)  Audit Committee  Nomination Committee  Remuneration Committee
Present  98.0% 80.1% 87.7% 
Absent 0.5%  18.4%  10.8% 
Unknown 1.5%  1.5%  1.5% 
        
Panel C. Composition of Committee Audit  Committee  Nomination  Committee Remuneration  Committee
Average committee size  3.81  4.30  3.80 
Executive presence in the committee    17.7%  53.5%  20.2% 
Proportion of executives in the committee  2.1%  14.7%  2.3% 
    
Panel D. CEO presence in committees    Audit Committee  Nomination Committee  Remuneration Committee
No  80.7% 54.6% 88.8% 
Yes as a Member  13.9%  32.5%  7.8% 
Yes as the Chairman  3.9%  11.4%  1.9% 
Unknown 1.5%  1.5%  1.5% 
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Table 3.4.8. CEO presence in committee by index 
 
This table provides information about CEO’s presence (as member or chairman) in a committee for 
companies belonging to different indices. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
 Audit  Committee 
FTSE Index  FTSE 100  
 1276  firm-years 
FTSE 250 
 3386  firm-years 
FTSE Small Cap 
 4662  firm-years 
FTSE Fledgling 
 2705  firm-years 
No  member    98.0% 87.9% 77.1% 69.2% 
Member  1.8%  10.0% 17.8% 21.5% 
Chairman  0.2% 2.0% 4.7% 8.1% 
Unknown  0%  0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 
   Nomination Committee 
No member  46.5% 44.3% 47.2% 60.2% 
Member  47.0% 43.4% 37.9% 23.4% 
Chairman  6.5%  12.2% 14.5% 15.2% 
Unknown  0%  0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 
   Remuneration Committee 
No member  97.3% 92.8% 90.3% 82.7% 
Member 2.2%  6.3%  7.6%  11.6% 
Chairman  0.5% 0.8% 1.7% 4.6% 
Unknown  0%  0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 
 
Table 3.4.9. Remuneration advisors   
This table shows the top 10 remuneration advisors in UK listed companies. Frequency indicates the number 
of companies that advisor has been employed to advise in a certain field. For instance, Towers Perrin has 
been hired by 142 companies during the sample period 1996-2007. ‘Internal advice’ signifies that the 
company explicitly mentions not to have hired an external advisor but to rely on internal advice only. Data 
source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Top 10 Remuneration advisor  Frequency Percentage 
New Bridge Street Consultants    376 15.3% 
Towers Perrin  142 5.8% 
Deloitte & Touche    121 4.9% 
Watson Wyatt    117 4.8% 
Monks Partnership  97 3.9% 
Mercer Human Resource Consulting  86 3.5% 
PricewaterhouseCoopers    58 2.4% 
KPMG    56 2.3% 
Kepler Associates    47 1.9% 
Hewitt Bacon & Woodrow  41 1.7% 
Internal Advice  561 22.8% 
Total (excluding Internal Advice)  1141 46.3% 
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Table 3.4.10. Ownership concentration over time of all listed companies 
 
This table shows how ownership concentration has developed over time. The numbers are based on all disclosed ownership 
stakes of 3% or more for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all shareholdings are reported and 
included in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the CEO. The table also shows 
share percentages owned by institutions, including banks, insurance companies, investment funds, pension funds, and of 
other outsiders such as corporations and individuals and families not related to a director. Data source: Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
 
  %  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  total 
N  760 807 939 1078 1063 1103 1344 1386  1409  1398  11412
CEO   1.3% 2.4% 2.8% 3.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.2% 2.7% 2.6% 2.2%  2.5%
Executive directors (incl. CEO)    2.6% 4.9% 5.5% 6.0% 4.8% 4.8% 4.1% 4.5% 4.9% 4.4%  4.7%
Non-executive directors    0.9% 1.8% 2.1% 2.8% 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4%  2.1%
Inside total  3.6% 6.7% 7.5% 8.8% 7.0% 7.0% 6.2% 6.6% 7.3% 6.8%  6.8%
Nominee accounts  0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 2.1% 2.2% 2.2%  1.5%
Institutions total  18.2% 19.1% 20.2% 21.6% 22.3% 22.7% 18.0% 20.9% 21.1% 22.3%  20.7%
Bank  funds  2.9% 2.0% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%  1.7%
Insurance  companies’  funds  6.5% 6.6% 6.2% 4.4% 3.7% 3.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4%  3.8%
Investment  and  mutual  funds  8.5% 10.1% 12.1% 15.4% 16.4% 16.9% 13.3% 16.1% 16.4% 17.5%  14.7%
Pension  funds  0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%  0.6%
Individuals and families  5.2% 1.6% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 1.8% 1.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3%  1.9%
Corporations  9.9% 9.0% 7.6% 6.9% 7.2% 7.1% 6.0% 7.6% 7.9% 9.3%  7.8%
Outside total  34.0% 30.7% 30.5% 31.4% 32.5% 32.7% 26.8% 32.0% 32.7% 35.1%  31.8%
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Table 3.4.11. Ownership concentration across indices 
 
This table presents the ownership difference for firms belonging to indices (FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE 
Small Cap, and FTSE Fledgling). The numbers are based on all disclosed ownership stakes of 3% or more 
for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all shareholdings are reported and included 
in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the CEO. The table 
also shows share percentages owned by institutions, including banks, insurance companies, investment 
funds, pension funds, and of other outsiders such as corporations and individuals and families not related to 
a director. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  FTSE  100  FTSE  250  FTSE Small Cap  FTSE Fledgling 
N  1049 2833 3967    2315 
CEO   0.3% 1.5% 2.5% 3.2%
Executive directors (incl. CEO)    1.1% 3.1% 4.7% 5.7%
Non-executive directors    0.2% 1.5% 2.0% 3.1%
Inside total  1.3% 4.6% 6.7% 8.7%
Nominee accounts  0.8% 0.6% 1.2% 1.5%
Institutions total  12.2% 21.2% 24.7% 25.3%
Bank funds  1.8% 2.1% 1.8%  1.6%
Insurance companies’ funds  2.3% 5.2% 5.2%  3.5%
Investment and mutual funds  8.0% 13.5% 16.9%  19.1%
Pension funds  0.1% 0.3% 0.7%  1.1%
Individuals and families  0.8% 1.1% 1.9% 3.2%
Corporations  5.9% 6.9% 8.2% 9.3%
Outside total  19.7% 29.8% 35.9% 39.2%
   112
Table 3.4.12. Ownership concentration by sector 
 
This table shows company ownership structure in different sectors according to the broad sector classification shown above. The 
numbers are based on all disclosed ownership stakes of 3% or more for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all 
shareholdings are reported and included in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the CEO. 
The table also shows share percentages owned by institutions, including banks, insurance companies, investment funds, pension funds, 
and of other outsiders such as corporations and individuals and families not related to a director. Data source: Own calculations based 
on Manifest. 
 
(All in percentage)  Chemical  Communi




Other Retailer Utility 
CEO   1.9% 5.2% 3.1% 1.2% 4.3% 2.1% 2.9% 2.7% 1.7% 1.2% 5.2% 1.7%
Exec   4.1% 6.2% 5.7% 2.8% 8.0% 4.2% 4.8% 7.7% 3.4% 2.1% 9.7% 3.7%
Nonexec   2.1% 1.0% 2.1% 1.8% 3.2% 3.0% 2.5% 2.1% 1.8% 1.4% 3.2% 2.3%
Inside total  6.2% 7.2% 7.8% 4.6% 11.2% 7.3% 7.3% 9.8% 5.2% 3.4%  12.9% 6.0%
Nominee accounts  1.2% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% 1.6% 0.9% 1.1% 2.0% 2.1% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9%
Institution total  19.5%  14.6% 21.3%  16.2% 20.2% 19.7% 22.5% 19.7% 20.5%  22.4%  18.7% 17.9%
Bank  1.5% 1.4% 1.6% 1.0% 1.5% 2.1% 1.8% 1.4% 1.9% 2.0% 1.6% 1.3%
Insurance  companies  2.8% 1.6% 4.8% 2.9% 2.9% 3.1% 3.8% 2.4% 4.2% 4.6% 3.2% 2.7%
Investment  funds  15.0% 11.5% 14.4% 12.1% 15.4% 14.2% 16.5% 15.7% 14.1% 14.6% 13.8% 13.7%
Pension  funds  0.3% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.4% 1.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Individual  1.3% 1.0% 1.8% 3.3% 2.3% 2.7% 2.2% 2.3% 1.7% 1.3% 3.5% 0.9%
Industrial 
companies  8.3%  12.4% 7.8% 8.5% 6.3% 10.2% 6.5% 11.8% 8.1% 6.8% 8.5% 9.5%
Outside total  30.4% 29.2% 31.9% 28.7% 30.3% 33.4% 32.3% 35.7% 32.4% 32.2% 32.5% 30.3%
 
 
Table 3.5.1. Random effects models explaining CEO total compensation   
 
The dependent variable in these random effect models is the natural logarithm of CEO annual total compensation. Performance is 
measured by return on assets and a market-adjusted stock return (with the FTSE All share index as the market). The definitions of the 
centrality measures are given in the main text. The D following the names of the centrality measures in the column titles refers to 
centrality measures on the individual director level; C refers to the company level. Gender equals to 1 if the director is male. Tenure is 
the number of years on the board of directors. Committee membership is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the subject is a member in 
any of the board’s committees. If the CEO is also the chairman, the Chairman-CEO duality variable equals 1. Also included is an 
interaction term between chairmanship and company size (measured by Total assets in ₤ millions). The notice period is the contractual 
notice in months that a company has to give to the CEO before his dismissal. The proportion of non-executive and female directors is 
based on the total number of directors. The size of remuneration consultant is the number of his listed client firms. The ownership 
concentration data by type of shareholder are the accumulated stakes passing the 3% disclosure threshold. The director ownership 
concentration data consist of the aggregate of all reported shares. Lastly, company financial information is gathered from data stream. 
The debt to assets ratio is the long term debt divided by the total assets. Stock price volatility is The stock's average annual price 
movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year: (high-low)/(high+low). 12 year and 12 industry dummies are also 
included. Data Source: own calculations based on data from Manifest, Thomson Financial, PricewaterhouseCoopers ownership 
database, annual reports.   113
 
Table 3.5.1 (Continued) 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  12.4124  < 0.001 12.3034 < 0.001 12.4806 < 0.001  12.2907  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0045  < 0.001 0.0044 < 0.001 0.0042 < 0.001  0.0040  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0002 0.021 0.0002 0.021 0.0002 0.024  0.0002 0.085
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.0136  < 0.001 0.0372 < 0.001 1.7933 0.001  -0.2807  0.032
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  0.0150 0.865 -0.0127 0.885 -0.0126 0.887  -0.0535 0.589
Tenure (months)  0.0068  < 0.001 0.0079 < 0.001 0.0077 < 0.001  0.0070  0.001
Committee membership (=1)  0.1207  < 0.001 0.1196 < 0.001 0.1253 < 0.001  0.1631  < 0.001
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.2875  < 0.001 -0.2478 < 0.001 -0.2669 < 0.001  -0.2274  < 0.001
Duality*firm size  0.0153 0.020 0.0136 0.039 0.0146 0.026  0.0133 0.040
Notice period (months)  0.0039 0.164 0.0040 0.152 0.0045 0.111  0.0058 0.048
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.9046  < 0.001 0.7637 < 0.001 0.8625 < 0.001  0.9157  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  0.7917  < 0.001 0.7058 < 0.001 0.8261 < 0.001  0.9518  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0020  < 0.001 0.0020 < 0.001 0.0020 < 0.001  0.0019  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.039 0.0000 0.031 0.0000 0.047  0.0000 0.843
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0052  < 0.001 -0.0053 < 0.001 -0.0055 < 0.001  -0.0067  < 0.001
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0017 0.185 -0.0011 0.409 -0.0014 0.274  -0.0028 0.047
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0015 0.277 -0.0010 0.462 -0.0012 0.374  -0.0016 0.303
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0042 0.010 -0.0040 0.015 -0.0041 0.012  -0.0011 0.567
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0020 0.001 0.0018 0.002 0.0017 0.002  0.0009 0.149
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0004 0.602 0.0000 0.963 -0.0002 0.800  -0.0006 0.514
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0031 0.057 -0.0030 0.069 -0.0034 0.037  -0.0048 0.008
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0001 0.788 0.0002 0.418 0.0001 0.587  0.0010 0.008
Debt to asset ratio  0.0027  < 0.001 0.0024 < 0.001 0.0027 < 0.001  0.0024  0.001
Stock price volatility  -0.0068  < 0.001 -0.0060 < 0.001 -0.0072 < 0.001  -0.0076  < 0.001
R-squared  0.3484 0.3716 0.3142 0.3157 
Number of observations  6773  6773  6773 5839 
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Table 3.5.2. Random effects model explaining CEO salary   
 
The natural logarithm of total salary in CEO compensation is the dependent variable in these regressions. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO salary 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  11.5529  < 0.001 11.5299 < 0.001 11.5499 < 0.001  11.6177  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0028  < 0.001 0.0028 < 0.001 0.0027 < 0.001  0.0024  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.0001 0.220 -0.0001 0.202 -0.0001 0.188  -0.0002 0.071
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.0116  < 0.001 0.0271 < 0.001 1.3663 < 0.001  0.0001  0.999
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  0.0763 0.215 0.0554 0.367 0.0598 0.336  0.0533 0.448
Tenure (months)  0.0158  < 0.001 0.0167 < 0.001 0.0165 < 0.001  0.0159  < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  0.0982  < 0.001 0.0986 < 0.001 0.1049 < 0.001  0.1386  < 0.001
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.1093  < 0.001 -0.0798 0.002 -0.0958 < 0.001  -0.0702  0.014
Duality*firm size  0.0077 0.103 0.0067 0.153 0.0078 0.099  0.0062 0.187
Notice period (months)  0.0073  < 0.001 0.0076 < 0.001 0.0081 < 0.001  0.0079  < 0.001
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.7486  < 0.001 0.6457 < 0.001 0.7336 < 0.001  0.7721  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  0.4521  < 0.001 0.3934 0.001 0.4834 < 0.001  0.5152  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0012  < 0.001 0.0012 < 0.001 0.0012 < 0.001  0.0012  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.282 0.0000 0.254 0.0000 0.306  0.0000 0.383
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0020 0.054 -0.0022 0.034 -0.0024 0.021  -0.0024 0.043
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0008 0.382 -0.0003 0.725 -0.0006 0.504  -0.0019 0.060
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0018 0.058 -0.0014 0.136 -0.0017 0.080  -0.0021 0.051
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0027 0.023 -0.0025 0.031 -0.0027 0.023  -0.0017 0.196
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0008 0.056 0.0006 0.133 0.0006 0.178  0.0000 0.914
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0002 0.764 0.0002 0.739 0.0000 0.974  -0.0003 0.642
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0021 0.072 -0.0020 0.081 -0.0025 0.036  -0.0028 0.030
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0001 0.481 0.0002 0.206 0.0002 0.299  0.0009  <  0.001
Debt to asset ratio  0.0025  < 0.001 0.0023 < 0.001 0.0026 < 0.001  0.0028  < 0.001
Stock price volatility  -0.0046  < 0.001 -0.0041 < 0.001 -0.0049 < 0.001  -0.0049  < 0.001
R-squared  0.3284 0.3485 0.2932 0.2907 
Number of observations  6655 6655 6655 5755 
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Table 3.5.3. Random effects model explaining CEO fees compensation   
 
The natural logarithm of total fees in CEO compensation is the dependent variable in these regressions. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO fees 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  11.4639  < 0.001 11.5590 < 0.001 11.7280 < 0.001   
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0038 0.578 0.0033 0.619 0.0032 0.635   
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.0008 0.614 -0.0007 0.632 -0.0008 0.593   
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  -0.0065 0.691 0.0050 0.905 -2.7925 0.621   
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  -2.3916 0.078 -2.4204 0.082 -2.5233 0.071   
Tenure (months)  -0.0389 0.070 -0.0373 0.090 -0.0384 0.080   
Committee membership (=1)  -0.6682 0.094 -0.7054 0.070 -0.7220 0.062   
CEO=Chairman (=1)  1.0410 0.008 1.0504 0.009 1.0464 0.009   
Duality*firm size  -0.3176 0.044 -0.3237 0.048 -0.3259 0.044   
Notice period (months)  0.0376 0.326 0.0470 0.227 0.0506 0.203   
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  -1.0986 0.241 -1.0656 0.278 -0.9944 0.295   
Proportion female directors  -6.3536 0.012 -6.1825 0.019 -6.5688 0.013   
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0052 0.018 0.0051 0.017 0.0053 0.012   
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.396 0.0000 0.476 0.0000 0.445   
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  0.0147 0.308 0.0129 0.349 0.0124 0.370   
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0041 0.576 -0.0041 0.589 -0.0045 0.549   
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0103 0.608 -0.0075 0.710 -0.0101 0.620   
Nominee account block holdings  -0.3639 0.001 -0.3572 0.001 -0.3701 0.001   
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0017 0.760 0.0022 0.695 0.0020 0.722   
Corporations’ block holdings  0.0074 0.372 0.0083 0.310 0.0074 0.361   
Individuals and families’ block holdings  0.0256 0.147 0.0248 0.146 0.0220 0.217   
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0046 0.078 0.0042 0.105 0.0043 0.094   
Debt to asset ratio  0.0003 0.978 0.0010 0.913 0.0005 0.956   
Stock price volatility  0.0096 0.373 0.0092 0.396 0.0089 0.412   
R-squared  0.6809 0.6659 0.6681   
Number of observations  92 92 92   
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Table 3.5.4. Random effects model explaining CEO bonus compensation 
 
The natural logarithm of total bonus in CEO compensation is the dependent variable in these regressions. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO bonus 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  11.0391  < 0.001 10.6777 < 0.001 10.6480 < 0.001  11.5931  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0061  < 0.001 0.0061 < 0.001 0.0058 < 0.001  0.0058  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0008  < 0.001 0.0008 < 0.001 0.0008 < 0.001  0.0008  < 0.001
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.0164  < 0.001 0.0323 < 0.001 2.2585 0.008  -0.5656  0.006
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  -0.2522 0.071 -0.2948 0.035 -0.2980 0.034  -0.4601 0.002
Tenure (months)  0.0133  < 0.001 0.0149 < 0.001 0.0146 < 0.001  0.0128  < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  0.0989 0.018 0.0953 0.023 0.1053 0.013  0.1180 0.007
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.0357 0.545 0.0075 0.899 -0.0123 0.836  -0.0104 0.872
Duality*firm size  0.0078 0.358 0.0067 0.431 0.0079 0.352  0.0088 0.295
Notice period (months)  -0.0109 0.012 -0.0106 0.015 -0.0102 0.019  -0.0054 0.225
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  1.1921  < 0.001 1.0770 < 0.001 1.1740 < 0.001  1.2094  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  0.7279 0.003 0.6494 0.009 0.7807 0.002  0.9007 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0014  < 0.001 0.0013 < 0.001 0.0014 < 0.001  0.0015  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.056 0.0000 0.057 0.0000 0.072  0.0000 0.158
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0018 0.500 -0.0021 0.418 -0.0024 0.368  -0.0032 0.256
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0033 0.154 -0.0025 0.278 -0.0029 0.212  -0.0027 0.276
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0035 0.111 -0.0032 0.147 -0.0034 0.121  -0.0043 0.069
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0024 0.381 -0.0021 0.443 -0.0023 0.402  -0.0015 0.614
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0016 0.072 0.0014 0.101 0.0012 0.165  0.0001 0.912
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0001 0.928 0.0005 0.665 0.0002 0.854  0.0006 0.623
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0031 0.242 -0.0030 0.269 -0.0038 0.162  -0.0063 0.027
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0000 0.987 0.0001 0.639 0.0001 0.737  0.0018  <  0.001
Debt to asset ratio  0.0018 0.086 0.0015 0.154 0.0018 0.091  0.0026 0.018
Stock price volatility  -0.0057 0.001 -0.0052 0.004 -0.0061 0.001  -0.0065 0.001
R-squared  0.2877 0.2910 0.2583 0.2746 
Number of observations  4649 4649 4649 4186 
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Table 3.5.5. Random effects model explaining CEO equity-based compensation 
 
The natural logarithm of total equity-based compensation in CEO compensation is the dependent variable 
in these regressions. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO equity-based compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  11.6745  < 0.001 11.7290 < 0.001 11.7093 < 0.001  11.7487  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0044 0.001 0.0042 0.002 0.0040 0.003  0.0042 0.004
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.0004 0.155 -0.0004 0.152 -0.0004 0.106  -0.0006 0.032
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.0239  < 0.001 0.0427 < 0.001 3.2770 0.027  -0.9975  0.006
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  0.0650 0.728 0.0387 0.837 0.0501 0.791  0.0491 0.802
Tenure (months)  -0.0174 <  0.001 -0.0139 0.003 -0.0148 0.002 -0.0130  0.006
Committee membership (=1)  0.1405 0.017 0.1414 0.017 0.1645 0.006  0.0994 0.100
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.1217 0.220 -0.0478 0.631 -0.0745 0.458  -0.0246 0.816
Duality*firm size  0.0181 0.150 0.0173 0.169 0.0194 0.123  0.0172 0.165
Notice period (months)  -0.0110 0.084 -0.0115 0.072 -0.0101 0.117  -0.0083 0.208
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  1.4119  < 0.001 1.2494 < 0.001 1.4153 < 0.001  1.3788  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  1.3188  < 0.001 1.2663 < 0.001 1.3905 < 0.001  1.4125  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0016  < 0.001 0.0016 < 0.001 0.0016 < 0.001  0.0017  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.027 0.0000 0.024 0.0000 0.024  0.0000 0.822
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0027 0.554 -0.0035 0.446 -0.0044 0.348  -0.0080 0.111
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0010 0.748 0.0005 0.866 0.0000 0.991  0.0017 0.587
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0011 0.744 -0.0006 0.863 -0.0013 0.709  -0.0031 0.358
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0117 0.006 -0.0109 0.011 -0.0120 0.005  -0.0120 0.007
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0015 0.255 0.0011 0.405 0.0008 0.534  -0.0009 0.495
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0005 0.794 0.0005 0.775 0.0001 0.947  -0.0002 0.938
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0098 0.036 -0.0098 0.037 -0.0111 0.019  -0.0124 0.013
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0001 0.784 0.0003 0.503 0.0002 0.550  0.0018 0.006
Debt to asset ratio  0.0001 0.969 -0.0003 0.803 0.0002 0.881  0.0002 0.878
Stock price volatility  -0.0011 0.633 -0.0003 0.903 -0.0019 0.414  -0.0046 0.054
R-squared  0.2138 0.2143 0.1795 0.1820 
Number of observations  3722 3722 3722 3428   118
Table 3.5.6. Economic effects 
 
This table summarizes the economic effect (impact of one standard deviation change) of the four centrality 
measures in regressions in Table 6.1 
 
Centrality measure  Std.dev  Estimated coefficient  Economic effect 
Degree (D)  6.777 0.0136 0.0921
Degree (C)  3.930 0.0372 0.1462
(n) closeness (D)  0.024 1.7933 0.0437
(n) closeness (C)  0.137 -0.2807 -0.0384
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Table 3.5.7. Random effects model explaining CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity   
 
The dependent variable is the difference between current year total compensation and that of the previous year. 
 
  Dependent variable: change in CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -1412719 <  0.001 -1369275 <  0.001 -1215036 0.006  -1130887 0.018
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  -336.8 0.905 588.6 0.771 2378.0 0.420  10111.9 0.036
Market-adjusted stock return  685.1 0.263 478.1 0.212 261.6 0.647  -649.6 0.594
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  7469.2 0.085 3477.3 0.661 -928624.6 0.500  -291071.3 0.491
Centrality measure * Return on asset (%)  206.7 0.486 261.2 0.574 -24585.0 0.652  -24647.7 0.057
Centrality measure * Market-adjusted 
return  -120.6 0.099 -337.6 0.002 -11408.2 0.315 314.6 0.921
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  231534.5 0.227 244213.6 0.203 248487.1 0.195  290942.9 0.225
Tenure (months)  18663.4  < 0.001 19160.1 < 0.001 19095.0 < 0.001  24595.3 < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  76242.8 0.170 87919.7 0.113 88413.2 0.110  86399.1 0.184
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -1797.7 0.983 -3165.1 0.970 -10541.2 0.899  3074.6 0.976
Duality*firm size  15594.5 0.458 17506.1 0.404 17878.6 0.394  16492.7 0.468
Notice period (months)  4165.1 0.518 4370.5 0.498 4535.1 0.482  5600.3 0.473
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  947533.8  < 0.001 981613.9 < 0.001 1004398.0 < 0.001  1167013.0 < 0.001
Proportion female directors  454863.4 0.209 510939.9 0.159 517574.3 0.152  647428.7 0.126
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    -204.0 0.608 -74.4 0.853 -84.7 0.831  -270.7 0.542
Consultant network degree*firm size  8.2 0.095 8.7 0.075 9.1 0.062  6.5 0.321
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  1447.7 0.655 1180.8 0.715 938.2 0.772 353.2 0.930
Executive directors. stock holdings  6100.9 0.070 6244.9 0.064 6061.9 0.072  7419.3 0.072
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -1063.8 0.749 -1302.4 0.697 -1709.1 0.609  -2034.7 0.639
Nominee account block holdings  1069.5 0.798 1326.2 0.751 736.5 0.860  2227.8 0.677
Institutional investors’ block holdings  2399.8 0.106 2205.6 0.137 2091.0 0.156  2617.5 0.125
Corporations’ block holdings  -3280.5 0.099 -3129.5 0.117 -3320.5 0.095  -4262.1 0.071
Individuals and families’ block holdings  950.8 0.814 495.3 0.902 294.4 0.942  -224.9 0.962
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  -113.8 0.781 -123.6 0.763 -156.9 0.702 542.5 0.517
Debt to asset ratio  -816.7 0.537 -802.6 0.545 -578.9 0.662  -1003.8 0.536
Stock price volatility  8.5 0.997 -221.9 0.918 -357.1 0.868 -67.8 0.979
R-squared  0.0261 0.0270 0.0271 0.0331 
Number of observations  5131 5131 5131 4384   120
Table 3.6.1. Random effects instrumental variable model explaining CEO total 
compensation 
 
These regressions use instrument variables of honorary title and board size for centrality measures on 
individual level and company level respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  12.1998  < 0.001 12.1303 < 0.001 11.6522 < 0.001  11.4830  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0045  < 0.001 0.0045 < 0.001 0.0032 0.003  0.0036  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0003 0.011 0.0003 0.009 0.0004 0.326  0.0004 0.005
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.0242 0.043 0.0893 <  0.001 19.2471 0.711  2.6486 0.111
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  0.0045  < 0.001 0.0045 < 0.001 -0.1616 0.450  -0.1536  0.163
Tenure (months)  0.0003 0.011 0.0003 0.009 0.0109 0.002  0.0102  <  0.001
Committee membership (=1)  0.0189 0.833 -0.0349 0.697 -0.0261 0.530  0.0462 0.164
CEO=Chairman (=1)  0.0066  0.001 0.0088 < 0.001 -0.1823 0.175  -0.2047  < 0.001
Duality*firm size  0.0969 0.002 0.0905 0.001 0.0020 0.836  0.0049 0.446
Notice period (months)  -0.2939  < 0.001 -0.2076 < 0.001 -0.0020 0.733  -0.0018  0.636
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.8616  < 0.001 0.5358 < 0.001 0.2884 0.625  0.5960  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  0.7559  < 0.001 0.5315 0.002 0.8255 0.041  1.0521  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0019  < 0.001 0.0017 < 0.001 0.0010 0.136  0.0014  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.029 0.0000 0.015 0.0000 0.154  0.0000 0.278
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0044 0.004 -0.0045 0.002 -0.0011 0.717  -0.0038 0.030
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0018 0.182 -0.0003 0.817 0.0008 0.812  -0.0009 0.571
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0010 0.449 0.0000 0.975 0.0027 0.100  0.0013 0.434
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0039 0.018 -0.0033 0.048 -0.0013 0.710  0.0012 0.544
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0022 <  0.001 0.0018 0.002 0.0013 0.437  0.0019  0.008
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0005 0.552 0.0005 0.501 0.0008 0.836  0.0003 0.763
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0024 0.155 -0.0019 0.257 -0.0004 0.831  -0.0024 0.204
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0000 0.992 0.0003 0.248 0.0000 0.959  0.0006 0.145
Debt to asset ratio  0.0025 <  0.001 0.0017 0.007 0.0009 0.320  0.0003  0.708
Stock price volatility  -0.0065  < 0.001 -0.0043 < 0.001 -0.0070 0.085  -0.0055  0.002
R-squared  0.3619 0.3950 0.2323 0.2395 
Number of observations  6773 6773  6773 5839   121
Table 3.6.2. Random effects model explaining CEO total compensation (individual 
specific effects) 
 
These regressions take individual as the cross-section identifier. CEO’s individual effects is captured rather 
than the company effect as in previous regressions. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  12.0765  < 0.001 11.9595 50.16 12.1270 < 0.001  11.8659  54.08
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0044  < 0.001 0.0044 < 0.001  0.0042 < 0.001  0.0039  < 0.001 
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0003 0.004 0.0003 0.005  0.0003 0.006 0.0002  0.056 
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.0173  < 0.001 0.0427 < 0.001 1.6780 0.001  -0.3551  0.005
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  0.2081 0.115 0.1693 0.193  0.2105 0.118 0.1450  0.325 
Tenure (months)  0.0133  < 0.001 0.0137 < 0.001  0.0144 < 0.001  0.0148  < 0.001 
Committee membership (=1)  0.2435  < 0.001 0.2286 < 0.001  0.2697 < 0.001  0.2922  < 0.001 
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.2696  < 0.001 -0.2249 < 0.001  -0.2554 < 0.001  -0.2414  < 0.001 
Duality*firm size  0.0425  < 0.001 0.0408 < 0.001  0.0464 < 0.001  0.0431  < 0.001 
Notice period (months)  0.0151  < 0.001 0.0144 < 0.001  0.0165 < 0.001  0.0158  < 0.001 
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.9074  < 0.001 0.7698 < 0.001  0.9032 < 0.001  0.9725  < 0.001 
Proportion female directors  0.8703  < 0.001 0.7967 < 0.001  0.9260 < 0.001  1.0321  < 0.001 
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0019  < 0.001 0.0018 < 0.001  0.0020 < 0.001  0.0019  < 0.001 
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.716 0.0000 0.541  0.0000 0.604 0.0000  0.172 
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0052 0.001 -0.0054 <  0.001  -0.0057 < 0.001  -0.0080  < 0.001 
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0014 0.302 -0.0007 0.602  -0.0011 0.417 -0.0021  0.151 
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0036 0.009 -0.0030 0.026  -0.0035 0.012 -0.0031  0.050 
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0039 0.014 -0.0037 0.019  -0.0038 0.016 -0.0007  0.709 
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0014 0.013 0.0013 0.022  0.0011 0.046 -0.0001  0.880 
Corporations’ block holdings  0.0004 0.612 0.0008 0.271  0.0006 0.435 -0.0002  0.817 
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0051 0.001 -0.0048 0.003  -0.0059 < 0.001  -0.0074  < 0.001 
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0006 0.019 0.0006 0.011  0.0007 0.006 0.0016  <  0.001 
Debt to asset ratio  0.0023  < 0.001 0.0021 < 0.001  0.0024 < 0.001  0.0026  < 0.001 
Stock price volatility  -0.0070  < 0.001 -0.0062 < 0.001  -0.0076 < 0.001  -0.0079  < 0.001 
R-squared  0.3557 0.3783 0.3177 0.3243 
Number of observations  6773 6773  6773 5839   122
Table 3.6.3. Heckman sample selection model explaining CEO total compensation   
 
The table below shows the results from the regression equation of the Heckman sample selection equations. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  11.6193  < 0.001 11.7811 < 0.001 11.7591 < 0.001  12.3836  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0065  < 0.001 0.0064 < 0.001 0.0065 < 0.001  0.0069  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0002 0.166 0.0002 0.116 0.0001 0.509  0.0002 0.355
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure  0.0385  < 0.001 0.0842 < 0.001 2.2339 < 0.001  -0.9001  < 0.001
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  0.1721 0.031 0.1091 0.166 0.2025 0.014  0.0749 0.417
Tenure (months)  -0.0017 0.353 0.0004 0.804 -0.0001 0.945  0.0025 0.217
Committee membership (=1)  0.1533  < 0.001 0.1476 < 0.001 0.2096 < 0.001  0.2563  < 0.001
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.3343  < 0.001 -0.2244 < 0.001 -0.3289 < 0.001  -0.2396  < 0.001
Duality*firm size  0.0359  < 0.001 0.0361 < 0.001 0.0468 < 0.001  0.0396  < 0.001
Notice period (months)  -0.0022 0.400 -0.0031 0.224 -0.0008 0.769  0.0025 0.403
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  1.6030  < 0.001 1.2854 < 0.001 1.7617 < 0.001  1.7716  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  1.0307  < 0.001 0.8281 < 0.001 1.2423 < 0.001  1.1883  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0032  < 0.001 0.0028 < 0.001 0.0036 < 0.001  0.0031  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.294 0.0000 0.248 0.0000 0.074  0.0000 0.416
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0035  0.012 -0.0043 0.002 -0.0055 < 0.001  -0.0089  < 0.001
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0029 0.041 -0.0001 0.951 -0.0019 0.187  -0.0014 0.366
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0087  < 0.001 -0.0062 < 0.001 -0.0100 < 0.001  -0.0096  < 0.001
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0045 0.013 -0.0034 0.054 -0.0051 0.006  -0.0028 0.184
Institutional investors’ block holdings  -0.0015  0.019 -0.0015 0.011 -0.0033 < 0.001  -0.0047  < 0.001
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0017 0.039 0.0004 0.611 -0.0010 0.251  -0.0019 0.037
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0115  < 0.001 -0.0101 < 0.001 -0.0144 < 0.001  -0.0134  < 0.001
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  -0.0003 0.210 -0.0002 0.391 -0.0003 0.221  0.0028 0.000
Debt to asset ratio  0.0032  < 0.001 0.0028 < 0.001 0.0038 < 0.001  0.0039  < 0.001
Stock price volatility  -0.0026  0.002 -0.0006 0.474 -0.0041 < 0.001  -0.0061  < 0.001
P-value chi
2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations  6564 6564  6564 5630 
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Table 3.6.4. Alternative Centrality Measures 
 
The table below shows the results from the regression equation with alternative centrality measures. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Director Level  Company Level  Outwards Degree  Non-missing Closeness
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  12.2071    < 0.001  12.2951  < 0.001  12.5944  < 0.001    12.5439    < 0.001 
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0045    < 0.001  0.0044  < 0.001  0.0043  < 0.001    0.0043    < 0.001 
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0002    0.014  0.0002  0.076  0.0002  0.027    0.0002    0.021 
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure (degree)  0.0131    < 0.001  0.0355  < 0.001  0.0075  < 0.001     
Centrality measure (closeness)  1.4647    0.006  -0.4270  0.001   0.1573    0.033 
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  0.0129    0.883  -0.0495  0.613  0.0041  0.963    -0.0074    0.934 
Tenure (months)  0.0068    < 0.001  0.0072  < 0.001  0.0072  < 0.001    0.0078    < 0.001 
Committee membership (=1)  0.1217    < 0.001  0.1592  < 0.001  0.1255  < 0.001    0.1275    < 0.001 
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.2796    < 0.001  -0.2080  < 0.001  -0.2822  < 0.001    -0.2673    < 0.001 
Duality*firm size  0.0145    0.028  0.0121  0.064  0.0149  0.023    0.0141    0.032 
Notice period (months)  0.0036    0.192  0.0051  0.078  0.0040  0.152    0.0043    0.129 
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.8725    < 0.001  0.8005  < 0.001  0.8646  < 0.001    0.8583    < 0.001 
Proportion female directors  0.7986    < 0.001  0.8239  < 0.001  0.8204  < 0.001    0.8323    < 0.001 
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0020    < 0.001  0.0019  < 0.001  0.0020  < 0.001    0.0021    < 0.001 
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000    0.035  0.0000  0.780  0.0000  0.049    0.0000    0.048 
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0002    0.954  -0.0031  0.461  -0.0001  0.983    -0.0003    0.944 
Executive directors. stock holdings  0.0033    0.401  0.0011  0.810  0.0038  0.329    0.0039    0.327 
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0057    0.133  -0.0039  0.372  -0.0062  0.099    -0.0061    0.106 
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0054    0.001  -0.0024  0.209  -0.0055  0.001    -0.0055    0.001 
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0018    0.003  0.0007  0.299  0.0017  0.004    0.0016    0.007 
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0003    0.748  -0.0003  0.695  -0.0003  0.712    -0.0002    0.811 
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0031    0.062  -0.0040  0.029  -0.0033  0.053    -0.0034    0.041 
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0000    0.725  0.0000  0.003  0.0001  0.628    0.0000    0.573 
Debt to asset ratio  0.0027    < 0.001  0.0020  0.005  0.0027  < 0.001    0.0027    < 0.001 
Stock price volatility  -0.0066    < 0.001  -0.0065  < 0.001  -0.0071  < 0.001    -0.0071    < 0.001 
R
2  0.3532    0.3732    0.3165    0.3111   
Number of observations  6773  5839  6773 6773   124
Table 3.6.5. Random effects model explaining CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity 
(based on performance-related compensation)   
 
The dependent variable is the difference between current year performance-related compensation and that 
of the previous year. 
  Dependent variable: change in CEO performance-related compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -1111710 0.002 -1074721 0.003 -902168.8 0.032 -1000634 0.06
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  -347.9 0.898 440.7 0.820 1928.2 0.495  7955.3 0.085
Market-adjusted stock return  593.5 0.311 462.0 0.208 225.8 0.680  -425.0 0.716
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  6396.1 0.124 2945.4 0.698 -888515.4 0.501  -227415.3 0.575
Centrality measure * Return on asset (%)  176.0 0.536 224.8 0.614 -20140.9 0.700  -19401.4 0.118
Centrality measure * Market-adjusted 
return  -100.5 0.152 -302.3 0.004 -9199.7 0.398  57.3 0.985
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  153452.5 0.404 164549.9 0.370 168446.4 0.359  182003.3 0.428
Tenure (months)  14865.7  < 0.001 15298.8 < 0.001 15237.5 < 0.001  19887.0 < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  67366.0 0.206 77553.4 0.145 78140.4 0.140  73822.5 0.236
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -7362.1 0.926 -8869.3 0.912 -15482.7 0.846  -6231.9 0.950
Duality*firm size  13479.0 0.503 15143.7 0.451 15484.0 0.441  14615.0 0.502
Notice period (months)  1644.1 0.790 1814.4 0.769 1960.6 0.751  2572.6 0.731
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  824386.6  < 0.001 855241.4 < 0.001 875229.0 < 0.001  1025739.0 < 0.001
Proportion female directors  415930.0 0.230 464390.3 0.181 469856.2 0.175  585147.1 0.150
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    -271.1 0.477 -154.3 0.688 -165.0 0.665  -333.6 0.433
Consultant network degree*firm size  8.0 0.090 8.4 0.073 8.8 0.061  6.7 0.287
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  1794.6 0.563 1571.3 0.612 1350.2 0.663 961.8 0.802
Executive directors. stock holdings  5368.5 0.096 5488.1 0.090 5326.5 0.099  6651.1 0.093
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -1033.6 0.746 -1244.8 0.698 -1600.1 0.617  -1823.5 0.661
Nominee account block holdings  568.3 0.887 800.5 0.842 270.8 0.946  1515.8 0.768
Institutional investors’ block holdings  2156.7 0.129 1989.9 0.161 1894.2 0.180  2401.3 0.142
Corporations’ block holdings  -2777.1 0.145 -2644.5 0.167 -2815.3 0.140  -3407.2 0.132
Individuals and families’ block holdings  685.8 0.859 289.1 0.940 123.5 0.974  -256.0 0.955
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  -128.2 0.744 -136.2 0.728 -166.5 0.672 415.3 0.604
Debt to asset ratio  -985.2 0.437 -976.4 0.443 -783.1 0.537  -1210.1 0.437
Stock price volatility  -205.2 0.920 -406.4 0.844 -537.4 0.794  -245.9 0.921
R-squared  0.0184 0.0191 0.0179 0.0213 
Number of observations  5131 5131 5131 4384   125
Table 3.6.6. More detailed ownership classification 
 
The previous institutional block holding is further explored as bank, insurance, investment and pension 
block holding 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept  12.4132  < 0.001 12.4177 < 0.001 12.4748 < 0.001  12.7949  < 0.001
Performance measures             
Return on assets (%)  0.0044  < 0.001 0.0044 < 0.001 0.0042 < 0.001  0.0039  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0002 0.011 0.0002 0.011 0.0002 0.013  0.0002  0.063
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure  0.0136  < 0.001 0.0376 < 0.001 1.8631 < 0.001  -0.2931  0.025
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  0.0191 0.828 -0.0092 0.916 -0.0087 0.922  -0.0531  0.591
Tenure (months)  0.0070  < 0.001 0.0081 < 0.001 0.0078 < 0.001  0.0071  < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  0.1193  < 0.001 0.1177 < 0.001 0.1241 < 0.001  0.1625  < 0.001
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.2816  < 0.001 -0.2418 < 0.001 -0.2609 < 0.001  -0.2219  < 0.001
Duality*firm size  0.0144 0.028 0.0128 0.051 0.0138 0.036  0.0125  0.055
Notice period (months)  0.0034 0.222 0.0035 0.204 0.0040 0.152  0.0053  0.068
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.8850  < 0.001 0.7470 < 0.001 0.8453 < 0.001  0.8967  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  0.7789  < 0.001 0.6919 < 0.001 0.8146 < 0.001  0.9337  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0020  < 0.001 0.0020 < 0.001 0.0020 < 0.001  0.0019  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.048 0.0000 0.040 0.0000 0.056  0.0000  0.902
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holding  0.0001 0.985 -0.0005 0.897 -0.0003 0.944  -0.0028  0.506
Executive dir. stock holding  0.0036 0.359 0.0039 0.325 0.0039 0.317  0.0012  0.793
Non-executive dir. stock holding  -0.0061 0.109 -0.0056 0.139 -0.0061 0.108  -0.0045  0.299
Nominee account block holding  -0.0058 0.001 -0.0056 0.001 -0.0058 0.001  -0.0028  0.143
Bank block holding  0.0079  < 0.001 0.0079 < 0.001 0.0076 < 0.001  0.0074  < 0.001
Insurance block holding  0.0034 0.027 0.0036 0.020 0.0032 0.043  0.0009  0.579
Investment block holding  0.0014 0.037 0.0011 0.097 0.0012 0.075  0.0003  0.630
Pension block holding  -0.0097 0.073 -0.0100 0.062 -0.0101 0.060  -0.0156  0.007
Corporate block holding  -0.0004 0.656 0.0001 0.889 -0.0001 0.876  -0.0006  0.527
Individual block holding  -0.0029 0.085 -0.0027 0.109 -0.0032 0.056  -0.0045  0.015
Firm size, Capital structure and risk             
Total assets  0.0001 0.782 0.0002 0.405 0.0001 0.576  0.0010  0.007
Debt to asset ratio  0.0027  < 0.001 0.0023 < 0.001 0.0027 < 0.001  0.0024  0.001
Stock price volatility  -0.0067  < 0.001 -0.0058 < 0.001 -0.0070 < 0.001  -0.0075  < 0.001
R-squared  0.3528 0.3769  0.3201  0.3226 
Number of observations  6773 6773  6773 5839   126
Table 3.6.7. Old contracts only 
 
The regressions below are based on the subsample with old contracts (tenure of the CEO > 1) only. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  12.1368  < 0.001 12.1709 < 0.001 12.2031 < 0.001  12.2305  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0046  < 0.001 0.0045 < 0.001 0.0043 < 0.001  0.0043  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0002 0.077 0.0002 0.081 0.0002 0.084  0.0001 0.264
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure  0.0153  < 0.001 0.0398 < 0.001 2.0086 < 0.001  -0.1960  0.135
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  -0.0018 0.985 -0.0269 0.772 -0.0287 0.760  -0.0990 0.357
Tenure (months)  0.0065  0.001 0.0073 < 0.001 0.0075 < 0.001  0.0069  0.001
Committee membership (=1)  0.1281  < 0.001 0.1266 < 0.001 0.1346 < 0.001  0.1771  < 0.001
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.2598  < 0.001 -0.2149 < 0.001 -0.2388 < 0.001  -0.2088  < 0.001
Duality*firm size  0.0206 0.002 0.0186 0.005 0.0204 0.002  0.0190 0.004
Notice period (months)  0.0021 0.471 0.0023 0.425 0.0031 0.289  0.0042 0.175
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  1.0131  < 0.001 0.8550 < 0.001 0.9654 < 0.001  1.0220  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  0.8242  < 0.001 0.7355 < 0.001 0.8737 < 0.001  0.9784  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0020  < 0.001 0.0019 < 0.001 0.0020 < 0.001  0.0019  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.021 0.0000 0.019 0.0000 0.027  0.0000 0.668
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0058  < 0.001 -0.0058 < 0.001 -0.0061 < 0.001  -0.0075  < 0.001
Executive directors. stock holdings  0.0000 0.974 0.0006 0.666 0.0003 0.834  -0.0006 0.685
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0022 0.119 -0.0017 0.230 -0.0019 0.169  -0.0023 0.140
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0046 0.006 -0.0044 0.007 -0.0045 0.006  -0.0011 0.547
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0015 0.010 0.0012 0.030 0.0012 0.032  0.0004 0.565
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0002 0.831 0.0003 0.716 0.0001 0.921  -0.0003 0.708
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0042 0.013 -0.0041 0.014 -0.0046 0.006  -0.0061 0.001
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0001 0.764 0.0002 0.364 0.0001 0.532  0.0010 0.006
Debt to asset ratio  0.0026  < 0.001 0.0023 < 0.001 0.0026 < 0.001  0.0023  0.002
Stock price volatility  -0.0064  < 0.001 -0.0056 < 0.001 -0.0068 < 0.001  -0.0071  < 0.001
R-squared  0.3792 0.3933 0.3293 0.3298 
Number of observations  5728  5728  5728 4919 
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Table 3.6.8. New contracts only 
 
The regressions below are based on the subsample with new contracts (tenure of the CEO ≤ 1) only. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  12.7215  < 0.001 13.0027 < 0.001 12.5943 < 0.001  12.4055  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0053 0.004 0.0051 0.005 0.0054 0.004  0.0049 0.016
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0012 0.020 0.0012 0.027 0.0011 0.042  0.0010 0.063
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure  0.0315  < 0.001 0.0698 < 0.001 4.9128 0.047  -0.4656  0.427
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  0.3252 0.256 0.1697 0.548 0.3073 0.290  0.3486 0.214
Tenure (months)  0.0471 0.072 0.0514 0.048 0.0438 0.099  0.0379 0.140
Committee membership (=1)  0.1967 0.022 0.1817 0.030 0.2309 0.007  0.2428 0.006
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.7369  < 0.001 -0.6394 < 0.001 -0.6788 < 0.001  -0.6166  < 0.001
Duality*firm size  0.0011 0.959 0.0037 0.864 0.0013 0.954  0.0001 0.998
Notice period (months)  0.0192 0.075 0.0146 0.168 0.0171 0.115  0.0220 0.045
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.6370 0.048 0.4091 0.199 0.7083 0.030  0.7189 0.031
Proportion female directors  1.4212 0.023 1.1329 0.066 1.5941 0.012  1.6281 0.010
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0031  < 0.001 0.0029 < 0.001 0.0032 < 0.001  0.0031  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.026 0.0000 0.147 0.0000 0.082  0.0000 0.064
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0039 0.684 -0.0067 0.476 -0.0061 0.528  -0.0046 0.649
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0148 0.001 -0.0119 0.008 -0.0148 0.001  -0.0175  <  0.001
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0097 0.059 -0.0071 0.162 -0.0102 0.053  -0.0130 0.021
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0083 0.232 -0.0047 0.497 -0.0073 0.300  -0.0067 0.339
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0018 0.424 0.0022 0.327 0.0001 0.958  -0.0014 0.550
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0053 0.098 -0.0029 0.355 -0.0050 0.127  -0.0073 0.035
Individuals and families’ block holdings  0.0023 0.698 0.0033 0.573 0.0007 0.904  -0.0001 0.982
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0036 0.004 0.0027 0.031 0.0037 0.004  0.0036 0.004
Debt to asset ratio  0.0032 0.115 0.0029 0.149 0.0039 0.063  0.0023 0.307
Stock price volatility  -0.0060 0.071 -0.0047 0.148 -0.0068 0.045  -0.0090 0.011
R-squared  0.3482 0.3813 0.3421 0.3365 
Number of observations  1045  1045  1045 920 
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Table 3.6.9. Random effects model explaining CEO total compensation in 
non-financial sectors 
 
The regressions below are based on the subsample with non-financial companies only. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  12.1483  < 0.001 12.0749 < 0.001 12.1972 < 0.001  12.2782  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0046  < 0.001 0.0046 < 0.001 0.0044 < 0.001  0.0041  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0002 0.066 0.0002 0.069 0.0002 0.075  0.0002 0.110
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.0132  < 0.001 0.0379 < 0.001 1.9301 < 0.001  -0.2702  0.051
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  0.0033 0.971 -0.0245 0.784 -0.0236 0.793  -0.0658 0.516
Tenure (months)  0.0052 0.009 0.0062 0.002 0.0059 0.003  0.0050 0.020
Committee membership (=1)  0.1322  < 0.001 0.1306 < 0.001 0.1384 < 0.001  0.1721  < 0.001
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.2679  < 0.001 -0.2263 < 0.001 -0.2458 < 0.001  -0.1968  < 0.001
Duality*firm size  0.0283 0.005 0.0268 0.008 0.0279 0.006  0.0272 0.007
Notice period (months)  0.0049 0.093 0.0051 0.079 0.0052 0.075  0.0066 0.031
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.8214  < 0.001 0.6837 < 0.001 0.7776 < 0.001  0.8546  < 0.001
Proportion female directors  0.6919  < 0.001 0.6111 < 0.001 0.7225 < 0.001  0.7829  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0020  < 0.001 0.0019 < 0.001 0.0020 < 0.001  0.0019  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.776 0.0000 0.685 0.0000 0.962  0.0000 0.954
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0052  0.001 -0.0054 < 0.001 -0.0055 < 0.001  -0.0076  < 0.001
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0022 0.127 -0.0015 0.310 -0.0018 0.216  -0.0031 0.053
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.0016 0.297 -0.0012 0.424 -0.0013 0.370  -0.0023 0.181
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0047 0.007 -0.0043 0.011 -0.0045 0.009  -0.0011 0.564
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0025  < 0.001 0.0023 < 0.001 0.0022 < 0.001  0.0013  0.050
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0003 0.696 0.0001 0.943 -0.0001 0.933  0.0001 0.884
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0041 0.022 -0.0039 0.029 -0.0043 0.017  -0.0057 0.005
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0232  < 0.001 0.0231 < 0.001 0.0246 < 0.001  0.0236  < 0.001
Debt to asset ratio  0.0029  < 0.001 0.0026 < 0.001 0.0029 < 0.001  0.0027  < 0.001
Stock price volatility  -0.0059  < 0.001 -0.0049 < 0.001 -0.0062 < 0.001  -0.0066  < 0.001
R-squared  0.3822 0.4024 0.3549 0.3544 
Number of observations  5857 5857 5857 5023 
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Table 3.6.10. CEO and CEO equivalents 
 
The regressions below are based on the enlarged sample with both CEOs and other identified top managers. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (D)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  12.6138  < 0.001 12.6085 < 0.001 12.4426 < 0.001  13.4482  < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  0.0042  < 0.001 0.0042 < 0.001 0.0041 < 0.001  0.0042  < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.0001 0.104 0.0001 0.090 0.0001 0.099  0.0001 0.450
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure  0.0051  < 0.001 0.0262 < 0.001 1.4095 0.002  -0.3072  0.009
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  0.1134 0.124 0.0907 0.216 0.0856 0.244  0.1000 0.224
Tenure (months)  0.0071  < 0.001 0.0072 < 0.001 0.0071 < 0.001  0.0067  < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  0.0144 0.571 0.0127 0.616 0.0163 0.522  0.0510 0.062
CEO=Chairman (=1)  -0.4132  < 0.001 -0.3953 < 0.001 -0.3993 < 0.001  -0.4260  < 0.001
Duality*firm size  0.0188 0.003 0.0183 0.004 0.0184 0.004  0.0191 0.003
Notice period (months)  0.0002 0.945 0.0001 0.962 0.0004 0.875  -0.0013 0.634
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  -0.1418 0.060 -0.2420 0.001 -0.1485 0.050  -0.2817 0.001
Proportion female directors  0.7023  < 0.001 0.6483 < 0.001 0.7080 < 0.001  0.8752  < 0.001
Remuneration consultant networks          
Degree of remuneration consultant    0.0025  < 0.001 0.0024 < 0.001 0.0025 < 0.001  0.0024  < 0.001
Consultant network degree*firm size  0.0000 0.071 0.0000 0.053 0.0000 0.073  0.0000 0.833
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.0025 0.050 -0.0025 0.055 -0.0025 0.049  -0.0038 0.015
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.0020 0.097 -0.0017 0.160 -0.0018 0.126  -0.0035 0.010
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  0.0010 0.412 0.0013 0.296 0.0011 0.382  0.0006 0.707
Nominee account block holdings  -0.0032 0.012 -0.0033 0.010 -0.0032 0.015  -0.0011 0.465
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.0014 0.002 0.0015 0.002 0.0014 0.004  0.0009 0.085
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.0001 0.926 0.0002 0.792 0.0000 0.949  -0.0001 0.844
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.0024 0.080 -0.0024 0.080 -0.0025 0.067  -0.0033 0.035
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.0002 0.289 0.0003 0.161 0.0003 0.238  0.0012 0.002
Debt to asset ratio  0.0019 0.001 0.0017 0.002 0.0018 0.001  0.0013 0.050
Stock price volatility  -0.0059  < 0.001 -0.0053 < 0.001 -0.0060 < 0.001  -0.0060  < 0.001
R-squared  0.5092 0.5276 0.5049 0.5444 
Number of observations  8922 8922  8921 7686   130
Appendix 3.A. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Remuneration     
Total  Sum of all remuneration items listed below.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Salary  Fixed remuneration paid to executive directors  Manifest 
Fee  Fixed remuneration mainly paid to non-executive directors.  Manifest 
Bonus  Performance-related remuneration paid out annually  Manifest 
Equity-based compensation  Remuneration paid as restricted shares and stock options (valued by means of 
Black-Scholes formula) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Miscellaneous   Sum of transaction bonus, deferred cash bonus, severance pay, recruitment 
incentive and relocation fee 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Other  Sum of rare remuneration components such as e.g. medical insurance  Manifest 
     
Performance indicator     
Return on asset  Net income prior to financing costs divided by total assets then multiplied by 
100. 
Datastream 
Market-adjusted stock return  Annual stock return minus the return of the FT All Share index    Own calculations 
based on Datastream 
    
Centrality measure     
Degree (ndegree)  Number of links of a vertex.(normalized degree)    Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Closeness (ncloseness)  The inverse of the geodesic distance from a vertex to all reachable vertices. 
(normalized closeness) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Betweenness (nbetweenness)  The probability that a specific vertex is on the geodesic path between any other 
two vertices. (normalized betweenness) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Eigenvector centrality (neigenvector)    The aggregation of centralities of adjacent vertices. (normalized eigenvector)  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
    
CEO information     
Gender (male)  Equals 1 if male and 0 if female.  Manifest 
Tenure  Number of years in current position  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Committee membership  Equals 2 if chairman of a specific committee, 1 if member, 0 if not member.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Chairmanship-CEO duality  Equals 1 if the target CEO is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise.  Manifest 
Notice period 
A period of time that the company must inform the CEO before terminating the 
contract. 
Manifest 
    
Board composition     
Prop. nonexecutive  Proportion of non-executive directors on board (denominator is total board size)  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Prop. female  Proportion by female directors on board (denominator is total board size)  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
    
Remuneration consultant networks     
Size remuneration consultant network  The number of firms to which a remuneration consultant gives advice    Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
    
Ownership structure     
CEO stock holding  All the CEO’s stock holdings.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Executive stock holding    The sum of all executive directors’ stock holdings.  Own calculations 
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Non executive stock holding  The sum of all non-executive directors’ stock holdings.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Nominee account block holding  The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more on nominee accounts.    Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Institutional block holding  The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds and investment, and mutual funds. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Corporate block holding  The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by industrial or commercial 
firms. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Individual block holding  The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by individuals or families not 
related to a director. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
    
Firm size, Capital structure and risk     
Total assets 
Sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other 
assets, except for financial companies. 
Datastream 
Debt to asset ratio  Sum of short term debt, current portion of long term debt and long term debt 
divided by total assets then multiplied by 100, except for financial companies. 
Datastream 
Stock price volatility  The stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean 
price for each year: (high-low)/(high+low). 
Own calculations 
based on Datastream 
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Appendix 3.B. Top manager identification procedure 
 
For most firm-years in our sample, we have one unique CEO who serves as the top manager of the firm. 
Sometimes, however, two CEO are present, often at times prior to the departure of one CEO. In some small 
companies, we have no CEO but only managing director. For those firm-years, we use the following 
procedure to identify the non-CEO top manager, or the so-called CEO equivalent. We first check whether 
there is a CEO in the firm-year. If the answer is no, we take as CEO, the managing director, and in case 
there is no managing director, the executive chairman. If there are multiple managers present, we check 
how many of them remain in the company until the end of the year. If only one remains, he will be 
identified as the CEO/CEO-equivalent. This solves most of the multiple CEO cases. If more than one stay 
until year end, or all depart before the year end, we rely on their compensation level and choose the best 
paid CEO/CEO-equivalent. If they receive same pay, we pick one of them randomly and include him in our 
CEO sample. (In the graph, a star denotes a successful identification of CEO or CEO-equivalent which 
terminates the procedure). 
 
Figure Appendix 3.B. This diagram shows the procedure of identifying the CEO or CEO equivalents 
in each firm-year. 
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Appendix 3.C. Sector classification 
 
Panel A shows the sector classification as obtained from Datastream and the frequency gives the number of 
firm-years that can be categorized in a specific sector. Panel B gives sector information for the year 2007. Panel 




(whole sample)  Frequency  Percentage Sector Frequency  Percentage
Aerospace & Defense  152  1.37 Industrial Metals & Mining  40  0.36
Alternative Energy  54  0.49 Industrial Transportation  233  2.1
Automobiles & Parts  62  0.56 Leisure Goods  94  0.85
Banks  126 1.14 Life  Insurance  101 0.91
Beverages  97 0.87 Media  664 5.98
Chemicals  199 1.79 Mining  329 2.97
Construction & Materials  332  2.99 Mobile Telecommunications  40  0.36
Electricity  86 0.78 Nonlife  Insurance  231 2.08
Electronic & Electrical Equipment  313  2.82 Oil & Gas Producers  337  3.04
Equity Investment Instruments  26  0.23 Oil Equipment & Services  92  0.83
Financial Services (Sector)  648 5.84 Personal  Goods  149 1.34
Fixed Line Telecommunications  132  1.19 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology  456  4.11
Food & Drug Retailers  137  1.23 Real Estate Investment & Service  422  3.8
Food Producers  241  2.17 Real Estate Investment Trusts  168  1.51
Forestry & Paper  26  0.23 Software & Computer Services  945  8.52
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities  122  1.1 Support Services  1,193  10.75
General Industrials  142  1.28 Technology Hardware &Equipment 318  2.87
General  Retailers  656 5.91 Tobacco  35 0.32
Health Care Equipment & Service  228  2.05 Travel & Leisure  725  6.53
Household Goods & Home Const.  345  3.11 Unclassified  16  0.14
Industrial Engineering  384  3.46  
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Panel B 
(2007) Frequency  Percentage  Sector  Frequency  Percentage 
Aerospace & Defense  14  1.2 Industrial Metals & Mining  9  0.77
Alternative Energy  11  0.95 Industrial Transportation  16  1.38
Automobiles & Parts  4  0.34 Leisure Goods  6  0.52
Banks 11  0.95 Life  Insurance  11  0.95
Beverages 6  0.52 Media  73  6.28
Chemicals 15  1.29 Mining  67  5.76
Construction & Materials  23  1.98 Mobile Telecommunications  4  0.34
Electricity 11  0.95 Nonlife  Insurance  21  1.81
Electronic & Electrical Equipment  30  2.58 Oil & Gas Producers  60  5.16
Equity Investment Instruments  5  0.43 Oil Equipment & Services  13  1.12
Financial Services (Sector)  87  7.48 Personal Goods  11  0.95
Fixed Line Telecommunications  8  0.69 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology  51  4.39
Food & Drug Retailers  8  0.69 Real Estate Investment & Service  52  4.47
Food Producers  24  2.06 Real Estate Investment Trusts  19  1.63
Forestry & Paper  2  0.17 Software & Computer Services  97  8.34
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities  8  0.69 Support Services  137  11.78
General Industrials  15  1.29 Technology Hardware & Equipment  36  3.1
General Retailers  51  4.39 Tobacco  3  0.26
Health Care Equipment & Service  27  2.32 Travel & Leisure  63  5.42
Household Goods & Home Const.  19  1.63 Unclassified  1  0.09
Industrial Engineering  34  2.92      
 
Panel C   
 
 








C h e m i c a l  6 5 54 . 7 3 6 64 . 3 1  
Communication 172 1.24 12 0.78 
Financial 1,722 12.43 206 13.46 
Food 510 3.68 41 2.68 
IT 1,670 12.05 169 11.04 
Leisure 725 5.23 63 4.11 
Logistics 1,426 10.29 153 9.99 
M e d i a  6 6 44 . 7 9 7 34 . 7 7  
Manufacture 1,467 10.59 168 10.97 
Other 3,496 25.23 426 27.82 
Retailer 656 4.74 51 3.33 
Utility 691 4.99 103 6.73   135
Appendix 3.D. CEO, executive and non-executive director remuneration by corporate size   
 
Table 3.D1. FTSE 100 CEO remuneration 
 
This table shows the CEO total remuneration and its components for FTSE100 companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration. The 
values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  Min  P25  Median  P75  Max  Percent 
Total salary  1276    553802    261108  0  390000  537749  711686    2147200  23.73%
Salary cash  344    707690    242201  2692  550000  707000  864522    1531000 
Salary shares  3    2997    4  2993  2993  2997  3000    3000 
Total fees  1276    4536    138522  0  0  0  0    4939000  2.20%
Fees cash  0    .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Fees shares  0    .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Total bonus  1276    506949    766244  0  100000  264107  619141    8451275  21.72%
Bonus cash  1046    517928    680161  3365  159000  307100  623000    7351275 
Bonus shares  15    334269    424955  2658  60000  230000  518923    1715000 
Bonus vdf  22    490862    354101  76760  204220  406000  666908    1259370 
Bonus mdf  149    545083    616004  18750  173962  335187  630000    3837500 
Total equity  1,276    1,174,156    2,260,997  0  0  475,002  1,351,518    26,700,000  50.30%
Restricted share  725    1,373,217    2,180,412  330  303,298  702,884  1,640,211    26,700,000 
Stock option  527    953,777    1,675,824  0  264,003  500,386  1,008,102    23,400,000 
Total misc  1276    15217    131543  0  0  0  0    3062944  0.65%
Transaction Bonus  2    929000    1231780  58000  58000  929000  1800000    1800000 
Deferred Cash Bonus  17    264845    175277  16000  152069  218750  470878    505039 
Loss of Office    10    595993    341766  103000  403799  588500  875000    1057971 
Recruitment Incentive  6    858101    1194629  4556  53737  342500  1342372    3062943 
Reallocation expenses  10    194830    146358  39479  99836  130055  259749    447469 
Others 1276    79468    238881  0  14702  25330  62000    6624000  3.40%
Overall total  1,276    2,334,128    2,812,143  0  796,093  1,442,278  2,853,719    31,000,000  100%
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Table 3.D2. FTSE 100 Executive remuneration (excluding the CEO)   
 
This table shows the CEO total remuneration and its components for FTSE100 companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration.  
The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  Min  P25  Median  P75  Max  Percent 
Total  salary  5825 303,739    182,630  0 188,387 281,000 390,000    2,609,000  29.56%
Salary  cash  1122 394,410    196,378  954 270,000 381,000 500,000    2,609,000 
Salary  shares  6 2,997    3 2,993 2,993 2,997 3,000    3,000   
Total  fees  5825  976    13,433 0 0 0 0    483,000  0.09%
Fees  cash  5 214,685    182,891  8,000  93,696 207,731 281,000    483,000 
Fees  shares  0  . . . . . . . 
Total  bonus  5825 220,285    480,961  0  21,000 101,000 244,000    17,900,000  21.44%
Bonus  cash  4522 245,326    411,154  0  68,031 135,000 266,000    10,400,000 
Bonus shares  45  101,884    102,691  0  18,000  75,000  162,930    362,376 
Bonus  vdf  81 214,615    203,956  0  72,000 177,000 295,000    939,000 
Bonus  mdf  479 284,823    601,263  0  78,000 148,000 322,000    11,400,000 
Total  equity  5825 428,194    1,699,809  0  0 143,323 494,998    112,000,000  41.67%
Restricted  share  2661 607,241    2,321,240  25 122,497 323,409 664,998    112,000,000 
Stock  option  2149 408,730    771,622  0 139,740 251,583 455,881    25,100,000 
Total  misc  5825  21,751    219,060 0 0 0 0    10,700,000  2.12%
Transaction  Bonus  10 289,130    172,387  80,000 200,000 207,500 415,000    645,000 
Deferred Cash Bonus  46  142,339    155,792  4,000  34,000  77,175  219,605    545,901 
Loss of Office    139  782,251    1,140,080  0  331,003  515,000  790,000    10,700,000 
Recruitment  Incentive  17 440,728    791,155  1,245 100,000 233,000 400,000    3,408,000 
Reallocation expenses  15  69,047    71,116  4,870  19,722  35,917  95,558    259,749 
Others  5825  52,674   192,396  0  10,000  17,000  34,000   9,538,471  5.13%
Overall total  5825  1,027,620    1,957,499  0  356,000  649,908  1,231,688    112,000,000  100%
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Table 3.D3. FTSE 100 non-executives’ remuneration 
 
This table shows non- executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE100 companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration.  
The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  Min  P25  Median  P75  Max  Percent 
Total  salary  9962  3,483    37,609 0 0 0 0    1,065,526  4.74%
Salary  cash  7  245,754    192,981 53,091 80,862  212,037  407,545    570,322 
Salary  shares  0  . . . . . . .  
Total  fees  9962 57,560    71,895  0 25,000 37,500 60,000    1,100,000  78.33%
Fees  cash  2605 85,945    94,483  0 44,000 58,113 85,000    1,100,000 
Fees  shares  98 24,534    30,740  0  7,500 20,000 25,000    175,000   
Total  bonus  9962  2,012    63,995 0 0 0 0    5,531,744  2.74%
Bonus  cash  72  253,941    616,916  601 25,000 87,750  201,593    4,811,743 
Bonus  shares  0  . . . . . . . 
Bonus  vdf  0  . . . . . . . 
Bonus  mdf  5  352,259    288,804 45,780 72,706  426,100  496,707    720,000 
Total  equity  9962  5,414    114,361 0 0 0 0    6,662,728  7.37%
Restricted  share  36 978,319    1,138,193  1,506 285,112 486,473  1,096,970    4,243,383 
Stock  option  64 292,496    582,766  0  57,402 115,958 241,039    3,393,328 
Total  misc  9962  493    18,975 0 0 0 0    1,230,000  0.67%
Transaction  Bonus  0  . . . . . . . 
Deferred  Cash  Bonus  1 35,000    .  35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000    35,000 
Loss  of  Office    11 443,295    377,643  23,000 105,678 403,799 628,528    1,230,000 
Recruitment  Incentive  0  . . . . . . . 
Reallocation  expenses  0  . . . . . . . 
Others  9962  4,520    105,982 0 0 0 0    9,157,000  6.15%
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Table 3.D4. FTSE 250 CEO remuneration 
 
This table shows CEO total remuneration and its components of FTSE250 companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration.  
The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  Min  P25  Median  P75  Max  Percent 
Total salary  3386    285,105    184,419  0 170,000 295,000 400,000    2,400,000  28.56%
Salary cash  785    409,363    149,932  2,692 318,475 400,000 487,600    1,147,945 
Salary shares  0    . . . . . . .   
Total fees  3386    3,246    15,269 0 0 0 0    337,000  0.34%
Fees cash  105    40,880   40,270  4,000  24,000  27,500  35,000   221,000 
Fees shares  0    . . . . . . .   
Total bonus  3386    194,164   398,354  0  0  85,250  236,539   5,740,000 19.45%
Bonus cash  2277    251,498    363,406  130  77,000 153,000 291,000    4,500,000 
Bonus shares  28    259,592    386,716  41,824 100,256 136,559 199,500    1,968,750 
Bonus vdf  39    237,555    247,029  12,680  76,760 159,000 340,000    1,312,500 
Bonus mdf  183    298,009    422,037  2,296  92,000 166,000 300,000    2,870,000 
Total  equity  3,386   467,380   4,191,657  0  0  26,802  367,290   186,841,117  46.81%
Restricted  share  1,150   823,644   4,270,988  330  174,998  361,302  652,041   134,000,000 
Stock  option  929   782,499   9,267,125  0  124,516  221,358  397,114   186,841,117 
Total misc  3386    14,060    182,179 0 0 0 0    6,333,880  1.41%
Transaction Bonus  13    1,085,083   1,316,301  58,000  156,250  505,104  1,760,934   4,686,697 
Deferred Cash Bonus  27    410,860    1,201,322  8,000  49,000 117,413 267,347    6,333,880 
Loss of Office    16    650,106    432,912 103,000 382,418 464,875 838,434    1,544,745 
Recruitment Incentive  13    899,279    1,044,107 150,000 350,000 508,055 735,514    3,225,044 
Reallocation expenses  4    79,277   59,181  35,000  39,338  58,838 119,216    164,431 
Others 3386    34,429   90,292  0  3,807  16,000  27,000   2,179,000  3.45%
Overall  total  3,386   998,383   4,273,865  0  274,000  561,655  1,060,530   186,879,117  100%
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Table 3.D5. FTSE 250 Executive remuneration (excluding the CEO) 
 
This table shows non-CEO executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE250 companies. N is the 
number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and Max 
are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% quantile 
respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in that type of 
remuneration. All the values are unconditional. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and 
Datastream. 
 
variable N  mean  sd  min  p25  Median  p75 max  Percent
Total  salary  11091 186,054    109,602  0 115,454 176,000 245,000   2,045,400    32.97%
Total  fees  11091  738   12,466  0  0  0  0   575,000   0.13%
Total  bonus  11091  108,542   259,380  0  0  47,000  121,000   9,925,000   19.23%
Total  equity  11091  227,703   2,583,158  0  0  8,019  178,725   209,000,000   40.35%
Total  misc  11091  13,577   126,150  0  0  0  0   6,076,200   2.41%
Others  11091  27,771   123,546  0  6,706  13,000  21,000   9,538,471   4.92%
Overall total  11091  564,386   2,621,771  0  194,200  338,335  592,000   209,000,000   100%
 
Table 3.D6. FTSE 250 non-executives’ remuneration 
 
This table shows non-executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE250 companies. N is the number of 
observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and Max are the 
minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% quantile respectively. 
The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in that type of remuneration. 
All the values are unconditional. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
variable N  mean  sd  min  p25  Median  p75 max  Percent
Total  salary  18775  1,758   21,259  0  0  0  0   875,000   4.16%
Total  fees  18775  34,250   37,761  0  15,000  25,000  38,000   705,000   81.03%
Total  bonus  18775  1,129   24,265  0  0  0  0   1,800,000   2.67%
Total  equity  18775  2,516   68,065  0  0  0  0   6,662,728   5.95%
Total  misc  18775  832   95,401  0  0  0  0   13,100,000   1.97%
Others  18775  1,784   20,609  0  0  0  0   1,111,942   4.22%
Overall total  18775  42,269   142,559  0  16,000  26,000  40,000   14,300,000   100%
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Table 3.D7. FTSE SmallCap CEO remuneration 
 
This table shows CEO total remuneration and its components of FTSE SmallCap companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration. 
The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  Min  P25  Median  P75  Max  Percent 
Total salary  4662    166,136    139,268  0  0 170,000 250,000    2,248,685  34.33%
Salary cash  852    274,444    140,894  1,846 200,133 270,000 330,000    2,248,685 
Salary shares  2    5,000    0 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000    5,000 
Total fees  4662    4,946    20,826 0 0 0 0    992,673  1.02%
Fees cash  342    27,009    23,719  2,000 19,500 23,000 27,000    237,118 
Fees shares  1    755,555    .  755,555 755,555 755,555 755,555    755,555 
Total bonus  4662    71,821   150,015  0  0  7,488  95,000   2,500,000  14.84%
Bonus cash  2364    135,212   178,816  623  44,000  90,000  165,000   2,500,000 
Bonus shares  15    103,320   125,764  3,000  41,200  63,654  122,057   510,000 
Bonus vdf  19    97,092   70,247  6,445  55,000  90,000 118,025    337,500 
Bonus mdf  65    123,245   133,262  3,000  52,286  84,500  138,000   835,000 
Total  equity  4,662   216,148   3,291,035  0  0  0  51,864   186,841,117  44.66%
Restricted  share  713   526,324   2,150,374  2  120,666  234,242  376,623   47,600,000 
Stock  option  715   1,012,584   11,200,000  0  69,124  144,588  272,851   186,841,117 
Total misc  4662    5,438    67,145 0 0 0 0    2,057,000  1.12%
Transaction Bonus  7    651,943   775,097  49,428  60,500  187,671  1,246,000   2,057,000 
Deferred Cash Bonus  20    234,708    382,432  573 100,125 138,000 209,750    1,818,000 
Loss of Office    29    467,742    351,000 125,000 248,000 390,000 470,000    1,544,745 
Recruitment Incentive  10    227,846    198,186  48,000  87,500 137,500 400,000    600,000 
Reallocation expenses  5    49,946    40,543 14,002 25,915 36,813 56,000    117,000 
Others 4662    19,474    58,362  0  0 10,920 19,000    1,396,000  4.02%
Overall  total  4,662   483,963   3,308,147  0  40,000  254,056  486,003   186,879,117  100.00%
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Table 3.D8. FTSE SmallCap Executive remuneration (excluding the CEO) 
This table shows non-CEO executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE SmallCap companies. N 
is the number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min 
and Max are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% 
quantile respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in 
that type of remuneration.    All the values are unconditional Data source: Own calculations based on data from 
Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable  N Mean  SD  Min  P25 Median P75  Max Percent
Total  salary  11708  129,829   75,492  0  82,000  122,000  170,000   933,712   36.15%
Total  fees  11708  1,124   21,335  0  0  0  0   1,029,013   0.31%
Total  bonus  11708  48,935   111,688  0  0  16,000  56,390   4,000,000   13.63%
Total  equity  11708  147,199   2,593,178  0  0  0  41,555   209,000,000   40.99%
Total  misc  11708  8,827   65,709  0  0  0  0   2,192,000   2.46%
Others  11708  23,235   92,452  0  3,942  10,000  16,000   3,087,696   6.47%
Overall total  11708 359,149    2,605,364  0 121,000 192,000 323,100    209,000,000    100%
 
Table 3.D9. FTSE SmallCap non-executives’ remuneration 
This table shows non-executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE SmallCap companies. N is the 
number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and 
Max are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% 
quantile respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in 
that type of remuneration. All the values are unconditional. Data source: Own calculations based on data from 
Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable  N Mean  SD  Min  P25 Median P75  Max Percent
Total  salary  20878  1,104   20,524  0  0  0  0   2,193,000   3.89%
Total  fees  20878 23,451    27,939  0 10,672 18,371 28,000    1,685,000    82.60%
Total  bonus  20878  428   9,799  0  0  0  0   673,120   1.51%
Total  equity  20878  1,970   99,145  0  0  0  0   13,000,000   6.94%
Total  misc  20878  192   7,180  0  0  0  0   606,000   0.67%
Others  20878  1,248   21,027  0  0  0  0   1,818,000   4.39%
Overall total  20878 28,392    111,078  0 11,000 19,679 29,350    13,000,000    100%
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Table 3.D10. FTSE Fledgling CEO remuneration 
This table shows CEO total remuneration and its components of FTSE Fledgling companies. N is the number of observations 
(firm-years). Mean stands for the average value; SD is the standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the value at the first and third 
quartile, respectively. Percent captures the percentage of the total remuneration that is awarded via this type of remuneration. 
The values in bold are unconditional statistics, which takes into account all variables with a zero value. The other values are 
conditional statistics based on non-zero values only. N (the number of observations) always equals to maximum number of 
observations possible for the unconditional statistics. The N for the conditional statistics is the number of firm years when a 
certain type of remuneration is actually given. Data source: Own calculations based on data from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable  N Mean  SD  Min  P25 Median P75  Max Percent 
Total salary  2705    108,556   98,259  0  0 114,000 174,000    757,000  46.20%
Salary cash  374    192,136   89,549  2,000 142,000 186,119 235,000    757,000   
Salary shares  1    22,000    .  22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000    22,000   
Total fees  2705    4,358    12,818 0 0 0 0    250,000  1.85%
Fees cash  170    24,731    26,439  3,750 17,000 20,000 23,500    216,666   
Fees shares  0    . . . . . . .   
Total bonus  2705    27,371   68,414  0  0  0  27,000   1,100,000  11.65%
Bonus cash  964    75,034    94,450  1,000 24,188 48,076 90,500    1,100,000   
Bonus shares  4    87,000   84,735  40,000  43,000  47,000 131,000    214,000   
Bonus vdf  1    105,000    .  105,000 105,000 105,000 105,000    105,000   
Bonus mdf  5    213,957    215,192  20,787  35,500 122,500 430,000    461,000   
Total equity  2705    76,496    932,563 0 0 0 0    42,900,000  32.56%
Restricted share  184    442,470    1,235,139  1,688  77,589 178,867 311,250    11,000,000   
Stock option  352    351,308   2,376,255  0  29,957  78,935  178,590   42,900,000   
Total misc  2705    3,182    45,715 0 0 0 0    2,000,000  1.35%
Transaction Bonus  2    1,012,507    1,396,526  25,014  25,014 1,012,507 2,000,000    2,000,000   
Deferred Cash Bonus  5    56,124    19,394 27,618 45,000 64,000 71,000    73,000   
Loss of Office    24    214,398   97,523  50,000 156,500 198,000 255,000    438,000   
Recruitment Incentive  4    129,491   47,365  85,000  98,482 118,482 160,500    196,000   
Reallocation expenses  4    159,501   229,187  14,002  24,501  62,000  294,500   500,000   
Others 2705    14,990   94,346  0  0  6,000  14,818   4,248,000  6.38%
Overall total  2705    234,954    963,678  0  18,750 145,000 255,434    43,300,000  100.00%
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Table 3.D11. FTSE Fledgling Executive remuneration (excluding the CEO) 
 
This table shows non-CEO executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE Fledgling companies. N 
is the number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min 
and Max are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% 
quantile respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in 
that type of remuneration.  All the values are unconditional.  Data source: Own calculations based on data 
from Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable  N Mean  SD  Min  P25 Median P75  Max Percent
Total  salary  5835 95,226    63,539  0 56,250 90,000  126,000    702,419    49.44%
Total  fees  5835  609   6,917  0  0  0  0   196,000   0.32%
Total  bonus  5835  17,208   46,960  0  0  0  20,000   1,037,080   8.93%
Total  equity  5835  57,054   611,070  0  0  0  0   28,600,000   29.62%
Total  misc  5835  7,565   49,437  0  0  0  0   1,247,000   3.93%
Others  5835  14,950   48,162  0  1,987  8,000  13,000   1,424,110   7.76%
Overall total  5835  192,612   627,990  0  77,000  123,000  194,000   28,800,000   100%
 
Table 3.D12. FTSE Fledgling non-executives’ remuneration 
This table shows non-executives’ total remuneration and its components of FTSE Fledgling companies. N is the 
number of observations. Mean is the average value of the variable. SD stands for standard deviation. Min and 
Max are the minimum and maximum value of the item. P25 and P75 are the value at 25% quantile and 75% 
quantile respectively. The percentage at the last column is how many percent of total remuneration is awarded in 
that type of remuneration.    All the values are unconditional. Data source: Own calculations based on data from 
Manifest and Datastream. 
 
Variable  N Mean  SD  Min  P25 Median P75  Max Percent
Total  salary  10336  1,036   12,605  0  0  0  0   450,000   3.75%
Total  fees  10336  20,926   291,453  0  8,254  15,000  22,500   29,600,000   75.87%
Total  bonus  10336  320   6,436  0  0  0  0   264,000   1.16%
Total  equity  10336  4,333   163,894  0  0  0  0   13,000,000   15.71%
Total  misc  10336  190   7,790  0  0  0  0   606,000   0.69%
Others  10336  776   8,011  0  0  0  0   358,000   2.81%
Overall total  10336  27,581   337,079  0  9,000  15,000  24,000   29,800,000   100%












A company’s shareholders are to elect the non-executive (supervisory) directors 
whose fiduciary duties include monitoring the CEO and the other executive directors. 
In case of poor corporate performance, one of the key responsibilities of the board is 
to contemplate the dismissal of the CEO and to appoint a successor. In this context, 
director networks are likely to play a central role. A CEO’s network may increase his 
influence and reduce the non-executive directors’ power to replace him. The role of 
social networks in job-searching for laborers and minorities has been well studied in 
sociology and labor economics, but not for the top management. Given the close 
connections between the corporate elite, we expect director networks in the top 
managerial labor market to be even higher than in the labor market for employees or 
middle management. In this paper, we embed the social network methodology into 
our analysis of CEO labor market behavior. More specifically, we focus on the 
following issues. First, we focus on firms with poor performance as the extant 
literature has shown that this is the primary reason for CEO turnover (that is not 
related to CEOs reaching retirement age). Turnover has also been shown to be related 
to the quality of the corporate governance mechanisms in place. In this issue, the 
network position of the top manager could provide him with more managerial   145
influence, which affects the board’s decision making. The CEO can also obtain more 
information through his networks, which may for instance improve the odds of 
finding better managerial positions. Therefore, we investigate whether network 
connectedness is related to CEO turnover probability. Second, we focus on the 
decision of hiring an internal versus an external CEO. In general, appointing an 
external CEO involves more uncertainty due to asymmetric information. However, we 
expect that these director networks provide a resolution to this problem. Moreover, the 
size of the external CEO’s network may reflect his past performance and may hence 
serve as a quality certification. The size of the current company’ network (and its 
information collection ability) may also be important in the search for a new external 
CEO position. In this research, the managerial influence oriented network and the 
information value oriented network are measured by different centrality measures 
based on the directors’ adjacent connections (direct centrality measures) and positions 
in the whole networks (indirect centrality measures). We will also describe other 
factors related to CEO appointment and the status of the new CEO’s network, for 
instance, the characteristics of the company and the candidate CEO. To sum up, we 
attempt to address this central question: to what extent do director networks affect the 
CEO labor market?   
 
This study yields some interesting findings. First, CEOs with better information 
access through indirect networks are more likely to leave their current position for 
another firm. Nevertheless, CEOs' direct centrality measures also increase their 
turnover probability. Concerning company level networks, we find evidence to 
support the relation between better information collection networks at the company 
level and CEO turnover probability in some regression specifications.   
 
Second, when we investigate the factors affecting the probability of CEO succession 
by an outsider, we use the new CEO’s direct and indirect centrality measures to 
explain the type of succession. It turns out that the CEOs with higher indirect 
centrality measures (with more information collection ability) are more likely to be   146
chosen as new CEOs from outside. Higher direct centrality measures do not seem 
related to external succession probability. We can conclude that director networks do 
benefit CEOs in their job market by providing better information access. We also find 
that companies with better information collection networks have a larger probability 
of hiring new CEOs from the outside. Our results are robust in different samples and 
variable specifications. The positive relation between the network’s information value 
and the external succession rate is in line with the ‘strength of the weak links’ theory. 
Such that the individual’s job market performance is improved more by information 
from distant contacts rather than local ones.   
 
Our results confirm some findings in the recent literature. For instance, at the 
individual level, we obtain the same result as Liu (2010) and Barnea and Gueji (2009) 
on the issue of succession. Beyond that, we discover that CEO’s direct and indirect 
connections play different roles in outside succession. Moreover, our result shows that 
networks at the individual level seem to be more important than those at the company 
level in the context of both turnover and  succession.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the existing CEO labor 
market studies. In section 3, we introduce the social network methodology and 
develop the hypothesis for our empirical analysis in Section 4. In Section 5, we 
describe the sample statistics, followed in Section 6 by our multivariate analysis and 
the interpretation of the results. In Section 7, we formulate our conclusions and point 
out some avenues for future research. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In this section, we review the studies on the top managerial labor market from two 
different perspectives: business and sociology. The literature in these different fields 
remained segmented until the 1990s in terms of methodology employed and the   147
research perspective. We discuss the early studies of the business literature in section 
2.1, those of sociology in section 2.2, and the recent work (since the 1990s) with both 
fields combined in section 2.3.   
 
2.1 The Finance and Management Literature 
Investors in the financial markets are concerned about how well the firm is governed. 
This comprises also insights into the firm’s policy regarding the management changes 
in case of corporate underperformance. Top managerial succession can have 
far-reaching impacts, e.g. on corporate strategy, corporate governance and ownership 
concentration. The core of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) states that 
managers (agents) are hired to maximize the shareholders’ (principals’) utility in 
terms of corporate value. However, managers are primarily motivated by the pursuit 
of their own goals which may be different from those of the shareholders. In order to 
discipline managers ignoring shareholders’ interests, dismissal may at times be an 
essential instrument. The pioneering empirical studies include Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985), and Weisbach (1987) who find that CEO turnover is associated with poor 
performance especially when an effective corporate governance system is active. As 
many CEO turnover events often coincide with the announcement of a successor, 
Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) study the negative relation between performance and 
turnover is only significant when it coincides with the hiring of an external CEO. In 
other words, internal succession seems less related to performance. Compared to the 
early studies on managerial turnover in the field of finance, researchers in 
management science put more emphasis on individual CEOs’ characteristics and 
background. At the beginning, managerial leadership changes are studied in a broader 
context such as memberships of sports clubs or political parties or education (Guest, 
1962; Grusky, 1963; Gamson and Scotch, 1964; Allen, Panian and Lotz, 1979; Brown, 
1982). In this literature two arguments have been put forward: the “common-sense” 
notion that manager succession leads to corporate improvements and the “vicious 
circle” argument that a change in management harms the performance of the group 
(following changes in organizational culture, morale, and accounting rules).   148
Management science studies have used surveys more often than empirical data. In 
contrast, financial management studies have focuses on leadership succession in large 
corporations by means of large sample research (Dalton and Kesner, 1985; 
Reinganum, 1985; Beaty and Zajac, 1987). For instance, Dalton and Kesner (1985) 
document that the choice between an internal and external CEO depends on the 
company’s performance prior to the succession. Only mediocre performing companies 
opt for external candidates whereas the well–performing and poorly-performing firms 
are happy with an internal successor. Reinganum (1985) finds that smaller companies 
experience a positive abnormal return when they announce the appointment of an 
external CEO succession, but no such effect is uncovered at the announcement of 
internal succession. Still, Beaty and Zajac (1987) observe a positive market reaction 
after the CEO change, regardless of the successor being an outsider or insider.   
 
Since the 1990s, the number of studies on CEO turnover has grown exponentially. An 
early example of a study integrating the research setup from financial economics and 
management science is by Zajac (1990), who contacts theoretical and empirical 
analysis of CEO selection, succession, compensation, and the performance of the 
largest US firms. Companies with internal CEOs outperform since internal CEOs are 
associated with fewer adverse selection problems than external CEOs.   
 
Concerning the turnover probability and performance, Mikkelson and Partch (1996) 
find that it is only significant during an active takeover period. In other words, 
turnover and performance are strongly related in the context of a takeover threat. This 
finding is contested by Huson et al (2001) who analyze 1316 CEO turnover for the 
period 1971-1994 and not find any change in the turnover and performance relation 
due to takeover activity. Denis et al. (1997) document that CEO turnover becomes 
more likely if outside blockholders are represented on the board of directors, but CEO 
stock ownership successfully impedes dismissal. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) 
find that board size is negatively related to corporate governance efficiency and thus 
large board is associated with lower turnover probability, which is contrary to   149
Yermack (1996) that a large board facilitates CEO turnover.   
 
There is much controversy about the performance subsequent to top managerial 
turnover. Khanna and Poulsen (1995) investigate a group of financially distressed 
companies and find that CEO turnovers do not trigger any positive market reactions 
(regardless of whether the new managers are internal candidates or not). Hence, the 
authors conclude that departing CEOs are serving as scapegoats. Whereas in the 
Khanna and Poulsen (1995), it is unclear whether the turnover is forced or not, Denis 
and Denis (1995) do make this distinction. They find that forced managerial turnover 
becomes more likely after a significant decline in performance and is usually followed 
by an improvement in performance, but these effects disappear for the sample of CEO 
departures that are possibly motivated by retirement. Weisbach (1995) studies 270 
cases of CEO turnover and the subsequent firms’ investment decisions. The 
probability of divesting from an unprofitable investment increases subsequent to the 
CEO’s departure, regardless of whether the departure is related to retirement or is 
disciplinary. Borokhovich et al. (1996) find that the market reacts differently to 
internal and external successions. At the succession, the cumulated abnormal returns 
(CARs) are significantly negative if the successor is already employed by the firm and 
are positive in case of the recruitment of an outsider. The frequency of external 
successions increases with the proportion of external directors on the board regardless 
of whether turnover is forced or not. Since a large proportion of external directors is 
considered to be a sign of better corporate governance, external succession is regarded 
as a positive outcome of more effective corporate governance. Murphy and Zabojnik 
(2007) argue that firm prefers external candidates to internal management to succeed 
the incumbent CEO. Since the desired qualification for professional managers in 
modern corporations is shifting from firm-specific skills to general management skills, 
the comparative advantage of internal management for having firm-specific skills 
becomes less important in top managerial labor market. The most recent studies on 
the performance and turnover relationship are Jenter and Kanaan (2010) and Taylor 
(2010). Although in principle turnover decisions ought to be made with exogenous   150
factors filtered out from performance, Jenter and Kanaan (2010) find CEOs are fired 
for industry and market shocks that are out of their control. Taylor (2010) proposes a 
model to evaluate the turnover decision making. From the fact that the theoretical 
turnover rate is higher than the empirical evidence, the turnover cost in reality must be 
higher than we have presumed. This turnover cost is not real cost for the shareholders, 
but rather due to managerial entrenchment. 
 
2.2 The Sociology Literature 
Many of the sociology studies on the role of networks do not specifically focus on 
CEO turnover and succession, but rather address the relation between the general 
labor market and social networks. Nonetheless, the top managers’ job searching has 
many mechanisms in common with the ordinary labor market, such as the role of 
networks in collecting employment information. Therefore, this discussion will 
provide some useful guidelines for the research on the top managerial labor market. 
 
Since the 1960s, most sociological studies have focused on interpersonal influence, 
the small world effect, and generally how networks affect the behavior of individuals 
and organizations. Among the early studies, Rees (1966) gives evidence of the 
importance of social contacts in job searching. More than 60% of the subjects in his 
survey find jobs via friends and relatives rather than from direct applications or via 
job searching agencies. Granovetter (1973, 1974 and 1983) focuses on the strength of 
social network contacts and demonstrates the importance of information transmission 
through weak links (e.g., acquaintances) compared to the strong ones (e.g., family and 
close friends). The main explanation for the success of weak ties in job searching is 
that weak ties are more likely to transmit information from distant parts of the 
networks. Nevertheless, some researchers offer different interpretations about the 
strength of weak ties (Lin, 1982 and Montgomery, 1992). For instance, the number of 
weak links is usually much larger than that of the strong links. Therefore, the 
information inflow via all weak links can be more intense than that from strong links. 
In short, weak links can bring in information at higher quality as well as quantity.   151
Montgomery (1991) shows statistical evidence that more than half of the jobs are 
obtained through social contacts regardless of ethnicities, gender, education, current 
occupation, and social status. The importance of social networks is also examined 
from the perspective of the employers in studies on referral. For instance, Holzer 
(1987) and Campbell and Marsden (1990) report that a considerable proportion of 
jobs are filled by candidates by referral. The main reason for favoring candidates who 
are referred to the employer is that the use of referral resolves the information 
asymmetry problem about the true quality of the candidates in an inexpensive way 
(Rees, 1966; Doeringer and Piore, 1971 and Wanous, 1980). Lastly, some researchers 
(Bridges and Villemez, 1986) argue that the networks and job-market performance 
may be driven by some hidden factors. For example, if the applicants' characteristics 
including age and education are controlled for, the network-job market relation may 
diminish. 
 
2.3 Recent Director Network and Turnover Studies   
Since the 1990s, the developments in social network theory have intrigued scholars 
from other fields, including labor economics, corporate finance and management 
science. For example, in studies combining economics and sociology, Montgomery 
(1991, 1992) presents an equilibrium analysis of network connectiveness and the 
probability of obtaining a new job. Moreover, Granovetter (1995) summarizes the 
various explanations for the importance of networks in job searching, including 
assertive matching (when employers favor candidates with a similar social status and 
educational level), information asymmetry, and turnover insurance (outside job 
opportunity when facing dismissal). Among these studies on networks and the labor 
market from different angles, we concentrate on the relation between director 
networks and the top managerial labor market in the remainder of this survey. Let us 
first give two definitions frequently used in director network research. 
 
Centrality 
Centrality refers to the level of connectedness of the director or company in the   152
corresponding network. There are various centrality measures, each capturing a 
particular aspect of a subject’s network. In the methodology section, we discuss 
the centrality measures in more details. 
 
Interlocks 
Interlocks refer to the links created between two boards when they share at least 
one director. The common director is also referred to as the interlocked director. 
The connected companies are referred to as the interlocked companies. 
 
The research on director networks in combination with CEO turnover started in the 
late 1990s. Fich and White (2003) employ the number of director interlocks to 
measure the degree of firm connectedness. After controlling for firm and CEO 
characteristics, they find an inverse association between the probability of CEO 
turnover and the degree of director interlocks, which implies that director interlocks 
may hinder good corporate governance practices. In a follow-up study, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) report that for the 508 largest US firms over the period 1989-95, 
the average number of directorships per director is 3.11. The authors introduce a ’busy 
outside director’ dummy variable which identifies the directors with 3 directorships or 
more. If a company’s external directors have more than 50% of its members classified 
as “busy”, this company has a busy board. A busy board is negatively associated with 
corporate performance, and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is significantly 
lower in firms with busy boards. To sum up, the above two studies provide 
compelling evidence of the negative impact of director interlocks on corporate 
performance and governance.   
 
In a recent study, Devos, Prevost and Puthenpurackal (2008) analyze the stock market 
reactions to the announcement of director appointments that create interlocks. 
Investors perceive such announcements as a sign of weak monitoring and managerial 
entrenchment, which trigger negative abnormal returns. Moreover, the CEO’s 
compensation and turnover sensitivity to performance is reduced when director   153
interlocks are present, which further confirms that interlocks lead to weaker corporate 
governance.  
 
The above studies analyze the effect of director networks on CEO turnover at the 
company level. The following two studies examine individual networks of CEOs and 
directors. Kirchmaier and Kollo (2007) conduct their research on a sample of external 
directors for two cross-sections of 264 FTSE 350 companies in 2001 and 2004. They 
collect data on prior directorships over the past 20 years for each director. The 
problem of this study is that the small sample does not enable them to capture the true 
networks properly as the study excludes more than 80% of the listed industrial and 
commercial companies, which erodes the completeness of the network. The study 
shows that the number of non-executive directorships is positively related to the 
executive director’s prestige, title, qualification, and education. Interestingly, the 
appointment of external directors with prestigious titles does not harm corporate value, 
with the exception when such directors join large boards. The authors argue that 
prestigious external directors break group think, which is especially valuable for 
smaller boards.   
 
Kirchmaier and Stathopoulos (2008) relate social networks and the hiring behavior of 
a cross-section of 363 UK listed companies in the year 2005. As in the previous study, 
this paper has a problem with the network integrity induced by the limited sample. 
CEO networks here are also measured by the number of boardroom connections 
directors accumulate over their professional career. Although the size of the CEO’s 
network affects the firm performance negatively, young firms are still eager to hire 
CEOs with large networks.   
 
Some empirical papers show a negative relation between the size of the director 
networks and CEO turnover probability. However, the discussion on the impact of 
networks on performance is not completely settled. Research deficiencies in recent 
papers have to do with inaccurate measurement of complex director networks. One   154
study sticks out: Barnea and Guedj’s (2009) study on director networks of the 1500 
largest S&P firms between 1996 and 2004. Based on the network graph in each year, 
the authors calculate the degree, betweenness and closeness centrality measures to 
describe the connectiveness of each director. Their CEO turnover analysis shows that 
the CEOs in the more central position of the network are less likely to be dismissed 
when firm performance declines. Moreover, better connected CEOs are more likely to 
be appointed by other boards. Liu (2010) has carried out a comprehensive study on 
the relation between CEO turnover and CEO networks for a large US sample. Liu 
investigates incumbent CEO departure, successor origin (internal versus external), and 
post-turnover performance by means of centrality measures. CEOs with a high 
connectedness are more likely to leave their current positions and are succeeded by 
well-connected candidates.   
 
 
3. Network Measurement 
 
To quantify the CEO’s network connectedness, we apply various graph-theoretical 
measures to measure the centrality of each director in the networks. Note that 
although our research focuses on CEOs, the network is generated from a broader 
range of individuals, namely all (executive and non-executive) directors. Relative to 
some recent studies which construct networks based on CEOs’ connections only, our 
network graph is more complete and hence measures the connections of all the listed 
UK firms. Indeed, network integrity is of great importance if we consider issues such 
as information flow through networks. Before introducing the calculation of those 
centrality measures, the readers may refer to Section 3.1 in Chapter 3 for the basic 
concepts in social network as illustrated by example of a real life director network.   
 
In this section, we describe the following four centrality measures.   
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Table 4.3.1 Centrality measures 
 Direct  connections  Indirect connections 
Main Degree  Closeness 
Alternative Eigenvector centrality  Betweenness 
 
The four centrality measures show the level of connectedness of a vertex either by 
capturing the direct connections or the indirect connections. We can analyze director 
networks at the individual as well as at the company level.   
 
The degree centrality of a vertex is calculated as the number of links of vertex.   
 
The closeness of a vertex is defined as the sum of geodesic distances between this 










In this formula, the closeness centrality of vertex v (Cc(v)) is equal to one divided by 
the sum of the lengths of geodesic paths (dG) from v to any other vertex t. 
 
The betweenness of vertex v is defined as the sum of its betweenness ratios. The 
betweenness ratio is the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t passing 
through vertex v, divided by the number of geodesic paths from s to t. The 















where the denominator is the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t, the 
numerator is the number of geodesic paths from s to t with vertex v on the geodesic 
path. The betweenness can be normalized by dividing it by the maximum number of 
pairs of vertices not including v.     156
 
Eigenvector centrality of vertex v (CE(v)) is equal to the sum of all adjacent vertices’ 
eigenvector centrality scores:   
 
This calculation process begins with assigning a score of 1 to all the vertices. At each 
iteration, the score of vertex v is calculated as the sum of all adjacent vertices’ scores 
received in the previous iteration. In the above formula, matrix A is an adjacent matrix 
capturing whether any vertex j is adjacent to the target vertex v. Therefore, the 
centrality score for each vertex evolves after every iteration. Factor    is to make 
sure that the centrality scores converge rather than explode after several iterations. 
The advantage of eigenvector centrality over other centrality measures is that it not 
only captures how many vertices are linked to the target vertex (degree), but also 
includes the network importance of those linked vertices (the degree of these linked 
vertices). A vertex has a higher eigenvector centrality score if it is connected to more 
vertices with higher scores. 
 
To sum up, degree, closeness, eigenvector centrality and betweenness are the four 
core measures we use to measure the network centrality in our graph. According to the 
nature of these measures, we categorize degree and eigenvector centrality measures as 
the  measures of direct links or direct measures. Closeness and betweenness are 
regarded as the measures of the indirect links or indirect measures.  
 
 
4. Hypotheses and Regression Methods 
 
The change in a CEO position involves the following steps. 
-  Departure:  
A turnover can be triggered by poor performance, age, illness or death. We 
focus on non-retirement turnover whereby the CEO’s age is less than 63 and 












the motivation behind the termination of the contract is not always reliable, 
since the firm often releases euphemistic press statements on the CEO 
departure which may cover up the true turnover reason. Furthermore, the 
actual dismissal decision may not only due to performance but rather depends 
on issues such as strategy conflicts with major shareholders, the corporate 
governance structure, and financial stability. Therefore, we focus on 
non-retirement turnover rather than disciplinary turnover. Once the CEO faces 
dismissal, his network may provide valuable information about job 
opportunities. 
 
-  Succession: 
Upon the departure of the predecessor, a new CEO candidate is needed. The 
board then has to attract a successor, based on ability, experience, and 
reputation. The nomination committee of the board considers a pool of 
potential candidates from both inside the company and outside. An internal 
manager has the advantage of being familiar with the firm but concerns may 
arise about managerial entrenchment. For external candidates, asymmetric 
information may be an obstacle. We investigate whether director networks can 
resolve this problem about CEO succession.   
 
Our research is based on two phases: the turnover and succession decision.   
 
4.1 Turnover 
Many factors affect the turnover evaluation process. In this study, we focus on the 
director network status of the CEO and the company. On the one hand, the CEO can 
take advantage of his direct connections to accumulate managerial power or influence, 
which may reduce the possibility of being dismissed when performance declines. We 
expect that CEOs with strong direct centrality measures are less likely to be dismissed 
(managerial influence hypothesis). On the other hand, direct connections may also 
help the CEO find better positions outside the company, which increases the turnover   158
probability. Our study could shed light on which of the two effects is more important 
on the CEO turnover issue. Moreover, if the CEO’s indirect network centrality is high, 
he has better access to information from the whole network, including new 
employment opportunities. Given these opportunities, we expect that the CEO is more 
likely to leave his current position (and resist less). Furthermore, we expect that 
managerial entrenchment lowers the turnover-performance sensitivity. 
 
H1. The CEO’s non-retirement turnover probability is reduced by his direct and 
increased by indirect connections at the level of the individual network. 
 
In the director networks of a company, more direct links increase the likelihood of 
having to deal with a ‘busy board’, which may hamper the corporate governance 
efficiency. We expect lower CEO turnover probability in such cases. When the 
company’s indirect network is strong, better access to information allows the 
company to detect a CEO’s mismanagement earlier on and to detect better CEOs more 
easily. Therefore, we expect turnover probability to be positively associated with the 
company’s indirect centrality measures. 
 
4.2 Succession 
Director networks may also play an important role in the selection of the new CEO. 
While we do not have data on the pool of CEO candidates, our analysis is necessarily 
confined to observing the results of the selection process, namely the internal or 
external CEO appointment. External CEO appointments are less common than 
internal promotions for the following reasons. First, as the internal executive directors 
have been working with (non-executive)  board members in the past, possible 
friendships between the internal candidate and other board members may make it 
easier for the internal candidate to be appointed as the new CEO. Second, the 
company has less information about the quality of the external candidate than the 
internal ones. In order to avoid adverse selection, the nomination committee may vote 
for a candidate from the inside. Third, the internal CEO has the advantage of being   159
familiar with the company's operation. However, for the new external CEO, it may 
take him a considerable period of time to fully understand the company's operation 
and culture. Director networks that improve information diffusion can help the 
external CEO candidates overcome the above obstacles. Therefore, we expect strong 
indirect network increases the chances of external appointments. 
 
H2. External CEO appointments are more likely to occur when the candidates have 
stronger network positions, primarily based on indirect measures. 
 
Similar to our discussion in 4.1 about the company level director networks, we expect 
a higher direct centrality score to be a measure of corporate governance inefficiency. 
Therefore the external succession rate should be lower. On the other hand, companies 
with higher indirect centrality measures are expected to be more likely to hire external 
CEOs. 
 
4.3 Control Variables 
Besides the centrality measures described above, we also employ many other 
variables to control for the factors that may affect turnover and succession. The 
descriptive statistics of these variables can be found in the next section. Most 
non-retirement turnover is triggered by poor performance. We use the return on assets 
(ROA) and market-adjusted return to capture a firm’s accounting and stock 
performances. Naturally, we expect turnover probability to be negatively associated 
with both performance measures. 
 
The CEO characteristics we include are gender, age and his position on the board 
(chairmanship and committee position). More senior CEOs are more likely to have a 
well-established career, more experience, as well as a stronger reputation which 
provide them with more job opportunities. Thus, we expect that older CEOs are more 
likely to leave their positions to accept a board position elsewhere. Being a member of 
the audit, remuneration or nomination committees may strengthen the CEO’s   160
bargaining power when the questions of his departure emerge. Therefore, we expect a 
lower turnover frequency if the CEO is a member of one of the board’s committees. 
Likewise, chairman-CEO duality, which renders the CEO more influential, is 
expected to have a negative impact on turnover probability. Lastly, we also examine 
whether gender plays a role in CEO turnover.   
 
Board structure is measured by the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. 
We expect boards with larger proportions of non-executives to have more effective 
governance, which is reflected in higher turnover probability. 
 
We also control for various aspects of ownership concentration. A CEO’s stock 
ownership gives him more power and may make him more immune to attempts to 
replace him. The mere ownership stake is also an incentive for the CEO to stay in his 
current company in order to safeguard the value of his stake (as well as private 
benefits of control). Hence, we expect that the CEO’s stock holdings lower the 
turnover probability. As for the outside blockholders (which include institutional 
investors, corporations, individuals and families not related to a director), we expect 
that those large shareholdings induce investors to invest more into monitoring and 
interventions, which should lead to turnover in case of underperformance. We also 
expect that non-executives holding large shares perform their monitoring tasks more 
effectively. 
 
Lastly, we control for firm size, capital structure, and stock volatility. Large firms are 
expected to have a higher turnover rate, as they may have a larger internal pool of 
potential top managers who participate in the corporate tournament for the top job and 
they may be able to offer more attractive remuneration packages to attract the external 
CEOs. As for capital structure and stock volatility, we expect CEO turnover is more 
likely to occur in financially distressed companies and companies with volatile stock 
performance. 
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4.4 Regression Models 
In the regression analysis, we use random effects probit regressions as the base-line 
models. Robinson (1982) shows that, compared to a standard probit model on pooled 
data, the random effects probit model considers the correlations across periods and 
thus estimates coefficients more efficiently. Moreover, although the standard probit 
model can generate consistent estimates, the routinely computed standard errors are 
incorrect (Verbeek, 2004). Random effects probit models solve this problem. The 
variable specification of the regression is as follows: 
CEO turnover it = α + β1 × Performance measures it  
+ β2 × Centrality measures it  
+ β3 × CEO characteristics it 
+ β4 × Board composition it 
+ β5 × Ownership concentration it 







γj, t × Industry j × Time t 
 
In the succession analysis, we employ Heckman sample-selection probit models to 
analyze the succession decision (on whether or not to recruit an external CEO) 
conditional on the old CEO’s departure/dismissal. We estimate the selection equation 
to model the turnover decision and the regression equation for the succession decision. 
The dependent variable for the latter is a binary variable, which equals 1 if the new 
CEO is an external manager and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
5. Data Description 
 
5.1 General Information about the Dataset 
Our data are primarily collected from Manifest.info. Company characteristics 
including accounting information, sector categorization and stock price information   162
are downloaded from Datastream Advance. Ownership data has been gathered from 
Thomson Financial and the PricewaterhouseCoopers ownership databases. 
 
Our dataset ranges from 1993 to 2008, but we concentrate on the period from 1996 to 
2007 as the data quality in this time window is excellent whereas this is not the case in 
the early years and the most recent year. A 12 year sample period for all listed 
companies in the UK including the members of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 
SmallCap, FTSE Fledgling and FTSE AIM make up a fine sample for panel data 
techniques. Our sample accounts for more than 99% of total market capitalization of 
the London Stock Exchange and comprises 42 different sectors. To control for 
industry fixed effects, we combine 42 sectors into 12 broad industries (see appendix 
B).  
 
The dataset comprises 9789 firm-years and 1154 companies in every year on average. 
In case a financial year deviates from the standard 12 months (more than 30 days 
longer or shorter than 365), the accounting information are adjusted accordingly to 
make sure they are comparable to the values of other companies with normal year 
length. As annual reports released in 2007 can cover either 2007 or 2006, we apply the 
rule that all financial years ending before June 31
st cover the previous year (e.g. 2006). 
Financial years ending after 1
st July and before 31
st December contain information or 
current year (e.g. 2007).   
 
In the following paragraphs, we describe three aspects of the dataset: turnover and 
succession, CEO characteristics and corporate financial information. 
 
5.2 Turnover and Succession 
Panel A of Table 4.5.1 shows the CEO turnover rate by year. The total annual turnover 
rate increases from 16% to 20% throughout our sample period. The largest companies 
(belonging to the FTSE 100) experience a similar turnover rate as the entire market 
but FTSE 250 and FTSE SmallCap companies have a slightly lower turnover. In the   163
group of smallest listed companies, CEOs are replaced most frequently (Panel B). 
Figure 4.5.1 depicts the positive association between the economy and CEO turnover 
rate. In the late 1990s, the stock price of companies on the London Stock Exchange 
increased so for the CEO turnover rate during this period. The CEO turnover rate 
peaked around 2000 when the bubble in the IT industry burst and the stock market 
started to collapse. In the subsequent period (2001-2004) when the economy was in 
the downturn, CEO mobility decreased and remained lower. When the economy 
recovered in 2004, CEO mobility increased 
 
[Insert Figure 4.5.1 and Table 4.5.1 about here] 
 
Table 4.5.2 shows the yearly average of the non-retirement turnover, which excludes 
the departure of CEOs younger than 63. The non-retirement turnover rate moves 
between 15% and 18%, with a mean of 16.3%. The non-retirement turnover rates by 
index follow a similar pattern as the ones reported in table 4.5.1. The CEO turnover 
rates differ somewhat across sectors: turnover is relatively higher in the sectors of 
leisure (e.g., tourism agencies) with 19.2% and logistics with 18.2%. In the industrial 
sectors such as chemical and manufacture & mining, the turnover rate is lower than 
average. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5.2 and Table 4.5.3 about here] 
 
Over the sample period, the average tenure decreases continuously (Panel A of Table 
4.5.4), which is consistent with the turnover rate. The CEO tenure in the largest and 
smallest companies (FTSE 100 and FTSE Fledgling) is somewhat shorter than the 
market average (panel B). CEOs in the retail industry have the longest average tenure 
(7.2 years) while companies in the communication and leisure sectors have CEOs 
with shorter tenures of around 5 years (Panel C). 
 
[Insert Table 4.5.4 about here]   164
 
Regarding the origin of the successor (internal or external appointment), over the 
sample period, we have 1731 new CEO appointments and the average external 
succession rate varies significantly between 30% (in 2001) and 49% (in 2005 and 
2006) (Panel A of Table 4.5.5). Panel A also suggests that the external succession rate 
is negatively related to the stock price in the market. In the first period (from 1997 to 
2000), the probability of hiring an external CEO decreased as the stock market surged. 
When the market index peaked (just prior to the collapse in 2000 and 2001), external 
succession was at its lowest. In the last period of our sample (since 2004), external 
succession grew steadily. Panel B shows the external succession by index membership: 
expectedly, the smallest companies attract significantly more external CEOs. Across 
sectors, the chemical and communication sectors hire more often CEOs from outside 
the firm (panel C) whereas financial and media firms rely more frequently on internal 
promotions.  
 
[Insert Table 4.5.5 about here] 
 
5.3 CEO Characteristics and Connectedness 
CEO characteristics are of great importance, as they can have a significant impact on 
the CEO’s performance on the labor market. We include in our models: gender, age 
and board position. In the whole sample, we have data on 3089 CEOs. Only 2% CEOs 
(or 61) are female. Over time, female CEO presence has slightly increased (Panel A of 
Table 4.5.6). Still, the largest companies who belong to the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
indices count even fewer female CEOs (Panel B). Across different industries (Panel 
C), there are relatively more female CEOs in the media and retail industries.   
 
[Insert Table 4.5.6 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 4.5.7, average CEO age is rather stable with around 50-51 years. 
The index and sector statistics show that CEOs in the larger companies and in   165
manufacturing are slightly older. For descriptive statistics on CEO position on the 
board, readers can refer to Section 5.4. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5.7 about here] 
 
In Table 4.5.8, we report the descriptive statistics on the CEOs’ professional networks. 
The average CEO is directly connected to about 10 directors, who sit on the board of 
his home company or on the board of other companies (Panel A). Over time, the level 
of connectedness decreases, possibly due to more strict regulation
20 on  the  maximum 
number of directorships the CEO can hold (Panel B). Panel C demonstrates that the 
CEOs of large corporations are significantly better connected. By comparing the 
average centrality measures by industry in Panel D, we observe that the CEOs in the 
financial and food industries have the most direct connections. In contrast, CEOs of 
IT firms have much fewer links. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5.8 about here] 
 
5.4 Company Characteristics 
We control in our multivariate analysis for company variables that may affect the 
turnover decision. These controls include the financial structure of the company, 
board characteristics and ownership concentration by type of shareholder. First, we 
control for corporate size (book value of total assets), leverage (long term debt over 
total assets ratio), and stock price volatility (Table 4.5.9). We gather information on 
board size and the composition of the board. The median and average board sizes is 7 
and 7.9, respectively. Among the board members, 3 (or 41%) are executive directors 
(including the CEO), the rest being non-executive position on the board. Many CEOs 
                                                 
 
20  The Higgs report (2003) requires that “the board should not agree to a full time executive director 
taking on more than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of 
such a company.” However, there are no direct limitations on the maximum number of directorships 
one can have.   166
are members of the audit, remuneration and nomination committees. On average, for 
58.5% of the firm-years, CEOs are members of at least one of the above three 
committees. In spite of the UK Corporate Governance Code, CEO-chairman duality is 
still present for 13% of the firm-years.   
 
[Insert Table 4.5.9 and Table 4.5.10 about here] 
 
We collect the ownership stakes held by directors as well as block holdings held by 
outside shareholders. Outside shareholders are those who hold more than 3% of total 
shares outstanding (which is the disclosure threshold). The average ownership 
distribution by year is shown in Table 4.5.11. Outside ownership concentration is 
rather stable over time and fluctuates around 32%.   
 
The combined insider ownership concentration, i.e., the share stakes owned by the 
CEO, the other executive directors, and the non-executive ones amounts to about 7% 
over the whole sample period. Relative to other countries (the US and Continental 
Europe) where executive directors rarely hold share stakes of more than 0.5% of the 
total shares outstanding of listed companies, executive ownership concentration in the 
UK is high. The CEO and his executive directors own on average almost 4.7% of the 
equity, which gives them significant voting power. The average CEO holds 2.5% of 
the market capitalization. From 1998 to 2001, an upward trend in insider ownership 
concentration is visible, possibly caused by an increase in the use of equity-based 
compensation for the top management. Subsequently, the combined insider stakes 
stabilize around 6.8%. The shareholder category with the highest ownership 
concentration is that of the investment funds that on average hold 14.7% of the equity. 
Investment fund ownership increased gradually over the sample period from 8.5% in 
1999 to 17.5% in 2007. The percentages of shares held by banks and pension funds 
have remained relatively stable over time. All the institutional shareholder classes 
combined control around 20.7% of the voting rights. The combined ownership 
percentage of industrial and commercial corporations is nearly 8% over our sample   167
period. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5.11 about here] 
 
In Table 4.5.12, we show director network centrality at the company level. The 
average listed company in the UK is connected to 4 other companies. Note that 
closeness is not calculated for some completely isolated companies. Similarly as for 
the director level centrality measures presented in Table 4.5.8, the level of 
connectedness decreases over time (Panel B). Large companies are much better 
connected than the small ones as shown in Panel C. The average FTSE100 company 
is connected to 10 other companies. This value drops to 2 for the FTSE fledgling 
index. In Panel D, the IT industry remains the least connected sector at the company 
level director networks. Food, communication and financial companies are relatively 
strongly connected. 
 
[Insert Table 4.5.12 about here] 
 
 
6. Results and Robustness Tests 
 
6.1 Turnover 
As expected, both accounting and stock performance are negatively correlated with 
turnover probability (Table 4.6.1). The models labeled Degree (D) and nCloseness (D) 
include centrality measures at the individual director level. Degree is a measure of the 
direct links (which proxy for both power as well as direct information collection) 
whereas closeness captures the indirect connections (which proxy for the information 
collection ability of a director throughout the network). In line with hypothesis 1, the 
indirect measure closeness increases the non-retirement turnover likelihood, which is 
in line with our prediction (hypothesis 1) that CEOs with better information collection 
networks are more likely to change position. The direct centrality measure (degree)   168
also increases the CEO turnover probability. So, our managerial influence proxy does 
not seem to impede dismissal. One possible explanation could be that a CEO’s direct 
connections are beneficial for him in the labor market. A CEO’s connections to other 
companies increase the odds of him finding a new position. Also, CEOs with multiple 
directorships may resist the dismissal decision less, which increases the turnover rate 
for this type of CEOs. Another possible explanation is that strongly connected CEOs 
do not devote all their time to the operations in their own company as many external 
directorships require time and effort. If these obligations lead to a lack of focus on and 
commitment to the CEO’s own firm, a higher probability of turnover is expected.   
 
The CEO turnover probability increases with the number of direct connections 
between companies (Degree (C)). The indirect centrality measure ((n)Closeness (C)) 
at the company level has a positive impact on CEO turnover, but this effect is not 
statistically significant. Hence, in this turnover study, we do not find evidence on our 
conjecture at the company level networks. We also run regressions with interaction 
terms between centrality and performance in order to analyze whether 
turnover-performance sensitivity is influenced, but the role of connections in the 
turnover decision process is not limited to just poorly performing companies as the 
parameter estimates of those interaction terms are not statistically significant.   
 
[Insert Table 4.6.1 about here] 
 
As for the control variables, CEO gender does not influence the turnover decision. 
Female CEOs are treated equally as male CEOs in this regard. Older CEOs do have a 
larger chance to end the current contract as we predicted. Committee membership is 
proven to be an effective factor lowering turnover probability. Presumably the 
associated managerial influence of being on board committees shields the CEO 
somehow from dismissal. To our surprise, CEO and chairman duality on the board 
increases the turnover probability. 
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CEO stock holdings significantly lower the turnover likelihood, which supports the 
managerial influence hypothesis. Such an inverse relation could also be a result of the 
CEOs attachment to the company. With much of his wealth related to the performance 
of his company, the CEO could be more reluctant to take up outside employment 
opportunities. Of the outside blockholders only corporations significantly increase the 
probability of CEO departure. This suggests that corporations are effective monitors 
compared to other investors. Lastly, company size and its capital structure do not 
affect CEO turnover. We only find evidence that higher stock volatility significantly 
increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
 
6.2 Succession 
Given that we employ the same set of variables in the selection equation as in the 
random selection models of section 6.1, we obtain very similar results. In the 
regression equations of Table 4.6.2, we find that both performance measures are 
negatively related to the probability of hiring an external CEO. This implies that the 
companies are more likely to opt for an external successor when performance is poor; 
conversely it makes sense that in the case of good performance a successor is sought 
from the incumbent management team.  Our proxy for the information collection 
ability (closeness) at the director level is significantly related (within the 10% level) to 
the decision to employ an external CEO. Direct connections (which reflect power, 
influence and reputation in addition to some direct information collection ability) do 
not significantly contribute to the chances of an external appointment. This result is 
also consistent with the ‘strength of the weak links’ theory, because as shown in our 
result the networks that improve information collection from the distance provide the 
CEO with a better chance to join a new company as an external, while direct links that 
generate managerial influence and local information seem ineffective in this case. The 
two centrality measures at the company level do not have a significant impact on the 
external succession probability. This implies that external succession is primarily 
determined by individual networks.   
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[Insert Table 4.6.2 about here] 
 
We also document in Table 4.6.2 that the proportion of non-executive directors 
increases the external succession rate, but we do not find any evidence that major 
shareholders influence the hiring decision.   
 
The fact that direct and indirect measures behave similarly in the turnover analysis but 
distinctively in the succession analysis may seem puzzling at first sight, but is actually 
intuitive. Both types of connections help the CEO find outside opportunities. Note 
that the new position found through direct connections can only be an internal 
succession because the CEO is already directly linked to the hiring company’s board. 
Therefore it is not surprising that direct centrality measures do not contribute to the 
odds of outside succession. 
 
6.3 Robustness Checks 
6.3.1 Non-retirement and Retirement Turnover 
In the turnover analysis presented in section 6.1, we employ a ‘non-retirement’ sample 
excluding turnover related to retirement, illness or death. In Table 4.6.3 we rerun the 
models on a sample comprising all types of turnover, including CEOs older than 63. 
The relation between turnover and other factors, including centrality measures, 
persists.  
 
[Insert Table 4.6.3 about here] 
 
6.3.2 Tenure 
We run random effects regressions with CEO tenure as the dependent variable and 
report the results in Table 4.6.4. CEO tenure is significantly related to accounting 
performance, but not to stock performance. We also find that a CEO’s direct network 
centrality measure prolongs tenure, which is in line with the managerial influence 
hypothesis. The company level degree measure is negatively associated with tenure.   171
This result is in line with our finding in the baseline model on turnover such that 
higher direct centrality at company level increases CEO turnover probability. We 
don’t find any significant relations between tenure and the indirect centrality measures. 
It seems direct centrality measures have stronger explanatory power than indirect ones 
with regards to CEO tenure. Our results show that older CEOs are also more likely to 
have longer tenure as do CEOs who serve on the main board committees (audit, 
nomination and remuneration committees) or are also the chairman of the board. 
Interestingly, it seems that tenures of female CEOs are longer than those of their male 
counterparts. CEOs in companies with a larger proportion of non-executive directors 
or stronger corporate blockholders usually have shorter tenures, which may indicate 
more effective monitoring. As expected, CEOs with larger stock holdings are able to 
impede their dismissal and stay on average longer in their positions. Lastly, higher 
stock price volatility has a negative impact on CEO tenure, which is again in line with 
our findings from section 6.1. 
 
[Insert Table 4.6.4 about here] 
 
6.3.3 Temporary CEO contracts 
For some dismissal decisions, particularly the disciplinary ones, a new CEO is not 
immediately appointed when the incumbent CEO leaves the firm. In those cases, the 
chairman or another senior manager becomes the acting CEO. In order to eliminate 
the noise of such temporary appointments, we exclude observations with CEO tenure 
being less than two years. The results for the turnover analysis and succession 
analysis can be found in Table 4.6.5 and 4.6.6, respectively. The results are very 
similar to those shown in Table 4.6.1 and Table 4.6.2, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 4.6.5 and Table 4.6.6 about here] 
 
6.3.4 Alternative Centrality Measures 
In the network methodology section, we also introduce alternative centrality measures   172
based on the direct connections (eigenvector) and the indirect connections 
(betweenness). Including these variables in the regressions, we get similar results as 
those from the regressions with degree and closeness centrality. However, there are 
some unique results from the regressions including betweenness centrality. In the 
turnover analysis of Table 4.6.1., the closeness measure at the company level has a 
positive but statistically insignificant impact on CEO turnover. With betweenness as 
the measure for information collection, we find that companies with higher 
betweenness centrality are significantly more likely to dismiss their CEOs. In the 
succession regression, external successions are more likely to occur in companies 
with higher betweenness score. Both results are in line with the information value 
hypothesis. However, these relations disappear if we also include temporary CEOs in 
the sample. 
 
We also calculate different versions of the degree centrality measure. For instance, we 
use the number of connections to directors outside their home company as another 
direct centrality measure in the regression. With this outside degree measure, we 
remove the influence of board size on the degree measure and only concentrate on the 
CEO’s direct connections in the connected companies. The estimates for these 
transformed centrality measures yield same conclusions as the original measures 
discussed above. 
 
Lastly, when both direct and indirect centrality measures at the individual level are 
included in the regression, we find that both of them significantly contribute to the 
turnover probability of the CEO (Table 4.6.7). The economic effects (based on one 
standard deviation change in centrality) of these two types of measures show that the 
direct measure (degree) at the individual (CEO) level is twice as high as the closeness 
measure. When including both the direct and indirect centrality at the company level 
into our model, we confirm that the direct measure increases turnover likelihood 
whereas closeness remains insignificant. 
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In this paper we have studied the relation between CEO network centrality and the 
turnover and succession decisions. The results provide support for the information 
value hypothesis which states that indirect connections through the professional 
director networks have a significant impact on the hiring and firing of top 
management.  
 
In our turnover analysis, we find that CEOs with larger networks in terms of direct 
and indirect connections are able to collect more information and thus leave their 
firms more frequently. We haven’t observed direct centrality measures’ effect on 
managerial influence, which is expected to decrease CEO turnover probability. This 
may result from the fact that direct connections create more job-market opportunities 
or excessive multiple directorships trigger turnover decisions by the board. 
 
In the succession analysis, we find the succeeding CEOs’ direct centrality measures 
are not related to the probability of external succession. In contrast, the external 
successions are more likely to involve the new CEOs with higher indirect centrality 
measures. In some specifications, we find companies with better information-value 
networks are more likely to hire external CEOs. In this external succession analysis, 
we find strong evidence for the argument that director networks of different structures 
have different functions. The important role of information collection networks for the 
CEO’s job market is also in line with ‘the strength of the weak links’ theory. Our 
results in the turnover study and the succession study are robust for various sample 
selections, control variable specifications and alternative centrality measures. 
 
This study presents empirical evidence of director network’s impact on the top 
managerial labour market. We reveal a positive relation between network centrality   174
and turnover probability. Furthermore, there are structural differences among 
networks (e.g. in some direct networks predominate whereas indirect connections are 
relatively more important in others), which can lead to a different degree of efficiency 
in terms of managerial influence or information collection. As reflected in the CEO 
succession analysis, indirect connections are more effective in explaining the outside 
succession probability than are direct connections. This result may be valuable to the 
regulator, company and even managers themselves. When directors are developing 
their networks, the consequence in their labour market performance should be kept in 
mind.   175
References 
Allen, M., S. Panian and R. Lotz, 1979, Managerial Succession and Organizational 
Performance: A Recalcitrant Problem Revisited, Administrative Science Quarterly 24, 
167-180. 
 
Barnea., A. and I. Guedj, 2009, Director Networks, EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings 
Paper, University of Texas at Austin. 
 
Beatty, R. and  E. Zajac, 1987, CEO Change and Firm Performance in Large 
Corporations: Succession Effects and Manager Effects, Strategic Management 
Journal 8(4), 305-317. 
 
Borokhovich, K., R. Parrino and T. Trapani, 1996, Outside Directors and CEO 
Selection, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 337-355. 
 
Brown, M., 1982, Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance: The 
Succession Effect, Administrative Science Quarterly 27(1), 1-16. 
 
Bridges, W. and W. Villemez, 1986, Overeducated Minority Workers: Does EEO 
Coverage Make a Difference? Affirmative Action Essays, McFarland and Company. 
 
Coughlan, A. and R. Schmidt, 1985, Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, 
and Firm Performance: An empirical Investigation, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 7(1-3) 43-66. 
 
Dalton, D. and I. Kesner, 1985, Organizational Performance as an Antecedent of 
Inside/outside Chief Executive Succession: An Empirical Assessment. Academy of 
Management Journal, 28(4), 749-762. 
 
Denis, D. and D. Denis, 1995, Performance Changes Following Top Management 
Dismissal, The Journal of Finance 50(4), 1029-1057.   
 
Denis, D., D. Denis and A. Sarin, 1997, Ownership Structure and Top Executive 
Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics 45(2), 193-222. 
 
Devos, E., A. Prevost and J. Puthenpurackal, 2006, Are Interlocked Directors 
Effective Monitors? Working paper, University of Texas at El Paso. 
 
Doeringer, P. and M. Piore, 1971, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, 
Heath Lexington Books. 
 
Fich, E., 2005, Are Some Outside Directors Better than Others? Evidence from 
Director Appointments by Fortune 1000 Firms, Journal of Business 78, 1943-1971.   176
 
Fich, E. and L. White, 2003, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The Effects of 
Mutually Interlocked Boards, Wake Forest Law Review 38, 935-59. 
 
Fich, E. and A. Shivdasani, 2006, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, Journal of 
Finance 61, 689-724. 
 
Gamson, W. and N. Scotch, 1964, Scapegoating in Baseball, American Journal of 
Sociology 70, 69-72. 
 
Granovetter, M., 1973, The Strength of Weak Ties, American Journal of Sociology, 
78(6), 1360-1380. 
 
Granovetter, M., 1974, Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Granovetter, M., 1983, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 
Sociological Theory 1, 201-233. 
 
Granovetter, M., 1995, Afterword, Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers. 
2nd edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Grusky, O., 1963, Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness, American 
Journal of Sociology, 69, 21-31. 
 
Guest, R., 1962, Managerial Succession in Complex Organizations, American 
Journal of Sociology 68, 47-55. 
 
Hallock, K., 1997, Reciprocal Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive 
Compensation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 331-344. 
 
Holzer, H., 1987, Hiring Procedures in the Firm: Their Economic Determinants and 
Outcomes, NBER Working Papers 2185. 
 
Huson, M., R. Parrino and L.T. Starks, 2001, Internal Monitoring and CEO Turnover: 
A Long-term Perspective, Journal of Finance 56, 2265-2297. 
 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305-360. 
 
Khanna, N. and A. Poulsen, 1995, Managers of Financially Distressed Firms: Villains 
or Scapegoats, Journal of Finance 30 (3), 919-939. 
 
Kirchmaier, T. and M. Kollo, 2007, The Role of Prestige and Networks in Outside   177
Director Appointments, Working Paper, University of Manchester. 
 
Kirchmaier, T. and K. Stathopoulos, 2008, From Fiction to Fact: The Impact of CEO 
Social Networks, FMG Discussion Papers, University of Manchester. 
 
Parrino, R., 1997, CEO Turnover and Outside Succession: A Cross-Sectional 
Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 165-197. 
 
Lin, N., 1982, Social Resources and Instrumental Action, Social Structure and 
Network Analysis 131-145, Beverly Hills, CA : Sage. 
 
Liu, Y., 2010, The Impact of Networks on CEO Turnover, Appointment and 
Compensation, Working Paper, University of Maryland. 
 
Marsden, P. and K. Campbell, 1990, Recruitment and Selection Processes: The 
Organizational Side of Job Searches, Social Mobility and Social Structure, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mikkelson, W. and M. Partch, 1996, The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary 
Managerial Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics 44, 205-228. 
 
Montgomery, J., 1991, Social Networks and Labour-Market Outcomes: Toward an 
Economic Analysis, American Economic Review 81(5), 1408-1418. 
 
Montgomery, J., 1992, Job Search and Network Composition: Implications of the 
Strength-of-Weak-Ties Hypothesis, American Sociological Review 57, 586-96. 
 
Murphy, K. and J. Zabojnik, 2007, Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs, 
Working Papers, Queen's University. 
 
Rees, A., 1966, Information Networks in Labor Markets, American Economic Review 
56. 
 
Reinganum, J., 1985, Innovation and Industry Evolution, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 100(1), 81-89. 
 
Renneboog, L, and G. Trojanowski, 2005, The Managerial Labor Market and the 
Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures, EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings 
Presented Paper. 
 
Wanous, J., 1980, Organizational entry: Recruitment selection, and socialization of   
Newcomers, MA: Addison Wesley. 
 
Warner, J., R. Watts and K. Wruck, 1988, Stock Prices and Top Management   178
Changes, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 461-492. 
 
Weisbach, M., 1988, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial 
Economics 20, 431-460. 
 
Weisbach, M., 1995, CEO Turnover and the Firm’s Investment Decisions, Journal of 
Financial Economics 37, 159-188. 
 
Yermack, D., 1996, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of 
Directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40(2), 185-211. 
 
Zajac, E., 1990, CEO Selection, Succession, Compensation, and Firm Performance: A 
Theoretical Integration and Empirical Analysis, Strategic Management Journal 11(3), 
217-230. 
   179
Table 4.3.1. Centrality measures 
 
This table shows the centrality measures   
  Direct connections  Indirect connections 
Main  Degree Closeness 
Alternative Eigenvector centrality  Betweenness 
 
Figure 4.5.1. CEO turnover over the sample period   
 






















Table 4.5.1. CEO turnover over the sample period 
 
This table shows the CEO turnover rate over the sample period. Panel A shows the number of observations and the turnover rate by year. Panel B compares turnover rates across 
FTSE indices. N is the number of observations. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Panel A. Turnover rate over time 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
N 564  644 699 759 800 780 822  1020 1054 1075 1081   9789
Mean  16.3% 16.9% 16.5% 17.8% 20.4% 17.3% 17.5% 16.7% 19.4% 19.1% 20.0% 17.7%
 
Panel B. Turnover rate over time across indices 
FTSE  100  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
N 83  86 99 108 109 105 98 100 104 102 108   1175
Mean 20.5%  14.0% 23.2% 22.2% 25.7% 9.5% 19.4% 17.0% 8.7% 17.6% 20.4%   17.6%
    
FTSE 250  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
N 181  198 221 255 261 246 232 222 231 233 237   2683
Mean 14.4%  21.2% 19.0% 13.7% 20.7% 17.5% 16.8% 14.9% 14.7% 20.2% 13.1%   16.4%
    
FTSE SmallCap  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
N 180  231 280 363 336 305 273 268 264 233 223   3104
Mean 14.4%  12.1% 10.4% 14.3% 19.9% 18.7% 14.7% 16.0% 17.0% 15.0% 22.0%   15.5%
    
FTSE Fledgling  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
N 74  94 108 161 215 221 185 168 134 88 90   1594
Mean 20.3%  23.4% 20.4% 24.8% 22.8% 19.9% 21.6% 16.7% 23.1% 22.7% 30.0%   21.6%  181
Table 4.5.2. CEO non-retirement turnover 
This table shows the non-retirement turnover (which excludes the departure of CEOs aged 63 or more) rate in the sample. N is the number of observations. Data source: 
Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total 
N 564  644 699 759 800 780 822  1020 1054 1075 1081   9789
Mean 15.1%  15.7% 14.7% 16.1% 19.1% 16.2% 16.9%  15.6% 17.7% 17.2% 18.1%   16.3%
 
Table 4.5.3 CEO turnover and non-retirement turnover across sectors 
This table shows the turnover rate comparison across broad sectors (for broad sector classification details, please refer to appendix B). N is the number of observations. The 
mean is the average value of the variable. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
Sector N  Turnover 
Non-retirement 
Turnover 
Chemical 565 14.7%  14.0%
Communication 148 19.6%  18.2%
Financial 1287 16.8%  15.6%
Food 411 18.7%  17.5%
IT 1422 18.7%  17.1%
Leisure 578 20.4%  19.2%
Logistics 1223 19.7%  18.2%
Media 575 18.8%  17.4%
Manufacture & Mining  1218 16.7%  15.1%
Other 1229 15.5%  14.3%
Retail 571 16.6%  15.4%
Utilities 562 18.3%  17.1%
Total 9789 17.7%  16.3% 
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Table 4.5.4. CEO tenure 
 
This table shows the statistics of CEO tenure over sample period. N is the number of observations. SD stands for standard 
deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at the 25% and 75% quartiles, respectively. Panel A shows the change in average 
tenure over time. Panel B compares the CEO tenure in companies by index membership. Panel C shows the difference in 
CEO tenure across sectors. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Panel A. CEO tenure over time 
  N Mean  SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
1996  491 8    7 0 3 7    11    48 
1997  564 8    7 0 2 6    11    49 
1998  644 7    7 0 1 4    10    50 
1999  699 6    7 0 2 3    10    43 
2000  759 6    7 0 1 3    8    44 
2001  800 5    6 0 1 3    7    45 
2002  780 5    6 0 1 3    6    46 
2003  822 5    6 0 2 3    7    47 
2004  1020 5    6 0 2 4    7    48 
2005  1054 5    6 0 1 4    7    49 
2006  1075 5    6 0 1 4    7    50 
2007  1081 5    6 0 1 3    7    51 
Total  9789 6    6 0 1 4    8    51 
 
Panel B. CEO tenure across indices 
  N Mean  SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
FTSE  100  1175 5    5 0 2 3    7    50 
FTSE  250  2683 6    6 0 2 4    8    39 
FTSE  SmallCap  3104 6    7 0 2 4    9    44 
FTSE  Fledgling 1594 5    6 0 1 3    7    51 
 
Panel C. CEO tenure across sectors 
  N Mean  SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Chemical  565 5   5  0  2  4   7   36 
Communication  148 5   6  0  1  3   5   25 
Financial  1287 6   6  0  2  4   7   29 
Food  411 6   8  0  1  3   8   50 
IT  1422 6   6  0  1  4   8   40 
Leisure  578 5   5  0  1  3   6   28 
Logistics  1223 6   6  0  1  3   7   32 
Media  575 5   5  0  1  4   7   26 
Manufacture  1218 5   5  0  2  4   8   33 
Other  1229 7   8  0  2  5   10   51 
Retailer  571 7   9  0  2  4   9   41 
Utility  562 6   6  0  1  4   8   28 





Table 4.5.5 External CEO Succession 
 
This table shows the external CEO succession rate. N is the number of observations. P25 and P75 are the 
values at the 25% and 75% quartiles, respectively. Panel A shows the change in the external outside 
succession rate over time. Panel B and C show the succession rate by index and sector, respectively. Data 
source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Panel A. External CEO succession rate over time 
  N Mean  Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
1997  92  40.2% 0 0 0 1 1
1998  109  45.9% 0 0 0 1 1
1999  115  40.9% 0 0 0 1 1
2000  135  37.0% 0 0 0 1 1
2001  163  30.7% 0 0 0 1 1
2002  135  40.7% 0 0 0 1 1
2003  144  38.9% 0 0 0 1 1
2004  170  53.5% 0 0 1 1 1
2005  204  49.0% 0 0 0 1 1
2006  205  49.3% 0 0 0 1 1
2007  216  54.6% 0 0 1 1 1
Total  1731  45.3% 0 0 0 1 1
 
Panel B. External CEO succession rate across indices 
  N Mean  Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
FTSE 100  207  34.8% 0 0 0 1  1
FTSE 250  439  36.4% 0 0 1 1  1
FTSE SmallCap  482  39.2% 0 0 0 1  1
FTSE Fledgling  344  45.6% 0 0 1 1  1
 
Panel C. External CEO succession rate across sectors 
  N Mean  Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Chemical 83  55.4% 0 0 1 1  1
Communication 29  62.1% 0 0 1 1  1
Financial 216  36.1% 0 0 0 1  1
Food 77  46.8% 0 0 0 1  1
I T  2 6 6   4 8 . 9 %0001   1
Leisure 118  43.2% 0 0 0 1  1
Logistics 241  44.0% 0 0 0 1  1
Media 108  39.8% 0 0 0 1  1
Manufacture 204  47.1% 0 0 0 1  1
Other 191  44.0% 0 0 0 1  1
Retailer 95  46.3% 0 0 0 1  1
Utility 103  51.5% 0 0 1 1  1
Total  1731 45.3% 0 0 0 1  1 
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Table 4.5.6. CEO gender 
 
This table shows the gender distribution of the CEO. Gender dummy variable = 1 if the CEO is male. N is 
the number of observations. SD stands for standard deviation. Panel A shows the CEO gender ratio by year. 
Panel B and C show the data by index and sector. Panel A and B are based on firm-years. Panel C is based 
on number of individuals. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Panel A. CEO gender over time 













Total  9789 98.1%
  
Panel B. CEO gender across indices 
  N Mean 
FTSE 100  1171 99.3%
FTSE 250  2676 98.7%
FTSE SmallCap 3086 97.5%
FTSE Fledgling 1571 96.7%
 
Panel C. CEO gender across sectors 













Total  3089 98.0% 
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Table 4.5.7. CEO age 
 
This table shows the average CEO age in our sample. N is the number of observations. Panel A shows the 
change in CEO average age over time. Panel B and C gives the data by index and sector. Panel A and B are 
based on firm-years. Panel C is based on individuals. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
Panel A. CEO age over time 
  N Mean  SD 
1996 483 52  6.584 
1997 558 52  6.667 
1998 638 51  6.895 
1999 695 51  7.076 
2000 753 51  7.265 
2001 794 51  7.420 
2002 778 51  7.374 
2003 816 51  7.332 
2004 999 51  7.495 
2005 1032 51  7.433 
2006 1042 50  7.536 
2007 1022 50  7.572 
Total  9610 51 7.300 
  
Panel B. CEO age across indices 
  N Mean  SD 
FTSE 100  1171 53 5.660 
FTSE 250  2676 51 6.805 
FTSE SmallCap 3086 51 7.125 
FTSE Fledgling 1571 51 7.938 
 
Panel C. CEO age across sectors 
  N Mean  SD 
Chemical 555 51  5.876 
Communication 145 49 5.291 
Financial 1267 50  7.148 
Food 407 51  6.425 
IT 1388 49  7.673 
Leisure 576 50  7.630 
Logistics 1209 51  7.137 
Media 559 51  7.217 
Manufacture 1200 53  6.515 
Other 1197 52  8.158 
Retailer 568 51  7.428 
Utility 539 52  6.844 




Table 4.5.8. CEOs’ network centralities 
 
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of the centrality measures on CEO’s director network. N is 
the number of observations. SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at the 25% and 
75% quartiles, respectively. Panel A shows statistics on the whole sample. Panel B, C and D demonstrate 
the average centrality’s change over time, and across indices and sectors. 
 
Panel A. CEO’s director network centrality 
 N  Mean SD  Min  P25  P50  P75  Max 
Degree  9789 9.699 6.777  0 6 8 11  62
(n)closeness  9785 0.052 0.024 0.011 0.045 0.052 0.07 0.086
(n)betweenness  9789 0.037 0.118  0 0 0 0 1.461
(n)eigenvector    9789 0.197 1.222  0 0 0.001 0.03  34.474
 
Panel B. CEO’s director network centrality over time 
  Degree (n)closeness  (n)betweenness  (n)eigenvector 
1996 11.094    0.069  0.061  0.428   
1997 11.126    0.073  0.054  0.398   
1998 10.592    0.070  0.046  0.421   
1999 10.567    0.068  0.046  0.389   
2000 10.065    0.054  0.036  0.399   
2001 10.013    0.054  0.038  0.305   
2002 10.035    0.058  0.037  0.158   
2003 9.861    0.058  0.041  0.113   
2004 9.303    0.043  0.032  0.003   
2005 9.021    0.040  0.030  0.003   
2006 8.535    0.041  0.024  0.003   
2007 8.566    0.036  0.023  0.164   
Total  9.699   0.052  0.037  0.197  
 
Panel C. CEO’s director network centrality across indices 
    Degree (n)closeness  (n)betweenness  (n)eigenvector 
FTSE 100  18.032 0.065 0.101 1.125
FTSE 250  11.714 0.062 0.056 0.158
FTSE SmallCap  8.367 0.054 0.024 0.042




Panel D. CEO’s director network centrality across sectors 
  Degree (n)closeness  (n)betweenness  (n)eigenvector 
Chemical 9.393  0.053  0.029    0.246 
Communication 10.743 0.057 0.029    0.505 
Financial 10.903  0.054  0.039    0.243 
Food 12.516  0.061  0.051    0.437 
IT 7.885  0.048  0.024    0.078 
Leisure 9.438  0.057  0.033    0.292 
Logistics 8.984  0.051  0.038    0.069 
Media 10.016  0.049  0.033    0.171 
Manufacture 9.658  0.054  0.038    0.172 
Other 9.924  0.051  0.045    0.208 
Retailer 9.774  0.053  0.041    0.263 
Utility 10.527  0.050  0.038    0.256 
Total  9.699 0.052 0.037    0.197 
 
Table 4.5.9. Company size, capital structure and stock volatility 
 
This table shows statistics about total asset (in GBP millions), debt to asset ratio (sum of short term debt, current portion of 
long term debt, and long term debt divided by total assets then multiplied by 100, except for financial companies.) and stock 
volatility (average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year: (high-low)/(high+low).). N is 
the number of observations. SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at the 25% and 75% quartiles, 
respectively. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest and Datastream. 
 
  N Mean  SD  Min  P25  P50  P75  Max 
Total  asset  8920  7.700    79.267  0.0004 0.051 0.177    0.835    2514.547 
Debt to asset ratio  8905  19.843    21.945  0.000  2.600  16.240    30.240    705.260 
Stock  volatility  9024  34.345    16.212  0.391 23.021 30.930    42.400    163.009 
 
Table 4.5.10 Board structure 
 
This table gives an overview of the board composition and structure and of the board’s committees. N is the number of 
observations. SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at the 25% and 75% quartiles, respectively. Board 
size refers to the number of directors on the board. Percentage of executives is calculated as number of executives divided by 
board size. CEO committee membership equals 1 if the CEO is a member in any committees on the board. The bottom row 
of Panel A shows the probability of having the CEO as chairman of the board. The denominator is the number of firm years: 
9789). Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  Mean SD  Min P25  P50  P75 Max 
Board size  7.89    3.41 1 6 7  10  26
Number of executive dirs.  3.35    2.26  0 2 3  5  18
Percentage of executive dirs  41%    15.0%  0% 25.0%  35.3%    45.5%    100%
CEO committee membership  58.5%  49.3% 0 0 1  1  1





Table 4.5.11. Ownership concentration over time 
 
This table shows how ownership concentration has developed over time. The numbers are based on all disclosed ownership 
stakes of 3% or more for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all shareholdings are reported and 
included in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the CEO. The table also 
shows share percentages owned by institutions, including banks, insurance companies, investment funds, pension funds, and 
of other outsiders such as corporations and individuals and families not related to a director. Data source: Own calculations 
based on Manifest.   
 
%  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  Total
N  760 807 939 1078 1063 1103 1344 1386  1409  1398  11412
CEO   1.3% 2.4% 2.8% 3.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.2% 2.7% 2.6% 2.2%  2.5%
Executive directors (incl. CEO)    2.6% 4.9% 5.5% 6.0% 4.8% 4.8% 4.1% 4.5% 4.9% 4.4%  4.7%
Non-executive directors    0.9% 1.8% 2.1% 2.8% 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4%  2.1%
Inside total  3.6% 6.7% 7.5% 8.8% 7.0% 7.0% 6.2% 6.6% 7.3% 6.8%  6.8%
Nominee accounts  0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 2.1% 2.2% 2.2%  1.5%
Institutions total  18.2% 19.1% 20.2% 21.6% 22.3% 22.7% 18.0% 20.9% 21.1% 22.3%  20.7%
Bank  funds  2.9% 2.0% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%  1.7%
Insurance  companies’  funds  6.5% 6.6% 6.2% 4.4% 3.7% 3.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4%  3.8%
Investment and mutual funds  8.5%  10.1%  12.1% 15.4% 16.4% 16.9% 13.3% 16.1%  16.4%  17.5%  14.7%
Pension  funds  0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%  0.6%
Individuals and families  5.2% 1.6% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 1.8% 1.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3%  1.9%
Corporations  9.9% 9.0% 7.6% 6.9% 7.2% 7.1% 6.0% 7.6% 7.9% 9.3%  7.8%
Outside total  34.0% 30.7% 30.5% 31.4% 32.5% 32.7% 26.8% 32.0% 32.7% 35.1%  31.8%
 
Table 4.5.12 Company director network centrality 
 
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of the centrality measures on company’s director network. 
N is the number of observations. SD stands for standard deviation. P25 and P75 are the values at the 25% 
and 75% quartiles, respectively. Panel A shows statistics on the whole sample. Panel B, C and D 
demonstrate the average centrality’s change over time, and across indices and sectors. 
 
Panel A. Company’s director network centrality 
 N  Mean SD  Min  P25  P50  P75  Max 
Degree 9789  4.112  3.931  0 1 3 6  29
(n)closeness  8149 0.361 0.137 0.065 0.247 0.396 0.43 0.585
(n)betweenness  9789 0.213 0.353  0 0 0.062 0.286 5.515











Panel B. Company’s director network centrality over time 
  Degree (n)closeness  (n)betweenness  (n)eigenvector 
1996 4.287  0.539  0.311  3.008 
1997 4.369  0.557  0.311  3.039 
1998  4.401 0.525 0.287 2.617 
1999  4.313 0.478 0.270 2.608 
2000  4.162 0.405 0.223 2.273 
2001  4.310 0.398 0.201 2.342 
2002  4.303 0.393 0.216 2.392 
2003  4.214 0.379 0.209 1.647 
2004  4.069 0.282 0.182 1.659 
2005  3.979 0.233 0.165 1.912 
2006 3.813  0.235  0.171  1.411 
2007  3.671 0.214 0.155 0.643 
Total  4.112 0.361 0.213 1.986 
 
Panel C. Company’s director network centrality across indices 
    Degree (n)closeness  (n)betweenness  (n)eigenvector 
FTSE  100  9.647 0.396 0.643 6.937 
FTSE  250  5.693 0.389 0.309 2.799 
FTSE  SmallCap  3.219 0.371 0.138 1.093 
FTSE  Fledgling  2.085 0.360 0.070 0.731 
 
Panel D. Company’s director network centrality across sectors 
  Degree (n)closeness  (n)betweenness  (n)eigenvector 
Chemical 3.970  0.358  0.208    1.692 
Communication 5.378  0.378  0.305    3.774 
Financial 5.204  0.358  0.298    2.647 
Food 6.170  0.392  0.346    4.033 
IT 2.841  0.342  0.132    0.961 
Leisure 4.505  0.375  0.216    2.606 
Logistics 3.832  0.358  0.182    1.556 
Media 3.889  0.351  0.190    1.956 
Manufacture 4.222  0.370  0.220    2.135 
Other 3.853  0.359  0.196    1.663 
Retailer 3.739  0.376  0.182    1.896 
Utility 4.278  0.346  0.246    2.190 




Table 4.6.1. Random effects probit models explaining CEO non-retirement turnover 
  
The dependent variable is a binary choice variable that equals 1 if there is CEO turnover (not related to 
retirement) and 0 if there is not. Performance is measured by return on assets and a market-adjusted stock 
returns (with the FTSE All share index as the market). The definitions of the centrality measures are given 
in Section 3. The ‘D’ following the names of the centrality measures in the column titles refers to centrality 
measures on the individual director level; ‘C’ refers to the company level. Gender equals 1 if the director is 
male. Committee membership is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the subject is a member in any of the 
board’s committees. If the CEO is also the chairman, the Chairman-CEO duality variable equals 1. The 
proportion of non-executive directors is based on the total number of directors. The ownership 
concentration data by type of shareholder are the accumulated stakes that are equal to or exceed the 3% 
disclosure threshold. The director ownership concentration data consist of the aggregate of all reported 
shares. Lastly, company financial information is gathered from Datastream. The debt to assets ratio is the 
long term debt divided by the total assets. Stock price volatility is the variance of stock price over the 
financial year. 12 year and 12 industry dummies are also included. Data Source: Own calculations based on 
data from Manifest, Thomson Financial, PricewaterhouseCoopers ownership database, and annual reports.  
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Table 4.6.1. (Continued) 
 
  Dependent variable: Binary =1 if the CEO is dismissed, 0 otherwise 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  nCloseness (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -1.957    < 0.001 -2.056  < 0.001 -1.956  < 0.001  -2.278    < 0.001
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  -0.004    < 0.001 -0.004  < 0.001 -0.004  < 0.001  -0.004    0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.001    < 0.001 -0.001  < 0.001 -0.001  < 0.001  -0.002    < 0.001
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.013    < 0.001 3.022  0.002 0.019  < 0.001  0.434    0.131
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  0.182    0.190 0.170  0.221 0.177  0.203  0.183    0.258
Age (years)  0.014    < 0.001 0.015  < 0.001 0.015  < 0.001  0.020    < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  -0.124    0.001 -0.107  0.006 -0.117  0.003  -0.104    0.014
CEO=Chairman (=1)  0.125    0.041 0.142  0.020 0.149  0.015  0.197    0.004
Board composition          
Proportion nonexecutive directors  -0.258    0.066 -0.234  0.096 -0.305  0.035  -0.294    0.061
Ownership concentration          
CEO stock holdings  -0.013    < 0.001 -0.014  < 0.001 -0.013  < 0.001  -0.014    < 0.001
Executive directors. stock holdings  0.003    0.175 0.003  0.128 0.004  0.097  0.006    0.023
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.003    0.188 -0.003  0.166 -0.003  0.233  -0.004    0.168
Nominee account block holdings  0.001    0.630 0.001  0.632 0.001  0.605  -0.001    0.808
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.001    0.231 0.001  0.614 0.001  0.342  0.001    0.426
Corporations’ block holdings  0.004    0.006 0.004  0.003 0.004  0.002  0.005    0.002
Individuals and families’ block holdings  0.003    0.328 0.002  0.525 0.003  0.373  0.002    0.512
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  0.000    0.953 0.000  0.606 0.000  0.825  0.000    0.397
Debt to asset ratio  0.000    0.975 0.000  0.846 0.000  0.998  0.000    0.792
Stock price volatility  0.004    0.002 0.004  0.003 0.005  0.001  0.004    0.013
Pseudo R-squared  0.0325  0.0305  0.031  0.0328 




Table 4.6.2. Heckman sample selection equation explaining CEO external succession 
This table shows the result from the regression equation of the Heckman sample selection model. The Presence of 
nomination committee is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a nomination committee installed in the company. 
 
Regression equation  Dependent variable: Binary =1 if there is the successor is from the outside, 0 otherwise 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  nCloseness (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  0.234    0.756 -0.005  0.993 0.127  0.867  -0.349    0.676
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  -0.003    0.127 -0.003  0.104 -0.003  0.114  -0.006    0.020
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.002    0.004 -0.002  0.004 -0.002  0.004  -0.002    0.021
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.005    0.493 4.610  0.081 0.016  0.216  -0.016    0.984
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  0.003    0.992 -0.002  0.996 -0.018  0.947  -0.088    0.771
Age (years)  -0.007    0.282 -0.007  0.336 -0.006  0.342  -0.004    0.615
Board composition          
Presence of nomination committee  -0.063    0.688 -0.103  0.513 -0.076  0.624  0.179    0.341
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.010    0.108 0.010  0.092 0.011  0.088  0.004    0.567
Ownership concentration          
Executive directors. stock holdings  0.003    0.608 0.002  0.647 0.003  0.559  0.006    0.310
Nominee account block holdings  -0.007    0.412 -0.006  0.482 -0.007  0.448  -0.014    0.198
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.003    0.268 0.003  0.309 0.003  0.264  0.002    0.471
Corporations’ block holdings  0.002    0.573 0.002  0.505 0.002  0.538  0.005    0.211
Individuals and families’ block holdings  0.009    0.240 0.009  0.209 0.009  0.211  0.014    0.101
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  -0.002   0.257 -0.002  0.270 -0.003  0.229  -0.002    0.346
Debt to asset ratio  0.002   0.433 0.002  0.403 0.002  0.473  0.005    0.125
Stock price volatility  0.002   0.578 0.002  0.563 0.003  0.481  0.003    0.525
Prob > chi2  0.0057  0.0029  0.0046  0.0005 




Table 4.6.3. Random effects probit models explaining all CEO turnover 
This table shows the result from CEO turnover regression on the sample including retirement turnover 
 
  Dependent variable: Binary =1 if the CEO is dismissed, 0 otherwise 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  nCloseness (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate  p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -2.513    < 0.001 -2.601  < 0.001 -2.511  < 0.001  -2.774    < 0.001
            
Performance measures            
Return on assets (%)  -0.004    < 0.001 -0.004  < 0.001 -0.004  < 0.001  -0.004    < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.001    < 0.001 -0.001  < 0.001 -0.001  < 0.001  -0.002    < 0.001
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure  0.012    < 0.001 2.748  0.005 0.017  0.001  0.276    0.329
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  0.180    0.197 0.169  0.225 0.175  0.209  0.183    0.259
Age (years)  0.025    < 0.001 0.026  < 0.001 0.026  < 0.001  0.031    < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  -0.123    0.001 -0.108  0.005 -0.117  0.002  -0.109    0.009
CEO=Chairman (=1)  0.176    0.003 0.191  0.001 0.198  0.001  0.245    < 0.001
Board composition            
Proportion nonexecutive directors  -0.295    0.034 -0.275  0.049 -0.338  0.018  -0.356    0.022
Ownership concentration            
CEO stock holdings  -0.013    < 0.001 -0.014  < 0.001 -0.013  < 0.001  -0.013    < 0.001
Executive directors. stock holdings  0.003    0.134 0.004  0.099 0.004  0.076  0.006    0.02
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.003    0.229 -0.003  0.209 -0.003  0.278  -0.004    0.156
Nominee account block holdings  0.001    0.725 0.001  0.726 0.001  0.701  -0.001    0.718
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.001    0.194 0.001  0.5 0.001  0.281  0.001    0.343
Corporations’ block holdings  0.004    0.005 0.004  0.003 0.004  0.002  0.005    0.002
Individuals and families’ block holdings  0.003    0.319 0.002  0.49 0.003  0.356  0.002    0.57
Firm size, Capital structure and risk            
Total assets  0.000    0.895 0.000  0.587 0.000  0.782  0.000    0.261
Debt to asset ratio  0.000    0.965 0.000  0.803 0.000  0.945  0.000    0.93
Stock price volatility  0.005    0.001 0.004  0.001 0.005  0.001  0.004    0.007
Pseudo R-squared  0.0441  0.0425  0.043  0.0474 




Table 4.6.4. Random effects models explaining CEO tenure 
This table shows the result of the regression of CEO tenure. The dependent variable is CEO tenure in years. 
 
  Dependent variable: CEO tenure 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  nCloseness (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate  p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -8.641    < 0.001 -8.511  < 0.001 -8.340  < 0.001  -10.541    < 0.001
            
Performance measures            
Return on assets (%)  0.011    < 0.001 0.011  < 0.001 0.011  < 0.001  0.011    0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.000    0.545 0.000  0.511 0.000  0.481  0.000    0.615
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure  0.021    0.046 0.968  0.750 -0.032  0.115  0.339    0.663
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  -1.036    0.041 -1.082  0.033 -1.083  0.033  -0.838    0.146
Age (years)  0.329    < 0.001 0.331  < 0.001 0.331  < 0.001  0.352    < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  1.132    < 0.001 1.154  < 0.001 1.172  < 0.001  1.314    < 0.001
CEO=Chairman (=1)  0.497    0.022 0.514  0.018 0.484  0.026  0.916    < 0.001
Board composition            
Proportion nonexecutive directors  -2.566    < 0.001 -2.560  < 0.001 -2.406  < 0.001  -2.656    < 0.001
Ownership concentration            
CEO stock holdings  0.089    < 0.001 0.088  < 0.001 0.087  < 0.001  0.093    < 0.001
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.034    < 0.001 -0.034  < 0.001 -0.034  < 0.001  -0.038    < 0.001
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.016    0.038 -0.016  0.036 -0.017  0.031  -0.013    0.177
Nominee account block holdings  0.012    0.178 0.012  0.183 0.011  0.201  0.007    0.492
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.000    0.994 0.000  0.918 0.000  0.93  0.000    0.982
Corporations’ block holdings  -0.010    0.022 -0.010  0.024 -0.011  0.019  -0.005    0.337
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.006    0.524 -0.007  0.473 -0.007  0.434  -0.009    0.425
Firm size, Capital structure and risk            
Total assets  0.000    0.801 0.000  0.745 0.000  0.81  -0.001    0.544
Debt to asset ratio  -0.002    0.658 -0.001  0.684 -0.001  0.761  0.001    0.886
Stock price volatility  -0.019    0.004 -0.020  0.003 -0.021  0.002  -0.024    0.001
R-squared  0.174    0.175    0.176    0.159   




Table 4.6.5. Random effects probit models explaining non-retirement CEO turnover, excluding temporary 
CEOs 
This table shows the result from CEO turnover regression on the sample excluding temporary CEOs 
 
  Dependent variable: Binary =1 if the CEO is dismissed, 0 otherwise 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  nCloseness (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate  p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -2.196    < 0.001 -2.411  < 0.001 -2.190  < 0.001  -2.627    < 0.001
            
Performance measures            
Return on assets (%)  -0.003    0.003 -0.003  0.003 -0.003  0.003  -0.003    0.020
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.001    0.001 -0.001  < 0.001 -0.001  < 0.001  -0.001    0.001
Centrality measure            
Centrality measure  0.012    < 0.001 2.890  0.011 0.019  0.001  0.452    0.174
CEO characteristics            
Gender (male=1)  0.170    0.283 0.162  0.307 0.171  0.282  0.153    0.401
Age (years)  0.022    < 0.001 0.023  < 0.001 0.023  < 0.001  0.028    < 0.001
Committee membership (=1)  -0.062    0.156 -0.049  0.263 -0.057  0.188  -0.034    0.475
CEO=Chairman (=1)  0.004    0.955 0.019  0.788 0.027  0.707  0.033    0.681
Board composition            
Proportion nonexecutive directors  -0.160    0.317 -0.133  0.405 -0.214  0.195  -0.245    0.166
Ownership concentration            
CEO stock holdings  -0.010    0.001 -0.011  < 0.001 -0.011  0.001  -0.009    0.007
Executive directors. stock holdings  0.003    0.264 0.003  0.206 0.004  0.169  0.005    0.065
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.004    0.173 -0.004  0.16 -0.004  0.212  -0.005    0.167
Nominee account block holdings  0.002    0.420 0.002  0.424 0.003  0.396  0.000    0.985
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.001    0.338 0.000  0.703 0.001  0.428  0.001    0.275
Corporations’ block holdings  0.002    0.182 0.002  0.14 0.003  0.091  0.003    0.099
Individuals and families’ block holdings  0.001    0.730 0.000  0.967 0.001  0.766  0.000    0.977
Firm size, Capital structure and risk            
Total assets  0.000    0.499 0.000  0.282 0.000  0.41  0.001    0.067
Debt to asset ratio  0.001    0.398 0.001  0.296 0.001  0.394  0.001    0.398
Stock price volatility  0.002    0.127 0.002  0.156 0.003  0.092  0.001    0.47
Pseudo R-squared  0.0292  0.0276  0.0283  0.0302 




Table 4.6.6. Heckman sample selection equation explaining CEO external succession, excluding temporary 
CEOs 
This table shows the result from CEO succession regression on the sample excluding temporary CEOs 
 
Regression equation  Dependent variable: Binary =1 if there is the successor is from the outside, 0 otherwise 
Centrality measure  Degree (D)  nCloseness (D)  Degree (C)  nCloseness (C) 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  0.671    0.417 0.396  0.631 0.621  0.449  -0.574    0.598
          
Performance measures          
Return on assets (%)  -0.005    0.071 -0.005  0.062 -0.005  0.069  -0.011    0.004
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.003    0.010 -0.003  0.01 -0.003  0.009  -0.003    0.015
Centrality measure          
Centrality measure  0.007    0.523 9.149  0.014 0.020  0.211  1.056    0.344
CEO characteristics          
Gender (male=1)  -0.469    0.161 -0.466  0.164 -0.506  0.133  -0.387    0.269
Age (years)  -0.004    0.641 -0.005  0.628 -0.004  0.705  -0.005    0.606
Board composition          
Presence of nomination committee  0.000    0.990 -0.052  0.820 -0.019  0.933  0.115    0.656
Proportion nonexecutive directors  0.004    0.597 0.007  0.436 0.006  0.510  -0.010    0.383
Ownership concentration          
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.005    0.509 -0.005  0.494 -0.004  0.580  -0.001    0.888
Nominee account block holdings  -0.006    0.524 -0.003  0.76 -0.005  0.578  -0.015    0.244
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.002    0.479 0.002  0.569 0.002  0.464  0.002    0.566
Corporations’ block holdings  0.006    0.198 0.006  0.182 0.006  0.184  0.009    0.066
Individuals and families’ block holdings  0.008    0.371 0.009  0.301 0.008  0.327  0.014    0.129
Firm size, Capital structure and risk          
Total assets  -0.003    0.268 -0.003  0.272 -0.003  0.229  -0.002    0.383
Debt to asset ratio  0.003    0.397 0.003  0.386 0.002  0.493  0.008    0.047
Stock price volatility  0.002    0.733 0.002  0.655 0.002  0.615  0.001    0.898
Prob > chi2  0.0091  0.0032  0.0077  0.0006 




Table 4.6.7. Regressions with both direct and indirect measures included 
This table shows the result from CEO turnover regression with both degree and closeness included. 
 
Dependent variable: Binary =1 if the CEO is dismissed, 0 otherwise 
Centrality measure  Individual level  Company level 
 Estimate p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept  -1.817  < 0.001 -2.328  0.041 
        
Performance measures       
Return on assets (%)  -0.003  0.001 -0.004  < 0.001 
Market-adjusted stock return  -0.002  < 0.001 -0.002  < 0.001 
Centrality measure       
Degree  0.012  < 0.001 0.016  0.010 
Closeness  2.086  0.049 0.223  0.460 
CEO characteristics       
Gender (male=1)  0.174  0.224 0.160  0.326 
Age (years)  0.010  < 0.001 0.017  < 0.001 
Committee membership (=1)  -0.135  0.001 -0.001  0.994 
CEO=Chairman (=1)  0.138  0.030 -0.359  0.030 
Board composition       
Proportion nonexecutive directors  -0.222  0.134 0.006  0.022 
Ownership concentration       
CEO stock holdings  -0.011  < 0.001 -0.010  0.471 
Executive directors. stock holdings  0.003  0.138 0.006  0.291 
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.003  0.242 -0.002  0.407 
Nominee account block holdings  -0.001  0.809 -0.003  0.479 
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.001  0.224 0.001  0.197 
Corporations’ block holdings  0.004  0.008 0.005  < 0.001 
Individuals and families’ block holdings  0.003  0.253 0.004  0.253 
Firm size, Capital structure and risk       
Total assets  0.000  0.758 0.000  0.677 
Debt to asset ratio  0.000  0.988 0.000  0.995 
Stock price volatility  0.005  < 0.001 0.005  0.002 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0306 0.0273 




Appendix 4.A. Variable definitions 
Variable Description  Source 
Remuneration     
Total  Sum of all remuneration items listed below.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Salary  Fixed remuneration paid to executive directors  Manifest 
Fee  Fixed remuneration mainly paid to non-executive directors.  Manifest 
Bonus  Performance-related remuneration paid out annually  Manifest 
Equity-based compensation  Remuneration paid as restricted shares and stock options (valued by means of 
Black-Scholes formula) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Miscellaneous   Sum of transaction bonus, deferred cash bonus, severance pay, recruitment 
incentive and relocation fee 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Other  Sum of rare remuneration components such as e.g. medical insurance  Manifest 
     
Performance indicator     
Return on asset  Net income prior to financing costs divided by total assets then multiplied by 
100. 
Datastream 
Market-adjusted stock return  Annual stock return minus the return of the FT All Share index    Own calculations 
based on Datastream 
    
Centrality measure     
Degree (ndegree)  Number of links of a vertex.(normalized degree)    Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Closeness (ncloseness)  The inverse of the geodesic distance from a vertex to all reachable vertices. 
(normalized closeness) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Betweenness (nbetweenness)  The probability that a specific vertex is on the geodesic path between any other 
two vertices. (normalized betweenness) 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Eigenvector centrality (neigenvector)    The aggregation of centralities of adjacent vertices. (normalized eigenvector)  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
    
CEO information     
Gender (male)  Equals 1 if male and 0 if female.  Manifest 
Tenure  Number of years in current position  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Committee membership  Equals 2 if chairman of a specific committee, 1 if member, 0 if not member.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Chairmanship-CEO duality  Equals 1 if the target CEO is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise.  Manifest 
Notice period 
A period of time that the company must inform the CEO before terminating the 
contract. 
Manifest 
    
Board composition     
Prop. nonexecutive  Proportion of non-executive directors on board (denominator is total board size)  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Prop. female  Proportion by female directors on board (denominator is total board size)  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
    
Remuneration consultant networks     
Size remuneration consultant network  The number of firms to which a remuneration consultant gives advice    Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
    
Ownership structure     
CEO stock holding  All the CEO’s stock holdings.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest  
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Executive stock holding    The sum of all executive directors’ stock holdings.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Non executive stock holding  The sum of all non-executive directors’ stock holdings.  Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Nominee account block holding  The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more on nominee accounts.    Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Institutional block holding  The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds and investment, and mutual funds. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Corporate block holding  The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by industrial or commercial 
firms. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
Individual block holding  The sum of the share stakes of 3% or more held by individuals or families not 
related to a director. 
Own calculations 
based on Manifest 
    
Firm size, Capital structure and risk     
Total assets 
Sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other 
assets, except for financial companies. 
Datastream 
Debt to asset ratio  Sum of short term debt, current portion of long term debt and long term debt 
divided by total assets then multiplied by 100, except for financial companies. 
Datastream 
Stock price volatility  The stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean 
price for each year: (high-low)/(high+low). 
Own calculations 




Appendix 4.B. Sector classification 
 
Panel A shows the sector classification as obtained from Datastream. The frequency gives the number of firm-years that a firm 
of this sector is included in our data. Panel B gives sector information for the year 2007. Panel C and D shows the broad sector 
distribution for whole sample as well as for the year 2007. 
 
Panel A. Sector classification in the whole sample 
(whole sample)  Frequency  Percentage Sector Frequency  Percentage
Aerospace & Defense  152  1.37 Industrial Metals & Mining  40  0.36
Alternative Energy  54  0.49 Industrial Transportation  233  2.1
Automobiles & Parts  62  0.56 Leisure Goods  94  0.85
Banks 126  1.14 Life  Insurance  101  0.91
Beverages 97  0.87 Media  664  5.98
Chemicals 199  1.79 Mining  329  2.97
Construction & Materials  332  2.99 Mobile Telecommunications  40  0.36
Electricity 86  0.78 Nonlife  Insurance  231  2.08
Electronic & Electrical Equipment  313  2.82 Oil & Gas Producers  337  3.04
Equity Investment Instruments  26  0.23 Oil Equipment & Services  92  0.83
Financial Services (Sector)  648  5.84 Personal Goods  149  1.34
Fixed Line Telecommunications  132  1.19 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology  456  4.11
Food & Drug Retailers  137  1.23 Real Estate Investment & Service  422  3.8
Food Producers  241  2.17 Real Estate Investment Trusts  168  1.51
Forestry & Paper  26  0.23 Software & Computer Services  945  8.52
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities  122  1.1 Support Services  1,193  10.75
General Industrials  142  1.28 Technology Hardware &Equipment  318  2.87
General Retailers  656  5.91 Tobacco  35  0.32
Health Care Equipment & Service  228  2.05 Travel & Leisure  725  6.53
Household Goods & Home Const.  345  3.11 Unclassified  16  0.14




Panel B. Sector classification in 2007 
(2007) Frequency  Percentage  Sector  Frequency  Percentage 
Aerospace & Defense  14  1.2 Industrial Metals & Mining  9  0.77
Alternative Energy  11  0.95 Industrial Transportation  16  1.38
Automobiles & Parts  4  0.34 Leisure Goods  6  0.52
Banks 11  0.95 Life  Insurance  11  0.95
Beverages 6  0.52 Media  73  6.28
Chemicals 15  1.29 Mining  67  5.76
Construction & Materials  23  1.98 Mobile Telecommunications  4  0.34
Electricity 11  0.95 Nonlife  Insurance  21  1.81
Electronic & Electrical Equipment  30  2.58 Oil & Gas Producers  60  5.16
Equity Investment Instruments  5  0.43 Oil Equipment & Services  13  1.12
Financial Services (Sector)  87  7.48 Personal Goods  11  0.95
Fixed Line Telecommunications  8  0.69 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology  51  4.39
Food & Drug Retailers  8  0.69 Real Estate Investment & Service  52  4.47
Food Producers  24  2.06 Real Estate Investment Trusts  19  1.63
Forestry & Paper  2  0.17 Software & Computer Services  97  8.34
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities  8  0.69 Support Services  137  11.78
General Industrials  15  1.29 Technology Hardware & Equipment  36  3.1
General Retailers  51  4.39 Tobacco  3  0.26
Health Care Equipment & Service  27  2.32 Travel & Leisure  63  5.42
Household Goods & Home Const.  19  1.63 Unclassified  1  0.09




Panel C. Sector and broad sector   
Sector Broad  sector    Sector Broad  sector 
Chemicals Chemical    Industrial Transportation  Logistics 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology        Support Services     
Fixed Line Telecommunications  Communication    Media Media 
Mobile Telecommunications        Aerospace & Defence  Manufacture   
Banks Financial    Automobiles & Parts  and   
Equity Investment Instruments      Construction & Materials  Mining 
Financial Services (Sector)      Forestry & Paper   
Life Insurance      General Industrials   
Nonlife Insurance      Industrial Engineering   
Real Estate Investment & Service      Industrial Metals & Mining   
Real Estate Investment Trusts        Mining     
Beverages Food    Health Care Equipment & Service  Other 
Food & Drug Retailers      Household Goods & Home Construction   
Food Producers      Personal Goods   
Tobacco        Unclassified  
Electricity IT    Unknown  
Electronic & Electrical Equipment      General Retailers  Retailer 
Leisure Goods      Alternative Energy  Utility 
Software & Computer Services      Gas, Water & Multi-utilities   
Technology Hardware & Equipment        Oil & Gas Producers   
Travel & Leisure  Leisure    Oil Equipment & Services     
 












C h e m i c a l  6 5 54 . 7 3 6 64 . 3 1  
Communication 172 1.24 12 0.78 
Financial 1,722 12.43 206 13.46 
Food 510 3.68 41 2.68 
It 1,670 12.05 169 11.04 
Leisure 725 5.23 63 4.11 
Logistics 1,426 10.29 153 9.99 
M e d i a  6 6 44 . 7 9 7 34 . 7 7  
Manufacture 1,467 10.59 168 10.97 
Other 3,496 25.23 426 27.82 
Retailer 656 4.74 51 3.33 















Director networks create connections between companies. These interlocks can be 
beneficial for the companies as they facilitate for instance the diffusion of information on 
innovations (Mizruchi, 1992). However, the finance (agency) literature stipulates that 
director networks can also harm corporate governance as managers can acquire 
managerial influence through their networks. Consequently, CEOs may be 
over-compensated or worry less about dismissal when they underperform. Since the late 
1990s, pioneers in this field (such as Hallock, 1997 and Fich and White 2003) have found 
empirical evidence supporting the positive relation between director networks and CEO 
compensation. In recent years, with the implementation of graph theoretical methods, the 
impact of director networks on CEO compensation and turnover has been further 
investigated by Barnea and Gueij (2009) and Liu (2009). Their studies conclude that 
director networks help the CEO gain managerial influence, which is reflected in higher 
compensation and lower turnover threat. 
 
Directors do not only have networks through their executive and non-executive positions 
on corporate boards (professional networks), but also keep networks originated from 
shared high school, college or university education, elite or sports club memberships or 
other social occasions (social networks). These social networks may affect the director’s 
compensation and turnover in the same way as professional networks (Kirchmaier and  
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Kollo 2007). Hwang and Kim (2009) find similar positive relation between social 
connections and pay. Moreover, Engelberg et al. (2009) and Brown et al. (2009) discover 
that past connections are important components in the CEO networks as well in terms of 
setting executive compensation. They also discuss social connections’ negative impact on 
pay-for-performance sensitivity and turnover-for-performance sensitivity. Lastly, 
Kirchmaier and Stathopoulos (2008) find that the CEO social networks hamper firm 
performance. In short, director networks from different origins (e.g., professional and 
social) have been shown to have negative impact on corporate governance. However, in 
most of the existing literature on networks, only one origin of network is analyzed 
(usually the professional network). This approach may jeopardize the integrity of director 
networks and affect the accuracy of centrality measures. In this study, we propose a 
method to consider director networks from different origins simultaneously. The 
professional network is the primary network. Networks from all other origins (including 
the past networks) are secondary networks. The aggregation of all director networks is 
referred to as the total director network. 
 
In order to illustrate the implementation of this method, we conduct an empirical analysis 
on the relation between the CEOs’ total networks and their remuneration packages and 
their firms’ performance. In the first part, we hypothesize that the directors’ professional 
network matrices are “enhanced” by networks based on the past connections and social 
connections. The result shows that the network enhancements by means of past, 
educational and nationality relations increase a CEO’s total remuneration while other 
explanatory variables such as corporate performance and ownership concentration are 
controlled.- 
 
The second part of our empirical analysis is about the extent to which firm performance is 
affected by a company’s average centrality based on indirect links of the directors’ total 
networks. We first calculate the indirect centrality measures for each director in the 
company to evaluate the directors’ information collection ability. Then we take the 
average of those centrality scores as a measure for the company’s access to information 
via director networks. We find that a high average centrality at the company level  
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improves firm performance while controlling for many firm and corporate governance 
characteristics. We also test the relation between firm performance and the average direct 
centrality measures of a company, but find no statistically significant relation. Thus, our 
analysis reveals that only indirect or information-driven network advantages can be 
transformed in better firm performance.   
 
Compared to the existing studies, our network data is more elaborate and complete as 
director networks are based on multiple origins. In our empirical analysis, two different 
approaches of treating networks from multiple origins are proposed and implemented. On 
the managerial influence hypothesis, we examine how the professional connections 
between the CEO and other directors are enhanced by other secondary connections. In the 
analysis of total network’s information value, we consider information flows in from the 
professional networks as well as past and social connections. These approaches are still at 
the experimental stage and there is much room for improvement.   
 
This paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we propose a framework to 
analyze networks from different origins (e.g. past professional and educational networks) 
simultaneously. In section 3, an empirical application of this method is carried out. 
Section 4 discusses the findings on directors’ social and professional networks and 
concludes with some remarks for a future research agenda. 
 
 
2. Director Networks from Different Origins 
 
In most of the network studies, only one type of network is examined, usually the current 
professional director network based on colleagueship on the board. However, directors 
are connected in other non-professional or social networks as well. In contrast to the 
literature on single network, we develop a technique that can handle hybrid networks (a 
combination of professional and social connections). As our main research interest lies in 
corporate performance and policies, we take the current professional network of the 
incumbent directors as the primary network. Director networks inherited from the past,  
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education experience, common nationality and club memberships are regarded as the 
secondary networks. These secondary networks are seen as enhancements of or 
supplements of the current professional networks. We expect that both the primary and 
the secondary networks can jointly affect corporate policies, as depicted in Figure 5.2.1. 
 
[Insert Figure 5.2.1 about here.] 
 
Several origins of these secondary networks are listed in rectangles on the left hand side 
of Figure 5.2.1. For example, directors who graduated from the same university may 
build up ties through alumni activities. Similarly, directors belonging to the same elite or 
sports club or organization may be acquainted with one another and may contact one 
another more easily to exchange information valuable to their firms. If two directors have 
sat on the same board in the past or, we assume that this tie does not immediately 
disappear when they no longer meet at those board meetings but lasts for some time.   
 
Figure 5.2.1 depicts that the current professional network is the primary one in this study. 
Primarily connections are built by directors serving on the same board. They can be built 
up to the benefit of their company but also for private reasons. The secondary director 
networks comprise other types of directors’ connections which are generated from the 
non-professional origins listed on the left. 
 
There are interactions between the primary and secondary networks. First, the different 
origins of networks can enhance each other. For instance, current professional 
connections become stronger if the two involved directors have studied in a same 
university before. Second, secondary networks can extend the primary networks. For 
instance, directors can obtain information from each other via different channels, 
including board meetings, alumni events and townsmen gathering. In the context of a 
network graph, information is transmitted throughout the total network that comprises 




On the right hand side of Figure 5.2.1, we have listed several examples of corporate 
issues that may be affected by director networks, including managerial compensation, 
managerial turnover decisions, corporate policies and, ultimately, firm performance. 
 
To construct a ‘total’ network, we assign networks from different origins onto different 
layers, with the current professional network being at the bottom as the primary layer. We 
project the director networks of the other layers onto the current professional network. As 
an example, let us consider a network between four directors (A, B, C and D in Figure 
5.2.2). Their networks, coming from three origins, are shown on layer 1, 2 and 3 in 
Figure 5.2.2. Primary network on layer one consists of the current professional network 
while the other secondary networks have origins in educational and past professional 
connections. In the current professional network, directors A and B work in the same 
company whereas C and D work in different companies. In the past, director B has been 
in a company with directors C and D, which implies that they may still be in contact with 
each other or can at least contact one another in case they need some company or 
industry-related information (past layer, layer 2). A and B hold the same degree from the 
same university from which they graduate in about the same time period (Educational 
layer, layer 3).   
 
[Insert Figure 5.2.2 about here] 
 
We project the educational and past connections onto the current professional network, 
which gives us the total network graph at the bottom of the figure (layer 0). Hence, the 
current professional links between A and B are further strengthened by the educational 
connections (bold line). Directors B, C and D are also linked to each other through past 
and educational ties (dashed lines). In most existing studies, only directors’ professional 
networks are taken into account, which suggests in the context of this example that only 
directors A and B are connected, while C and D are not. When we also consider the 
secondary networks, we find that directors C and D are no longer isolated but are actually 
connected by past and educational connections. Moreover, the connection between  
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director A and B has been enhanced by educational connection. Therefore it is in fact 
stronger than that when only the current professional connections are counted.   
 
 
3. Empirical Analyses on Director Networks from Multiple Origins 
 
We collect data on past connections, educational background, and foreign (non-British) 
nationalities as examples of secondary networks to study a hybrid network of 
professional and other non-professional connections. Once we have constructed the total 




We study the enhancement effect of social and past connections on current professional 
connections. The current professional connections of the CEO with the other directors 
within the company are used as the primary network. If the CEO and another director are 
connected by sharing a common past in terms of working for the same company, similar 
educational background or same (but not British) nationality, we consider the current 
professional links as being enhanced. We calculate the number of the current 
CEO-director links that are enhanced by the past, educational and nationality connections 
as a percentage of all the CEO-director links in the CEO’s own company in order to 
measure the CEO’s influence. Then, we use these percentages as measurements for 
managerial influence to explain the variations in CEO pay when performance and other 
factors are comparable. It should be noted that it is important to work here with 
percentages and not with the number of ties as the latter is related to firm size (we later 
use the number of connections as a robustness check).   
 
Hypothesis 1 (Enhancement): The CEOs whose current professional connections with 
other board members are enhanced by non-professional connections have stronger 




Next, we use total networks comprises current professional connections, past professional 
connections and connections derived from common education and nationality to enlarge 
the traditional scope of directors’ networks for the purpose of measuring the information 
collection ability. We assume here that the secondary networks generated from different 
origins are equally effective in information transmission. With all origins taken into 
account, we use closeness and betweenness to evaluate whether the director has good 
access to information in the total network. For each company, we then take the average of 
all directors’ centrality score to measure the network information value of the company
21. 
Compared to other assessments including the highest centrality or the median centrality 
in the company, the average is a better measure in the context of joint decision making 
with shared information (Other assessments are analyzed in robustness check).   
 
Hypothesis 2 (Supplement): Companies with better connected directors have more 
access to value business information, which is reflected in better corporate performance, 
ceteris  paribus.   
 
3.2 Network Construction 
We record our networks by means of matrices of directors. It is important to note that the 
matrices related to each of the above hypotheses are different. First, the current 
professional connections (primary), past professional connections (secondary), 
educational connections (secondary) and nationality connections (secondary) are 
identified as follows. In the current professional network, two directors are linked if they 
sit on the same board. Similarly, for the past professional networks, we identify directors’ 
professional connections in the previous year (if they are different from the current year). 
In the educational and nationality networks, two directors are connected if they have 
studied at the same university or they originate from same country (excluding the UK). 
Then, the primary and secondary networks are stored in four n*n symmetrical matrices, 
                                                 
 
21  The other option of measuring company level information value in the director networks is to calculate 
the centrality measures of each company in a graph with companies as vertices. Due to technical difficulty, 
the company level networks including social connections are not feasible. Nevertheless, when we compare 
the company level centrality to the company average centrality in a hypothetical example, we find that 
these two measures are highly correlated.  
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where n is the number of directors in the dataset. Each element in the matrices equals 1 or 
0, representing there is a link between two directors or not.   
 
According to the enhancement hypothesis (managerial influence), we consider the past 
professional, educational and nationality connections as reinforcements of the current 
professional connections within the company. To measure these enhancements, we export 
the matrix coordinates (i.e., the pairs of identification numbers of the two connected 
directors) from the three secondary network matrices into a file. In another file of 
coordinates extracted from the current professional network matrix, we have all the 
CEO-director links within each company listed as pairs of director identification numbers. 
The pairs of identification numbers in the second file are then compared and matched 
with those in the first file in order to find out which current professional links have been 
enhanced by the secondary connections within the CEO’s home company. This matching 
procedure is essential: if we simply analyze the enhancements of all the links involving 
the CEO, many of which are in fact between the CEO and directors outside the CEO’s 
home company, we thus mistakenly capture many enhancements which are not relevant 
to the managerial influence of the CEO. With the matching procedure, the enhancement 
effects of the secondary networks can now be measured precisely within the home 
company.  
 
For the supplement hypothesis (based on information collection), we consider the 
secondary connections to have a similar impact on the efficiency of information 
collection. Intuitively, a director acquires useful information from contacting past 
colleagues as well as meeting other directors during alumni activities. In terms of 
network matrices, we sum the four matrices (the primary network matrix and the three 
secondary ones). Then, we transform all non-zero elements into one and study the 
indirect centrality measures of each director in the aggregate matrix, including closeness 
and betweenness, normalized to account for the network sizes.    Once the centrality score 
has been calculated for the directors, we take the mean centrality score of all directors in 




Compared to the existing literature on director’s social connections (Kirchmaier and 
Kollo, 2007; Engelberg et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2009 and Hwang and Kim, 2009), our 
method has the following advantages. First, the above approach allows us to study 
professional and social networks in one system with different weights assigned for them.   
Second, we are able to employ multiple centrality measures to reveal more insights about 
the total director networks.   
 
3.3 Data Description 
Our data comprises 894 UK companies from all sectors and all FTSE indices for the 
period of 2006-2007. Detailed company and director information is collected from 
BoardEX and Manifest. BoardEX provides data on boards, directors and companies. 
Manifest provides information on corporate governance and remuneration. The current 
and past professional connections are retrieved from board composition data provided by 
Manifest. We use the director network in 2007 as the current director network and that of 
2006 as the past network. The educational background and nationality data are retrieved 
from BoardEX. We collected information from the director profiles which comprise 
individual characteristics such as age, gender, nationality, education, qualifications, and 
awards. Directors that have been to the same college or university are considered to be 
connected through an educational network. Some educational institutions are classified as 
one because they are closely related to each other. For instance Harvard Business School, 
Harvard College, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Law 
School and Harvard University are regarded as one institute. In Table 5.3.1 we show the 
most common educational backgrounds for UK directors. We have 9351 educational 
backgrounds for 6269 directors in 2007. One notable fact is that nearly 20% of the 
directors have received their education either from Oxford, Cambridge or Harvard.   
 
[Insert Table 5.3.1 about here] 
 
Directors from the same foreign country sitting on UK boards may form closer 
connections through their common national background. Enhanced connections of 
nationality are based on the directors’ professional connections whereby the connections  
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of directors with the same nationality (excluding the British one) strengthen the links 
between these directors. Table 5.3.2 shows the non-British nationalities that are most 
frequently present in UK boardrooms. Among the 6269 directors in this study, about 13% 
are foreign directors are from the US (240 directors), followed by France (56), South 
Africa (50), Ireland (46), the Netherlands (41), and Germany (41). 
 
[Insert Table 5.3.2 about here] 
 
In the study on CEO managerial power and its influence on his compensation package, 
past, educational and nationality connections can enhance the CEO’s power within his 
firm. In this context, we assume that the secondary networks do not increase managerial 
influence independently of the current professional connections. For example, in Figure 
5.2.2, only the bold lines are considered in the managerial influence networks. Table 
5.3.3, shows the number of CEO-director connections being enhanced by past, 
educational and nationality connections on the board as well as the percentage (with the 
total within company CEO-director connections as the denominator). In an average 
company, there are 7 links from the CEO to the other directors. Nearly 70% of them are 
enhanced by past connections. One and 0.3 percent of them are enhanced by educational 
and nationality-based connections. 
 
[Insert Table 5.3.3 about here] 
 
In the study of the value of information collection, the past, educational and nationality 
connections are not necessarily bound to within-company connections. All connections 
are treated as equivalent sources of information (in Figure 5.2.2, both the bold and dashed 
lines are considered to be equivalent in this context). In Table 5.3.4, we show the basic 
statistics of the CEO’s centrality in the total network and the average centrality measure 
of all directors in the company. On average, a CEO is connected to 46 other executive or 
non-executive directors via the professional and social networks for the current and the 
previous years. Interestingly, a company’s average degree (50) is higher than the CEO’s 
average degree, which implies some non-CEO directors have more connections than the  
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CEO. This is also confirmed when comparing the centrality measures other than the 
degree.  
 
[Insert Table 5.3.4 about here] 
 
In order to test the hypotheses on managerial influence/enhancement, we focus on the 
CEO’s total compensation. The compensation data are collected from Manifest and 
include fixed salary, fees, bonuses, equity based compensation (stock options and 
restricted stocks) and other miscellaneous compensation items. A detailed description of 
these data is presented in Table 5.3.5.   
 
[Insert Table 5.3.5 about here] 
 
As firm profitability is needed to test both hypotheses, we collect the return on assets and 
the market-adjusted returns (from Datastream). The descriptive statistics of the 
performance measures can be found in Table 5.3.6, along with other firm characteristics 
such as firm size, capital structure and stock price volatility. 
 
[Insert Table 5.3.6 about here] 
 
Ownership concentration, including director share stakes and outside blockholder 
ownership, are also included in our multivariate regressions. Their descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 5.3.7. The CEO owns an average of 2.9% of the shares outstanding. 
Among the investors, institutional block holders hold most of the share stakes, 22% on 
average. 
 
[Insert Table 5.3.7 about here] 
 
I n   a d d i t i o n   t o   a l l   o f   t h e   a b o v e   v a r i a b l e s ,   w e   a l s o   i n c l u d e   1 1   s e c t o r   d u m m y   v a r i a b l e s .                     
 
3.4 Results  
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To test hypothesis 1, we first run regressions including one type of network enhancement 
at the time. Table 5.3.8 shows that when a larger percentage of CEO connections have 
been enhanced by either past, educational and nationality networks, total compensation 
increases significantly, whilst controlling for performance, corporate size, and other firm 
characteristics. Let us take educational enhancement as an example: we find that when 
many board members are from the same university as the CEO, the CEO is ceteris 
paribus paid significantly more. In the regression with all three enhancements (Table 
5.3.9), we observe that the three origins of network enhancements all have a significantly 
positive impact on CEO compensation. The effect of enhancement through past 
connections is the highest (0.162 compared to 0.067 and 0.063 for education and 
nationality, respectively). Note that although the descriptive statistics suggest that the past 
connections are much more common than educational and national connections, in terms 
of economic significance, the differences between them are not that large. We also 
performed Wald test on these three coefficients and conclude that these three effects are 
jointly significant in the model (F(3, 766) = 5.67; Prob > F = 0.0008). To sum up, our 
hypothesis 1 is confirmed: past connections and social connections contribute to the 
managerial influence in the boardroom, resulting in higher compensation. While in some 
network studies, the number of social and past connections are used (e.g. Kirchmaier and 
Stathopoulos, 2008), the number of social and past connections in the company is 
strongly dependent on board size, which could make these measures problematic. Indeed, 
when we also include the number of past and social connections in our models, the 
estimates turn out to be less significant.   
 
[Insert Table 5.3.8, 5.3.9 about here] 
 
From the estimated coefficients for the control variables, we confirm many findings from 
chapter 3. When a CEO holds large share stakes in his own company, his remuneration is 
lower. This is not surprising as in that case, the CEO’s incentives are more aligned with 
those of the shareholders. The non-executive directors’ block holdings also have a 
negative effect on CEO compensation. When non-executive directors hold more shares, 
they are expected to be more active monitors of the management, and may therefore curb  
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excessive pay policies. CEOs are paid less when individual investors (and nominee 
investors) hold large shareholdings. As frequently documented before, larger firms pay 
their CEOs significantly more. High stock price volatility is negatively correlated with 
CEO pay, but leverage has no significant bearing on CEO compensation.   
 
To test the second hypothesis, we run regressions with ROA as the dependent variable. 
Table 5.3.10 shows that the average normalized closeness and betweenness at the 
company level are significantly positively correlated with corporate performance 
(columns 1 and 2). This implies that when the directors of a company are on average well 
connected by means of professional and/or social networks, the company is more likely 
to perform well. We also investigate the information value of the CEOs through their 
total network. In column 4, the closeness centrality of the CEO in the total network has a 
significant impact on the accounting performance of the company. The direct centrality 
measure of the CEO (degree) in the total network (column 3) has no impact on firm 
performance. This last result confirms our finding from Chapters 3 and 4 that the director 
networks have different functions given their structural difference. We also run 
regressions with stock performance as the dependent variable and most of our results 
persist. 
 
[Insert Table 5.3.10 about here] 
 
In the above regressions, we use the average indirect centrality measures of the directors 
to access the information collection ability of the company. Intuitively, the quality of the 
corporate decisions depends on each director’s information access. Alternatively, one 
may argue that a company’s access to information is determined by the director with the 
best information access or the director with median information access. We present the 
regression results with the company’s maximum centrality and median centrality as 
explanatory variables in Table 5.3.11. All these alternatives except for maximum 
betweenness have significant and positive impact on return on assets, which is inline with 




[Insert Table 5.3.11 about here] 
 
 
4. Remarks on Future Study 
 
In the future study, the following direction may prove to be interesting as research topics. 
 
Company networks can have different origins. Just as individual directors are connected 
to other directors, companies are connected by director interlocks but also in other ways 
e.g. to financial institutions by lending relationships. Companies who hire the same 
(remuneration) consultant may be regarded as linked as well as they could for instance, 
obtain information about remuneration policy changes of other companies belonging to 
the client network of their consultant. Companies can also be connected through business 
relationships. For instance, companies in manufacturing are connected with their retailers 
and suppliers. In short, company networks consist of links from multiple origins, which 
may have a different impact on corporate policies. In this direction, Ahern and Harford 
(2010) study the relation between inter industry interlocks and merger waves. They 
indeed find that economy-wide merger waves can be explained in part by information 
diffusion across industry network. The difference lying in between Ahern and Harford 
(2010) and our suggested future work is that they have industries as the vertices in the 
network rather than companies. Furthermore, in Ahern and Harford (2010) only supply 
and demand connections are considered. Nevertheless, Ahern and Harford (2010) have 
shown that connections between companies that are not based on interlocking directors 
may have impact on corporate policy.   
 
One obstacle in the study of individuals’ social networks is the validity of the 
self-reported data. For instance, there may be an reporting bias in relation to the 
educational background of directors who may choose only to make public their more 
prestigious degrees education at the most reknown universities and ‘forget’ the mediocre 
ones. A solution could be the use of a secondary data source or even interviews to enrich 
and cross-check the current data. A second problem with the self-reported data is a lack  
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of standardization, but we have classified similar educational backgrounds to resolve the 
issue. Finally, one improvement in identifying connections through educational 
background is to add the time element. In this chapter, we simply assume that graduates 
from a same university/school form a connection because they graduated from the same 
place. Without controlling for time, they may still know each other through alumni 
meetings. This treatment may be appropriate in the context of managerial influence 
(enhancement effect) as we assume here that the supervisor-director will support the CEO 
in his compensation bargaining and other issues if they share the same education 
background. However, this assumption may be less convincing in the context information 
value discussion (the supplementary effect). When the age gap is large, graduates from 
the same university might not know each other at all. In the future research, giving more 
weight to educational links between people that have studied at a university at the same 
time could make the identification of education connection more robust. 
 
In our analysis of the enhancement and supplement hypotheses, more research is needed 
on how various networks ought to be combined. For instance, an avenue for further 
research is the measurement of the strength of connections in the calculation of the 
indirect centrality measures. Intuitively, the stronger links should be more efficient in 
information transmission. Therefore, stronger links should be allocated shorter geodesic 
distances between the vertex under consideration and the other vertices. Such an adjusted 






To conclude, we have proposed in this paper a method to combine director networks from 
multiple origins. We conduct an empirical analysis to illustrate how this method can be 
used and obtain strong evidence for our basic hypothesis that different origins of 
networks have a (reinforcing) impact on managerial influence and performance. Social 
and past connections in the secondary networks effectively enhance the current  
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professional connections in the primary network between a CEO and other board 
members, which give the CEO more managerial influence and lead to larger 
compensation packages. Companies with total networks (including primary and 
secondary networks) that are more effective in terms of information collection are indeed 
performing better. At the level of the CEOs, superior information arising from their total 
networks also enables the company to improve performance. In contrast, the CEO’s 
managerial influence based network (measured by direct connections through his total 
networks) does not benefit his company.   
 
Our method of treating multiple origins of networks simultaneously partially reduces the 
problem of network integrity when only one type of network is studied. We prove that 
networks from different origins can affect corporate governance and performance in a 
similarly way as the current professional networks. Given that the current laws and 
regulations regarding director interlocks solely focus on current professional connections, 
our study suggests that other types of connections should be noticed and regulated as well. 
From the perspective of the investor, company and consultant, the value of the director’s 
social and past connections should be better recognized as well as the network’s potential 
harm to corporate governance when nomination decision is to be made. On this issue, our 
study sheds light on how people should access director networks of a larger variety and 
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Figure 5.2.1. Director networks of different origins 
 





















Figure 5.2.2. Director networks on different layers 
This figure is a visual demonstration of the multiple networks projection. 
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Table 5.3.1. Educational background 
 
This table shows the educational backgrounds of the UK directors in 2007. The total number of educational background entries is 9351. 
The left panel lists the most frequently-seen education backgrounds recorded by BoardEX. Based on that, we merge similar education 
backgrounds and list the most popular ones in the right panel. In network construction, we reply on the broad educational background. 
Data source: Own calculations based on BoardEX. 
 
Educational background  Freq.  Prop. Broad educational background  Freq. Prop.
    
Cambridge University  433  4.63% Oxford  699 7.48%
Oxford University  417  4.46% Cambridge  694 7.42%
Harvard Business School  209  2.24% Harvard  334 3.57%
INSEAD  160  1.71% INSEAD  160 1.71%
London Business School  157  1.68% London Business School  157 1.68%
University of Edinburgh  153  1.64% University of Edinburgh  153 1.64%
University of Manchester  147  1.57% University of Manchester  147 1.57%
University of London  132  1.41% University of London  132 1.41%
Imperial College, University of London  126  1.35% Imperial College, University of London  126 1.35%
London School of Economics (LSE)  113  1.21% London School of Economics (LSE)  113 1.21%
University of Bristol  109  1.17% University of Bristol  109 1.17%
University of Glasgow  94  1.01% University of Glasgow  94 1.01%
University of Leeds  86  0.92% University of Leeds  86 0.92%
University of Warwick  79  0.84% University of Warwick  79 0.84%
Harvard University  77  0.82% University of Southampton  75 0.80%
University of Southampton  75  0.80% University of Strathclyde  68 0.73%
University of Strathclyde  68  0.73% Durham University  67 0.72%
Durham University  67  0.72% University of Sheffield  65 0.70%
University of Sheffield  65  0.70% University of Birmingham  64 0.68%
University of Birmingham  64  0.68% University College London (UCL)  63 0.67%
University College London (UCL)  63  0.67% Nottingham University  62 0.66%
Nottingham University  62  0.66% Wharton School, University of Pennsylva  61 0.65%
Wharton School, University of Pennsylva  61  0.65% Eton College  58 0.62%
Eton College  58  0.62% Stanford University  58 0.62%
Stanford University  58  0.62% University of Liverpool  58 0.62%
University of Liverpool  58  0.62% Cranfield School of Management  51 0.55%
Cranfield School of Management  51  0.55% University of the Witwatersrand  51 0.55%
University of the Witwatersrand  51  0.55% University of Reading  50 0.53%
University of Reading  50  0.53%  
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Table 5.3.2. Foreign nationality 
 
This table shows the foreign nationalities of directors serving 
on UK boardrooms. Our data comprise 6269 directors. Data 
source: Own calculations based on BoardEX. 
 
Nationality Freq.  Prop. 
 
American  240 3.83%
French  56 0.89%
South African  50 0.80%
Irish  46 0.73%
Dutch  41 0.65%
German  41 0.65%
Australian  29 0.46%
Swedish  26 0.41%
Belgian  21 0.33%
Canadian  21 0.33%
Indian  16 0.26%
Italian  16 0.26%
Malaysian  16 0.26%
Spanish  13 0.21%
Swiss  13 0.21%
 
 
Table 5.3.3. Enhancement of CEO-director links 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics on the number of CEO-director links, the numbers of CEO-director links 
enhanced by secondary connections. The three rows at the bottom show the percentages of CEO-director links being 
enhanced by the secondary connections. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest and BoardEX. 
 
  N Mean  SD  Min  P25  P50  P75  Max 
           
Total link  1195  7.250    2.979 1 5 7 9  21
       
Past professional link  1195  5.177    3.512 0 3 5 7  19
Educational link  1195  0.079    0.378 0 0 0 0 4
Nationality link  1195  0.024    0.239 0 0 0 0 5
       
Past proportion.  1195 69.7% 36.6% 0.0% 62.5% 83.3%  100.0%  100.0%
Education proportion.  1195 1.0% 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  60.0%
Nationality proportion.  1195 0.3% 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  60.0%








Table 5.3.4. CEOs’ total network centralities and company average centralities 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of CEOs’ total network centralities and the average centrality of all directors in a 
company. (n) stands for normalization. Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest and BoardEX. 
 
  N Mean  SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
       
Degree  1195 45.825    80.470  1 10 15  35  604
(n) degree  1195 0.126    0.221 0.003 0.027 0.041    0.096    1.660 
(n) closeness  1195 0.129    0.035 0.011 0.139 0.139    0.139    0.139 
(n) betweenness  1195 0.025    0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000    0.016    0.719 
       
Degree avg  1195 49.656    40.345  1.000 16.600 37.400    73.667    243.417 
(n) degree avg  1195 0.136    0.111 0.003 0.045 0.103    0.202    0.669 
(n)closeness avg  1195 0.129    0.035 0.011 0.139 0.139    0.139    0.139 
(n) between avg  1195 0.039    0.032 0.000 0.017 0.030    0.054    0.298 
       
 
Table 5.3.5. CEO compensation   
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of CEO total compensation and the remuneration components in GBP for 2007. 
Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  N  Mean  SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
           
Total  1106  1,125,332   2,030,224  0  159,674  509,420   1,222,941   31,000,000 
Salary  1106  275,031   244,819  0  110,469  228,110   380,000   2,040,686 
Fees  1106  1,872   32,150  0  0  0   0   992,673 
Bonus  1106  282,556   634,190  0  0  69,500   314,000   10,000,000 
Equity-based   1106  520,019   1,519,857  0  0  9,774   447,181   26,700,000 
Miscellaneous  1106  19,951   195,340  0  0  0   0   4,686,698 
Other  1106  25,903   72,696  0  0  11,518   25,000   1,126,000 
       
 
Table 5.3.6. Firm characteristics   
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics in 2007. Market-adjusted returns (in percentage) are 
calculated by means of the FTSE All Share index as the market. The debt to assets ratio is the long term debt divided by 
the total assets. The stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year: 
(high-low)/(high+low). Data source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  N Mean  SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
          
ROA  957  0.852   28.871  -310.530  -0.450  5.960   10.460   340.770 
Market-adj. return  905  5.051   50.859 -99.868 -27.498  0.672   28.092    381.763 
Total assets  971  11600000   119000000  780 39879  157770    747012    2510000000 
Debt to asset ratio  969  18.581   20.462  0.000  0.710  13.860   29.110   167.240 
Stock volatility  948 37.061    18.696  0.391 24.761 33.750    45.740    163.009 







Table 5.3.7. Ownership concentration 
 
This table shows ownership structure by type of shareholder. The numbers are based on all disclosed ownership 
stakes of 3% or more for all shareholder categories apart from the directors of whom all shareholdings are reported 
and included in this table. The share stake concentration of the executive directors includes that of the CEO. The table 
also shows share percentages owned by institutions, which include banks, insurance companies, investment funds, 
pension funds, and of other outsiders such as corporations and individuals and families not related to a director. Data 
source: Own calculations based on Manifest. 
 
  N  Mean  SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
           
CEO   1057 2.9% 7.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8%  59.0%
Executive directors (incl. CEO)    1057 2.7% 8.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9%  100.0%
Non-executive directors    1057 2.8% 8.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7%  100.0%
Nominee accounts  1057 2.0% 8.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  100.0%
Institutions total  1057 22.2% 19.4% 0.0% 5.0% 18.6% 34.6% 92.5%
Bank funds  1057 1.9% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1%  59.8%
Insurance companies’ funds  1057 2.4% 4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.5%  63.1%
Investment and mutual funds  1057 17.7% 18.1% 0.0% 0.0% 12.7% 28.8% 92.5%
Pension funds  1057 0.4% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  19.8%
Individuals and families  1057 1.6% 5.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  63.9%
Corporations  1057 9.0% 13.5% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8%  13.6%  100.0%




Table 5.3.8. CEO compensation and enhanced networks   
 
This table examines the relation between CEO total compensation and three enhancements in three 
regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the CEO’s annual total compensation. 
Performance is measured by return on assets and market-adjusted stock return (with the FTSE All share 
index as the market). The network enhancement is based on past, educational and nationality connections. 
Tenure is the number of years on in the board position. The ownership concentration data by type of 
shareholder are the accumulated stakes passing the 3% disclosure threshold. The director ownership 
concentration data consist of the aggregate of all reported shares. Company financial information is 
gathered from Datastream. The debt to assets ratio is the long term debt divided by the total assets. Stock 
price volatility is the stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each 
year: (high-low)/(high+low). Twelve industry dummies are also included. Data Source: own calculations 
based on data from Manifest, Thomson Financial, PricewaterhouseCoopers ownership database, annual 
reports. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation   
          
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  13.667  < 0.001 13.957  < 0.001 13.984    < 0.001
        
Performance measures        
Return on assets (%)  0.007  < 0.001 0.008  < 0.001 0.008    < 0.001
Market-adjusted stock return  0.000 0.936 0.000 0.935 0.000    0.974
   
Network Enhancement   
Past enhancement  0.466 0.001  
Education enhancement  1.631 0.049  
Nationality enhancement  2.696   0.033
   
CEO characteristics   
Tenure (months)  -0.016 0.030 -0.009 0.218 -0.009    0.209
   
Ownership concentration   
CEO stock holdings  -0.019  < 0.001 -0.019  < 0.001 -0.019    < 0.001
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.016 0.001 -0.016 0.001 -0.017    <  0.001
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.014 0.003 -0.013 0.006 -0.013    0.005
Nominee account block holdings  -0.012 0.020 -0.011 0.032 -0.011    0.037
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.000 0.998 0.001 0.782 0.000    0.880
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.027  < 0.001 -0.026  < 0.001 -0.026    < 0.001
Corporations’ block holdings  0.002 0.533 0.002 0.477 0.002    0.492
   
Firm size, Capital structure and risk   
Total assets  0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001    0.003
Debt to asset ratio  0.009  < 0.001 0.009  < 0.001 0.009    < 0.001
Stock price volatility  -0.016  < 0.001 -0.016  < 0.001 -0.016    < 0.001
 
R
2  0.2532 0.2455 0.2461 
N  794 794 794  
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Table 5.3.9. CEO compensation and all enhancements 
 
This table examines the relation between CEO total compensation and all three enhancements. 
 
  Dependent variable: Logarithm of CEO total compensation   
      
  Estimate p-value  Econ. Sign. 
Intercept  13.655 <  0.001  
     
Performance measures     
Return on assets (%)  0.008 <  0.001  
Market-adjusted stock return  0.001 0.937  
   
Enhancement   
Past enhancement  0.442 0.001 0.162   
Education enhancement  1.433 0.082 0.067   
Nationality enhancement  2.323 0.065 0.063   
   
CEO characteristics   
Tenure (months)  -0.015 0.04  
   
Ownership concentration   
CEO stock holdings  -0.019 <  0.001  
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.015 0.001  
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.014 0.003  
Nominee account block holdings  -0.012 0.023  
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.000 0.977  
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.027 <  0.001  
Corporations’ block holdings  0.002 0.524  
   
Firm size, Capital structure and risk   
Total assets  0.001 0.003  
Debt to asset ratio  0.009 <  0.001  
Stock price volatility  -0.016 <  0.001  
   
R
2  0.3561 




Table 5.3.10. Firm performance, company average centrality and CEO total network centrality 
 
This table examines the relation between the return on assets and company average indirect centrality measures (in total 
network) and CEO’s centrality measure (total network). Closeness measures how close the target director is to all other 
‘reachable’ directors based on the geodesic distance. Betweenness measures how often the target director is standing on the 
geodesic paths between other two directors. Both closeness and betweenness are used to evaluate the information value of the 
directors’ networks. Degree is the number of links of a specific director and is used to measure managerial influence in local 
networks.  
 
  Dependent variable: Return on assets    
        
        
 1  2  3  4 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  11.803   0.014 16.146  <  0.001 19.151 <  0.001  11.796  0.014
          
Centrality    
Company average (n) closeness  56.407   0.046  
Company average (n) betweenness   63.783  0.019  
CEO total degree   0.007  0.470 
CEO total (n) closeness     56.459  0.046
    
CEO characteristics    
Tenure (months)  0.139   0.380 0.140  0.375 0.114 0.469 0.139 0.380
    
Ownership concentration    
CEO stock holdings  0.023   0.844 0.024  0.840 0.009 0.937 0.023 0.844
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.022    0.840 -0.003 0.978 -0.022 0.843  -0.022 0.840
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.109    0.271 -0.114 0.252 -0.113 0.257  -0.109 0.271
Nominee account block holdings  0.119   0.252 0.121  0.242 0.122 0.241 0.119 0.252
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.033   0.460 0.035  0.435 0.039 0.387 0.033 0.460
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.002    0.990 0.009 0.955 -0.003 0.986  -0.002 0.990
Corporations’ block holdings  0.039   0.536 0.039  0.541 0.030 0.632 0.039 0.536
    
Firm size, Capital structure and risk    
Total assets  -0.005    0.433 -0.005 0.467 -0.006 0.401  -0.005 0.433
Debt to asset ratio  -0.012    0.783 -0.015 0.728 -0.015 0.717  -0.012 0.783
Stock price volatility  -0.523    < 0.001 -0.512  < 0.001 -0.526  < 0.000  -0.523  < 0.000
    
R
2  0.1340 0.1355 0.1306 0.1340 




Table 5.3.11. Firm performance, company max and median centrality, and CEO total network 
centrality 
 
This table examines the relation between the return on assets and company maximum and median indirect centrality measures 
(in total network). 
 
  Dependent variable: Return on assets    
        
        
 1  2  3  4 
  Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  15.993   0.003 21.533  <  0.001 15.9766 0.004  17.7424  <  0.001
          
Centrality    
Company max (n) closeness  52.081   0.064  
Company max (n) betweenness   5.875  0.23  
Company median (n) closeness   52.189  0.063 
Company median (n) betweenness     311.986 <  0.001
    
CEO characteristics    
Tenure (months)  0.197   0.214 0.189  0.234 0.197 0.214 0.256 0.100
    
Ownership concentration    
CEO stock holdings  -0.006    0.958 -0.011 0.922 -0.006 0.958  -0.007 0.954
Executive directors. stock holdings  -0.034    0.758 -0.029 0.792 -0.034 0.758 0.024 0.821
Non-executive dir. stock holdings  -0.117    0.236 -0.125 0.205 -0.117 0.236  -0.100 0.303
Nominee account block holdings  0.127   0.217 0.131  0.206 0.127 0.217 0.117 0.247
Institutional investors’ block holdings  0.039   0.384 0.040  0.367 0.039 0.384 0.051 0.246
Individuals and families’ block holdings  -0.012    0.937 0.040 0.367 -0.012 0.937 0.051 0.246
Corporations’ block holdings  0.039   0.538 0.035  0.579 0.039 0.538 0.028 0.653
    
Firm size, Capital structure and risk    
Total assets  -0.006    0.377 -0.006 0.387 -0.006 0.377  -0.006 0.362
Debt to asset ratio  -0.029    0.494 -0.033 0.435 -0.029 0.494  -0.037 0.376
Stock price volatility  -0.511    < 0.001 -0.509  < 0.001 -0.511  < 0.001  -0.487  < 0.001
    
R
2  0.1640 0.1621 0.1640 0.1950 
N  894 894 894 894 
 
 